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2Abstract
The fall of the Berlin Wall opened the way for a reform path – the transition process – which
accompanied ten former Socialist countries in Central and South Eastern Europe to knock at
the EU doors. By the way, at the time of the EU membership several economic and structural
weaknesses remained, due to the limited ability of the fast introduced policies to address the
socio-economic and historical peculiarities of the “beneficiaries”. Thus, after more than 20
years from the beginning of transition, a tendency towards convergence between the new
Member States (NMS) and the EU average income level is evidenced, together with a spread of
inequality at the sub-regional level, mainly driven by the backwardness of the agricultural and
rural areas, which still host the highest percentage of poor people.
In the last decade, several progresses were made in evaluating the development policies for
rural areas, but a shared definition of rurality is still missing. Numerous indicators were
calculated for assessing the effectiveness of the Common Agricultural Policy and Rural
Development Policies, and their role on the convergence process of the EU members. Previous
analysis on several case studies from Central and Eastern European countries (CEEc)
highlighted the limited knowledge of the local reality in the areas for which the intervention was
designed. The characteristics of the most backward areas were insufficiently addressed by the
policies enacted; the low data availability and accountability at a sub-regional level, and the
deficiencies in institutional planning and implementation represented an obstacle for targeting
policies and payments.
This study provides a methodological contribution to the identification of rural areas and the
analysis of the changes occurred during the EU membership in Hungary, assessing the effect of
CAP introduction and its contribution to the convergence of agricultural and rural counties in
Hungary. This country has been chosen as a case study from the CEEc because it was
considered by the international financial institutions in the late 1990s one of the best
performers in the transition process.
The persisting lacks in time series availability for agricultural and rural areas at a
disaggregated level (NUTS 3) determined the choice for explorative techniques belonging to
multivariate statistics and spatial econometrics. A mixed methodological approach is applied to
a set of relevant variables, chosen coherently with the EU Common Monitoring and Evaluation
Framework, with the last findings on the determinants of wealth gaps among the EU regions,
and with the new CAP orientation towards  diversification and environment sustainability.
Therefore, the next pages aim at providing a basis for understanding the connections between
the peculiarities of the transition process, the current development performance of NMS and the
role of the EU contribution, with particular attention to the agricultural and rural areas. The
attention should be focused on the introduction of timely monitoring and evaluation
instruments, and on the need for data validation and analysis, in order to make policy work
better. More targeted – and therefore efficient – policies for agricultural and rural areas
require a deeper knowledge of their structural and dynamic characteristics.
3To Alessandro, for all the reasons which lead us to happiness.
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7INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
“People respond to incentives”
S. Landsburg, 1993
“I am a child of two epochs. One man inside me understood something and the
other shouted something completely different”
N. S. Khrushchev to the poet E. A. Evtušcenko, 1971.
Two decades passed since the beginning of the transition process in the former Soviet
Union and in the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEc), which slowly moved
towards the European Union (EU) home. Several analyses were devoted to understand
the characteristics of transition in the different economic fields; a work they fast
realized was harder than thought. In fact, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Western
analysts knew very little about how the former Communist system worked, and simply
looking at the previous statistical accounts couldn’t help, due to the different accounting
system used and the numerous distortions which characterized all the sectors. Thus, the
first attempts to build up consistent time series and to reconcile the economic accounts
were much demanding and quite unsuccessful. At the same time, transition started and it
required to be governed. Therefore, even in the absence of clear ideas on the initial
economic situation, analysts preferred to opt for the usual growth models and recipes. In
fact, their studies, often based on hypothesis on the current socio-economic conditions,
represented the base for the introduction of corrective public and international economic
policies, supported by well-known International Organizations (IMF; WB; EC, EBRD).
More or less successful macro and microeconomic theories were adapted from
developing countries (Easterly, 2002) to meet the policy needs in transition countries.
By the way, low consideration was devoted to the fact that countries classified as “in
transition”  differed  from  other  countries  with  a  similar  per  capita  income,  as  they
usually presented a larger share of their workforce in heavy industry, a system of
extensive infrastructure, mostly skilled and alphabetized population (Gros et al., 2004).
Later on, a distinction emerged also within transition countries,  mainly on the base of
the “software” required by the market economy. In fact, some CEEc introduced fast and
quite successful reforming policies which resulted in the EU membership in 2004 and
2007. At the opposite, the former Soviet Union1 and South-eastern European countries
(SEE)2 adopted a slower and uncertain reform path, and are still lagging behind.
1 The Former Soviet Union is composed by the 15 independent states that seceded from the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics in its dissolution in December 1991: Armenia; Azerbaijan; Belarus; Estonia;
Georgia; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Latvia; Lithuania; Moldova; Russia; Tajikistan; Turkmenistan;
Ukraine; Uzbekistan. In this work the FSU excludes the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania),
included instead in the EU new Member States since they joined the EU in 2004.
2 They includes the Western Balkans (Albania and the former Yugoslavia, excluding Slovenia), plus
Romania and Bulgaria. These two countries joined the EU in 2007, thus they are considered in the NMS.
8The  beginning  of  the  transition  process  raised  the  issue  of  the  optimal  speed  of
transition – i.e. the speed of the reforms to be introduced, but fewer words were spent
about their quality. Two alternative approaches emerged: big bang versus gradualism
(Sachs et al., 1994; Roland, 2000). The reform path should have been not too slow in
order to free resources for the growth of the private sector, to arrange wages claims on
unemployment, to stimulate investment through increased productivity, but neither too
fast, because of the risk of social unrest and political backlashes of reformers (Rodrik,
1995). The unemployment level, which was widely underestimated at the beginning of
the transition process, became the indicator of the speed of transition (McAuley, 1991;
Macours et al., 2000; Boeri, 2000). As a difference from the agricultural and rural areas,
where open unemployment turned into under-employment in the primary sector,
preventing from restructuring and the reach of labour productivity gains. In fact, if the
growth of unemployment level mirrors the speed of transition, the change in agricultural
productivity can be considered as an indicator of the “quality” of transition.
Studies on agricultural transition were provided only later on, and they highlighted the
important  contribution  of  agricultural  and  rural  areas,  and  their  peculiar  reforming
policies, in shaping the path for change (Swinnen et al., 2006). Instead, as evidenced by
the classic economic theory (Lewis, 1954; Kutznet, 1963; Rostow, 1960) the reform of
the agricultural sector plays a main role for economic development, starting with land
division and the introduction of key property rights. The failure to address the
importance of agricultural reforms (which were often moved by political aims) by the
governments in transition countries first and the EU institutions later, contributed to
slower the development path, enhancing the structural bottlenecks which still
characterize  agricultural  and  rural  areas  in  the  CEEc,  in  the  FSU  and  in  the  Western
Balkans (WBs).
Nowadays, in a fast moving world economy, post-transition economies tried to find out
their place, surviving economic and financial crisis (1998, 2008) and change in the
European and international scenario. In the last decade, ten countries from Central and
Southern Eastern Europe3,  the  EU new Member  States  (NMS),  signed  their  “return  to
Europe” with different fortune. At the same time, a renewed powerful role of a mostly
unequal Russia, as provider of gas and first raw materials and the difficult development
conditions of FSU, characterize the Eastern borders.
A long list of studies was produced in the last years, showing a fragile convergence path
of  the  (former)  transition  economies  with  the  Western  ones,  a  persisting  structural
fragility and a bump in socio-economic inequality. Something went wrong, and Boeri
and Terrel provide us some insight on the reasons:
“Studying the transition means analyzing the interactions between institutions and
structural change, a process we still now very little about” (Boeri et al., 2002).
3 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.
9Something was missed, while policies were drafted according to the common law of the
Washington Consensus, in a similar fashion for all the transition countries, not
considered in their geographical, historical and socio-economic peculiarities. And, as
results showed already after 10 years from the start of the transition process, the “block”
of  the  former  Communist  countries  turned  out  to  be  not  homogeneous  at  all,  and  the
policies enacted didn’t conduced to the expected results. This outcome was influenced
by the limited knowledge we had of those countries after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and
the difficulties to understand how the previous system worked. Reforming policy
making proceeded faster than the institutional and political rebuilding: was the time
right? The current socio-economic and financial reality of the FSU and the CEEc would
let us answer “no”. And the consequence followed.
Although the reforms introduced in transition countries were accompanied by
considerable flows of public and private investments, which culminated in the EU
structural, cohesion and CAP funds for the NMS, inequality spread within the countries,
determining winners and losers from transition (Iara et al., 2003; Csáki et al., 2010;
Lackenbauer, 2004; Nickel, 2005; Monasterolo, 2008).
Neither  the  accession  in  the  EU  was  able  to  reverse  the  partial  results  of  the  past
transition  policies,  and  to  open  the  way for  a  balanced  growth  path  based  on  targeted
policies. In fact, the last economic and financial crisis, with speculations attacking the
Hungarian forint at first, showed the fragility of CEEc economies, and the low
effectiveness of external (i.e. IMF) and internal (ECB) support.
Thus,  the  objective  of  the  following  pages  is  to  shed  some  light  on  the  connection
between the open issues emerged in the transition process and not addressed by the
policies introduced, either promoted by external experts or by national governments,
and the current development bottlenecks which affect CEEc. In particular, I will focus
on agriculture and rural development, highlighting their contribution to the
transformation process and their current importance, reassessed at the time of the EU
enlargement negotiates by the animated discussions on the CAP introduction and the
related budget redistribution issues). Moreover, the agricultural and rural areas are on
the international policy agenda due to their contribution to the current trans-national
challenges (climate change, production and consumption sustainability, trade distortion,
poverty alleviation and inequality).
Numerous studies about transition in agriculture evidenced the importance of the sector,
which often still represents the main income and occupation source in lagging behind
rural areas, and where food still constitutes the main voice of households’ income
spending. Agriculture represent a main issue both in the ongoing WTO negotiates, and
inside the EU, which has just launched the new regulation for the CAP after 2013 (EC,
2011). While the functioning of the agro-food (formal and informal) system is still very
cloudy in CSI, a deeper knowledge of the agricultural economy in the CEEc in the
transition  period  is  available.  In  the  NMS,  also  thanks  to  the  EU  membership
requirements, comparable statistical information on the state of agriculture and socio-
economic and demographic development and living conditions in rural areas are
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provided. By the way, several statistical limitations persist, especially when working
with  data  at  disaggregated  sub-regional  level  (i.e.  NUTS  3),  which  represents  serious
limits for in depth statistical and econometric analysis, as showed later on in this work.
“Knowledge evolves by comparing actual with expected outcomes and learning from
these deviations. It is easy to be wise after the events. It is more difficult to understand
why wrong predictions were made at the outset” (Boeri, 2011).
The citation above introduces another big issue addressed in the next pages: the role of
monitoring and evaluation, here applied to the policies for agricultural and rural areas in
the enlarged EU. The last years have seen several methodological and conceptual
improvements in the EU policy evaluation approach, for its contribution to
understanding why what we expected didn’t realize, and what lesson can we learn from
the past experience. Analysing the impact of economic phenomena requires a bunch of
collected data to be updated, accountable, comparable and available at the need. The
provision of preliminary “lessons learnt”, and the identification of “best practices” from
the previous transition and enlargement experience of the EU NMS could provide
useful insights for the introduction of corrective measures in periods of crisis.
Moreover, they can avoid repeating the same errors in the future, while the EU has kept
its doors open for the Western Balkans (WBs).
Although it is difficult - due to the structural break in the system change, and the limited
time series available – provide quantitative evaluations of the policies enacted in
transition, and tell out the impact of the wrong initial predictions determinant of the
success of transition, and policies enacted, it should be much easier to assess the impact
of the EU membership for the NMS. Instead, quite a decade after the completion of the
Acquis Communitaire, the evaluation of the introduction of agricultural and rural
development policy reforms in these countries is not uneven, nor in the method to use
(whose pros. and cons. will be explained later), neither in the outcomes. Among the few
certainties showed by the numbers, there is the spread of income (and development)
inequality both within the NMS and at the sub-regional level, and between the NMS and
the EU-15, both in expansive (1997-2006) and recession periods (after 2008). Inequality
grew at a slower pace, and a tendency towards convergence with the EU average
emerged in the pre-accession years (1998-2003), also thanks to the limited initial
dimensions of these economies. Instead, after the EU membership the convergence path
slowed down, and the NMS regions started to display divergence, mainly driven by the
lower  performance  of  agricultural  and  rural  areas,  which  still  suffered  from  structural
problems unsolved in transition. This provides a first evidence of the limited effect of
the EU Cohesion policy and CAP introduction in the NMS, and due to the lack of
targeting policies for the most in need areas, the limited institutional abilities in dealing
with project and funds management, and the low financial endowments which were not
able to reach a critical level.
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Hungary has been chosen as a case study from the CEEc due to its development path: in
fact, it was considered by the main international financial institutions (the World Bank
in primis) in the late 1990s one of the best transition performers, and it was among the
first six countries to start the accession negotiates with the EU. By the way, Hungary
was also among the first countries to be seriously hit by the last financial crisis, and it
still under the tight control of the IMF. Moreover, the country is atypical because, at the
time of the system change, already presented a kind of “stop-and-go” limited reform
process since 1968 (after the “Prague spring”), while the other countries had to start
from the basics. Thus, an in depth case study analysis is provided, enriched by the
experiences gathered in the region by the author.
Several topics are addressed: the analysis of the initial socio-economic scenario, the
characteristics of the reform path, the reforming policies introduced and the role of the
EU enlargement in meeting the remaining development goals, the current challenges.
Then, through qualitative and quantitative methodologies, these latter belonging to
multivariate statistics, spatial econometrics and non-parametric methodologies, an
analysis of the evolution of Hungarian agriculture and rural areas, identified through an
improved classification method, and the impact of the EU support on the characteristics
of rural areas is provided.
Chapter 1 begins with an analysis of the basic facts and results of transition economics:
the main approaches to policy reforms are introduced and explained, and the
macroeconomic results are analyzed in a comparative perspective between the CEEc
and the FSU. Then, a focus on agricultural economics follows: the structural changes
occurred in the transition process in agriculture and the differences in regional
performances are discussed. A particular attention is paid to the difficulties to compare
the statistical accounts calculated before the system change with those provided in the
transition period, due to their construction differences, and the need for data
reconciliation.
Moving from the results obtained by previous analysis on convergence in the enlarged
Europe, mainly conduced with the most used but severely limited parametric methods
(β and σ convergence) at the national or regional level, in chapter 2 the first attempt to
assess  convergence  in  p.c.  GDP  PPS  between  the  NMS  and  within  the  Hungarian
counties (NUTS 3 level) is provided. The choice to use the most disaggregated level of
data  for  which  a  time series  of  at  least  ten  years  was  available,  NUTS 3,  is  important
because it finally allows to compare the distribution of the development path of the sub-
regional units, from the signature of the EU pre-accession agreement until 2008, four
years after the EU accession. In fact, applying the Quah’s non-parametric approach of
convergence based on the stochastic kernel, it is possible to evidence the evolution of
the growth distribution followed by the statistical units, and map them graphically. A
specification of the same methodological approach allows us to analyse the conditioning
role of a variable on the evolution of the distribution of the p.c.  GDP PPS, and on the
convergence path. Accordingly, the first non parametric analysis of p.c. income
convergence conditioned to the CAP direct payments for the first years available (2004-
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2008) is provided for the Hungarian counties (NUTS 3 level), in order to assess whether
the CAP funds conditioned the convergence of Hungarian rural and urban areas. The
results are commented also looking at the correlation analysis on the characteristics of
the successful SAPS applications and their beneficiaries. Being agricultural labour
productivity addressed as a main indicator for the sector performance in the CEEc, and
an important objective and the main voice of expenditures for the CAP, an analysis of
its evolution in the Hungarian counties since 2000 is provided. Due to the lack of time
series for the variables which compose a suitable indicator for agricultural labour
productivity, a sigma convergence method is applied.
Chapter 3 provides an overview on the main issues which characterized the important
CAP reforms occurred since 1992 and the new regulations launched in October, 2011
for the next programming period 2014-2020. The main positions behind the need for
such a CAP support and structure are discussed, with a particular attention to three
pressing problems: the persisting inappropriate calculation of farmers’ income, the need
for the identification of rural poverty and policy targeting, the dimensions of inequality
in the distribution of the CAP payments.
Chapters 4 and 5 provide evidence of the situation of the Hungarian agricultural and
rural areas. In Chapter 4, an overview on the changes which interested the Hungarian
agricultural sector in the long EU way is provided, and the problems unsolved in the
transition process are highlighted. The challenges represented by the CAP introduction
in  the  country  are  explained,  together  with  the  rationale  and  the  characteristics  of  the
EU measures and instruments for agricultural and rural areas in the NMS.
Chapter 5 analyzes the changes occurred in the Hungarian rural areas during the EU
membership, drafting a preliminary evaluation. In order to do so, the evolution occurred
in the concept of rural areas is explained, and the main issues linked to rural
development statistics for policy monitoring and evaluation are highlighted. Then, after
an overview on the most used methodologies to classify rural areas, a new mixed (quali-
quantitative) methodological approach, based on a multidimensional dataset of timely
updated official variables and indicators, is introduced and applied to the analysis of the
Hungarian counties, before (2003) and after (2007) the EU membership. The analysis is
conduced through an explorative application of multivariate statistics methods and
backward econometric models.
The conclusions draws some lessons learnt from the Hungarian accession experience of
agricultural and rural areas, for improving the quality of the current EU evaluation
framework for agricultural and rural development policy, and for the preparation of the
future  EU  enlargement  to  the  WBs  (starting  with  Croatia,  which  will  join  the  EU  in
2013). The focus is set on the importance of tailoring statistical information and
targeting policies to the area specificities, in order to prevent the insurgence of
backlashes from development. This point comes together with the need for more
transparency within the CAP at all the policy stages (from decision making to data
collection and policy evaluation), which could represent a real turning point for drafting
a CAP reform finally aimed at the sustainable development of agricultural and rural
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areas, based on a proper theoretical framework and policy evaluation instruments.
Under this perspective, a serious obstacle for assessing the CAP impact on agricultural
and rural areas is caused by the persisting lack of disaggregated data available from the
national paying agencies at the regional and sub-regional level, on farms performances
and on agricultural households’ incomes.
As final remarks, some considerations on the current pressing challenges which interest
agricultural and rural areas – sustainability in food production and public goods
preservation against climate change, the redefinition of the peri-urban and rural
geography, the increasing citizens’ demand for public goods preservation and the new
producers-consumers partnership in the short food chain– area provided.
This work, in the shape and content presented here, draw on the experience gathered by
the  author  in  several  CEEc  and  The  WBs  (Estonia,  Hungary,  Romania  and  Serbia
among the others). Therefore, it would not have been possible without the useful
comments and suggestions received from academics, researchers and friends such as
Prof. Natalija Bogdanov, Prof. Csaba Csáki, Dr. Tamás Mizik, Dr. Attila Jambor, Prof.
Giovanni Anania, and the European Rural Development Network (ERDN) group. A
couple of people deserve mention in particular: Prof. Roberto Fanfani, Prof. Mario
Mazzocchi and Prof. Cristina Brasili. I would also like to thank Francesco Pagliacci and
Federica Benni for their advices and fruitful collaborations.
I am particularly grateful to Claudio and Domenico, and to my friends Eleonora,
Manuela, Simona, Peter, Alberto, Stefano, which shared with me important steps in the
development of this project, always supporting me.
I alone am responsible for the results and views expressed here.
Bologna, April 15th, 2012.
14
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ALP: Agricultural Labour Productivity
AWU: Annual Working Unit
CAP: Common Agricultural Policy
CEEc: Central and Eastern European countries
CIS: Common Independent States
CMEF: Common Monitoring Evaluation Framework
CMO: Common Market Organization
COMECON: Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CSF: Common Strategic Framework
DG Agri: Director-General for Agriculture and Rural Development
EAFRD: European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development
EBRD: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ECB: European Central Bank
ERDN: European Rural Development Network
ESF: European Social Fund
EU: European Union
FAO: Food and Agricultural Organization
FSU: Former Soviet Union
GAO: Gross Agricultural Output
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
HCSO: Hungarian Central Statistical Office
ILO: international Labour Organization
IMF: International Monetary Found
MPS: Material Production System
NMS: New Member States
OST: Optimal Speed of Transition
RD: Rural Development
RDP: Rural Development Policy
RDPs: Rural Development Programs
SAPS: Single Area Payment Scheme
SEE: South and Eastern Europe
SFP: Single Farm Payment
SMEs: Small and Medium Enterprises
SNA: System of National Accounts
SOEs: State Owned Enterprises






UNDERSTANDING THE NEED FOR POLICY REFORMS IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES:
CLASSICAL GROWTH MODELS VERSUS THE TRANSITION EXPERIENCE
1.1 The political economy of transition: out from the neoclassic model
The rise and fall of centrally planned economies probably constitute not only one
of the greatest events of the XXth century
but also one of the most important failed experiments in human history
Roland, 2000.
The 20th century was characterized by the dichotomy between two main models of
development: the capitalist one, based on market economy and its connected
institutions, and the socialist one, organized around the role and powers of the Party and
the Central Planner, and the state ownership of production structures. Their application,
in the respective countries of influence, determined the development of specific socio-
economic and political features. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, which represented the
collapse of the socialist  alternative,  a process of transition from a planned to a market
economy started in the countries previously under the control of U.R.S.S, as well as in
the ex-Yugoslavia and in Albania. Instead, in China the Communist Party started
reforming the economy already since 1978, with the decollectivization of agriculture,
the introduction of the Households Responsibility System and the price reform, while
leaving the role of the political institutions unchanged (Swinnen et al., 2006).
During the 1990s, the transition process was mainly considered as a matter of
economics (Kornai, 2008). Other issues, such as democratization and the need for a new
institutional setting, where advocated but quite marginalized in terms of analytical
strengths devoted to them. Just after the negative results obtained at the end of the
1990s (as the financial crisis which affected Russia, the FSU and CEEc in 1998), the
importance of institutional transformation was asserted. Western analysts often forgot,
because they were used to it, that the democratic and market institutions were absent in
transition countries. The FSU and the CEEc had to reintroduce or, in some cases, to set
up from the beginning, the institutions of democracy and governance (new executive,
legislative and judiciary branches of government), freedom of speech and its
instruments (press, TV, radio, religion, civil society), new social norms and values, and
the openness to private entrepreneurship. In a few words, a new social contract between
a young State and the citizens. The state was in charge of promoting the creation of high
quality institutions to support the introduction of a competitive institutional framework,
which would have allowed a well functioning and inclusive market economy (Nickel,
2005). In fact, in absence of adequate institutions incentives would not work, or even
generate perverse effects (Rodrik, 2000). Moreover, the process of transition
highlighted the importance of a dynamic adaptation of capitalism institutions, and their
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complementarities in creating and supporting the momentum for reforms. Instead, the
main initial stated objective was the introduction of market economy, in order to bring
transition countries to levels of prosperity comparable with the Western ones. The
policies and interventions proposed, rooted on neo-classical theoretical foundation,
aimed at prompting the “catching up” of the former planned economies, in a similar
fashion to the development programs proposed by the First World aid donors for low
income countries (Easterly, 2002). A specific set of ten economic policy prescriptions to
constitute a "standard" reform package for transition countries (Table 1.1.1) where
already in the first two years of transition, reforms implementation prevails over their
preparation.
Table 1.1.1: Washington Consensus: reform policies
Policy type 1-2 years 2-5 years 5+ years
Macroeconomic stabilization implementation continuation continuation
Price and market reform implementation continuation continuation
Trade liberalization implementation continuation continuation
Labour market reform preparation implementation continuation
Financial reform preparation implementation continuation
Small privatization implementation implementation continuation
Private sector development implementation implementation continuation
Large privatization preparation implementation continuation
Legal (tax, property rights) implementation continuation continuation
Institutional reforms implementation implementation implementation
Unemployment insurance implementation continuation continuation
Source: adapted from Fischer et al., 1991
The task was hard, due to the number of people interested (quite 900 millions, that
becomes 1.7 billions if we include China, accounting for the estimate errors which
affect the Chinese data, Swinnen et al., 2006) and the low knowledge that analysts and
experts had, at that time, of the economies in transition. In fact, official statistics were
difficult  to  be  gathered  and  compared,  due  to  the  closeness  of  the  former  Communist
economies, and the different accounting system used for the main indicators (i.e. NMP
instead of GDP). Nevertheless, at the turn of transition, the question for Western experts
was not whether to embrace the market economy, but how to reach it. As Blanchard,
Froot and Sachs (1994) explicit, “arguments ranged from the timing of stabilization, the
speed of price liberalization, the design of privatization”.
How the radical transformation should look like? What to design and how to implement
it, in a panorama characterized by strong faith in the change and much uncertainty?
In order to answer these questions, an extensive literature was produced about the
characteristics of transition, accompanied by a kit of “ad hoc” models to explain the
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movement of the main structural variables (GDP, unemployment, wages,...) and
consumers’ behaviour in transition.
Box 1: How the socialist system looked like
One of the main economists and intellectuals which widely described how the socialist
system was organized is Janos Kornai. In the figure below, he describes the main line of
causality in a positive rather than normative way. It includes some of the most important
phenomena, and it has to be read from the left to the right. According to Kornai, the key
of system understanding lies in the political structure. In fact, the turning point is
represented by the undivided political power of the Communist party (where the
presence of opposition parties was just a pro-forma): it is the Party’s ideology that
determines and imposes the property form, which contributes to the spread of
bureaucracy, and to the formation of a certain citizens’ behaviour. A good example is
represented by the role played by the Chinese Party, even in the transition process.
All the blocks are directly or indirectly linked, because the different phenomena they
represent are all mutually influenced. Thus, components of block 4 (plan bargaining,
soft budget constraints), which represent actors’ motivations, are not only explained by
the preponderance of bureaucratic coordination (block 3), but also by the dominance of
state ownership and by the official ideology. The main ideology and the dominance of
state ownership could not be enforced without a pervasive bureaucratic coordination
mechanism, which constitutes the hearth of the preservation of the system (even if it
varied from country to country).
Figure 1.1.1 Explaining the Socialist structure
Accordingly, the three necessary and sufficient conditions (to be present at the same
time) identified by Kornai for assessing that a country embraced a socialist system, are:
- the political monopoly of the ideology of the Marxist-Leninist Communist party,
which shapes the introduction of the following two ones;
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- the dominant role of public ownership (with just few and marginal forms of private
ownerships allowed, i.e. in agriculture);
- the presence of a pervasive centrally directed bureaucratic coordination system.
From these three features, other secondary traits can develop, which vary according to
country specific implementation of the official ideology.
Count Sergei Witte, a prominent reformer under the Czars, used to say that there were
two essential elements for radical reforms in Russia: absolute monarchy, because you
need not pay attention to your critics if His Majesty supported you, and speed, because
somebody might persuade the Czar to change his mind before the reform could be made
irreversible.
The most of the models proposed in the 1990s explains the process of change looking at
the “optimal speed of transition”, from here OST (WB, 1997). In fact, political economy
arguments, such as privatization of state owned enterprises, the macroeconomic
stabilization and trade opening, were at the centre of discussions about the speed and
sequencing of reforms. Two main approaches emerged: big bang versus gradualism
(Sachs et al., 1994; Roland, 2000; Svejnar, 1989). Supporters of the former one defined
the process as a “window of opportunity”, thus advocating governments to fast adopt
and implement reforms (Lipton and Sachs, 1990; Balcerowicz, 1995; Blanchard, 1997).
The “period of exceptional policy” introduced by the change towards democracy was to
exploit in order to create irreversibility for these reforms (Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny,
1996; Roland, 2000). Przeworski (1991; 1995), in praise of a fast transition, evidenced
the possible insurgence of citizens’ tiredness of reforms:
“While a gradualist approach may cause lesser social tensions, a long period of
moderate reforms entails the danger that both reformers and the population will
‘become tired of reforms’ as they do not seem to bring visible changes… and various
anti-reform and other lobbies may mobilize their forces and may gradually strangle the
reform process”.
The speed was the essence, while the quality and coherence of reforms came behind. At
the opposite, supporters of the gradualist approach highlighted the importance of
planning reforms following a precise sequencing, because proper initial reforms could
pave  the  way  for  a  successful  development  path  (Dewatripont  et  al.,  1992).  Some
examples can be found in the Chinese case study: in fact, the Chinese decollectivization
in 1978 resulted the biggest poverty reduction program ever introduced (Rozelle, 1996).
There is an extensive political economy literature it is the idea that a deep crisis is the
propeller of reforms (Rodrik, 1996), because in this case the government is not keen to
interest groups anymore, if it wants to survive. Some analysts see in the deterioration of
economic conditions the chance for a political change, in order to reach better economic
performance (Krueger, 1993). By the way, the introduction of reforms despite interest
groups,  rather  than  because  of  them,  points  out  the  problem of  their  short  term costs.
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When  are  reforms  sustainable?  Rodrik  asserts  that  reforms  are  sustainable  when  they
generate winners, which are interested in continuing them. At the same time, reforms
imply a J-curve (Piñera, 1994), because the effect of economic reform on growth is
negative in the short run, thus creating a key political problem of how to support reform
programs  (Bresser  Pereira  et  al.,  1993).  The  counterfactual  of  “no  reforms”  performs
even  worse,  while  data  shows  that  in  the  long  run  reform  policies  start  to  work.  The
experience of the CEEc compared to the FSU confirms it: reforming countries, such as
the Visegrad group (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia), experienced
short term costs (and the rise of internal opposition) but the reforms enhanced reduced
them, as a difference with the slower/no reforming FSU (Table 1.1.2).
Reforms have distributional effects, with the emergence of winners and losers, and in
transition countries this truth was accompanied by the spread of interregional income
and living conditions inequality (Heidenreich et al., 2008). A reforming government is
the key: foreign aids can support governments to survive in the short term, but a change
in policy must be introduced in order to allow aids to help (Sachs, in Williamson, 1994).
Table 1.1.2: Reform in selected economies in transition
Country Average annual real GDP
change in the first 3 years of
transition











Sources: own elaborations on Rodrik (2006) and IMF (1994)
First year of reforms: 1990 for Poland and Hungary, 1991 for others (figures for Czech Republic refers to 1991 and
1992)
According to Blanchard (1997), a too fast or too slow process of restructuring (and
workers reallocation) in the public sector could prevent from reaching good final
results:  if  state  owned enterprises  (SOEs)  close  down too  fast,  then  new private  firms
find it hard to emerge, because of the fiscal cost of unemployment (i.e. the
unemployment benefits) they have to afford. Instead, if the process of privatization
moves too slowly, it decreases the incentives for private activities to enter the market. In
this case, no critical mass of unemployment is created (with the negative impact on
wages and labour productivity), and no benefits are introduced for the reforming
process. Thus, the restructuring of SOEs became the key of the OST, and transition was
meant as reallocation of workers from the public to the private sector.
Some variables, such as unemployment, output (fall), labour reallocation, and
investments, became the control variables of the process of restructuring of SOEs and
for the creation of new firms. Measures were proposed for governments in transition
countries to affect the pace of closing down of SOEs, by cutting down direct and
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indirect subsidies. Unemployment was expected to emerge, as a result of labour
reallocation from the declining public to the rising private sector, and new provisions
would have allowed voluntary quit and pre-pensioning. In the reality, different paths of
restructuring  were  followed  by  the  CEEc  and  the  FSU,  according  to  the  speed  of  the
reforms enacted, the relevance of the by-side policy instances and the political trade-off
emerged in introducing reforms.
Several models tried to define the optimal transition path and its determinants, moving
away from the neoclassical growth models, opting for a partial equilibrium approach
(Aghion et al., 1994, Blanchard, 1997), with some relevant exceptions (i.e. the general
equilibrium model by Castanheira and Roland, 1998). They originated numerous
structural assumptions, from which it is hard to define the role of single market
imperfections, or the contribution of single factors.
By the way, when planning transition interventions, experts often looked at the
experiences of the pro-market policies introduced in developing countries since the
1950s. Neoclassical political economy arguments, referring to the so-called Washington
Consensus, were used to support policy introduction and explain the different economic
performance across transition countries (Roland, 2000), namely between the CEEc and
the FSU.
Three main steps shaped the process of economic transition (Blanchard, 1997):
1. Price liberalization: prices for consumers and producers goods which were
formerly fixed by the state via the central authority, start to follow the
market (demand-supply principles), in order to guarantee market
equilibrium.
2. Institutional reforms: the existing institutions are reformed (privatizing state
enterprises, reorganizing the State administration, new tax system) and new
institutions introduced (stock exchanges, investment and pension funds,
unemployment offices).
3. Macroeconomic control: market institutions need to be introduced in order
to control public economy, to limit public deficit and fast rising inflation.
Main interventions relate to the introduction of hard budget constraints for
the remaining public companies, the increase in direct and indirect taxation
(and the introduction of a fiscal authority), cuts in public spending and the
increase in interest rates.
Price liberalization was inevitable, because in a market economy the information about
the optimal allocation of resources, according to consumers and producers’ marginal
utility and costs, is showed by prices. At this regard, Hayek (1945) pointed out the
informational limitations which characterize the plan: in fact, in the former planned
economies  the  Central  Planner  was  in  charge  of  setting  the  prices,  which  were  often
established  arbitrarily,  distorting  the  economy.  As  a  difference  from  the  market
economy, the objectives of the Party were far away from the “social optimum”, and
from the maximization of consumers and producers utilities.
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The following equation
Total income = (consumers’ willingness to pay – price paid by consumers) + (price
received by producers – producers’ costs)
was widely unattended, and the plan didn’t maximize the total economic income (in
GDP). Then, the planned system was characterized by several negative externalities,
such as corruption, bureaucratization, and several distortions on production (as the soft
budget constraints, labour hoarding) which induced the presence of perverse incentives
for the economic agents. And incentives mattered, as demonstrated by the faster
recovery and better current performance of the CEEc, which were offered the
perspective to join the EU, as a difference with the FSU. Here, after price liberalization,
the expected growth results from privatization didn’t occur, because the incentives of
privatized enterprises to produce were still far from profit maximization, being
accustomed to the old soft budget constraint scheme. Thus, profit becomes the variable
to maximize, according to the market requests (demand/supply equilibrium).
Among the institutional reforms, privatization of the former SOEs and activities played
a main role in setting the basis for future productivity and growth, and in generating
revenues for the State. Privatization in the FSU and in the CEEc wasn’t only about
selling State production assets to private investors, which are allowed to enter the
market after the previous liberalization. It also consisted of the conversion of an entire
production and workers’ attitude system. In fact, under the plan the SOEs had different
objectives than the Western ones: they were politicized and they aimed at maintaining
high employment while keeping prices below the average cost. As a difference from
Western economies, where state ownership occurs mainly because of market failures
(i.e. natural monopoly), in transition economies the market structures are highly
imperfect because of the large firm bias of the Central Planner. Moreover, the soft
budget constraint created disincentives to the SOE workers and managers (perks, job
security, and managerial power). In this scenario, rapid privatization was important in
order to prevent the insurgence of asset stripping (via legal and illegal means) from the
former SOEs workers and management, and make reform irreversible through the
creation of a group of winners (Balcerowitz, 1994).
In the FSU and in the CEEc, three main privatization methods were adopted:
· auctions, which often favoured foreigners due to the small domestic saving stock
(in  comparison  with  the  huge  stock  of  state  owned  capital  assets).  A  good
example is Hungary, where foreign investors could acquire large shares of
capital assets;
· restitution  of  the  pre-communist  private  capital  (it  doesn’t  apply  to  the  assets
generated under Communism), which mainly occurred in the CEEc. In some
cases (i.e. agricultural privatization in Hungary) it didn’t contribute to reach
productivity results nor to create clear property rights;
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· mass privatization through vouchers, which allows the people to buy state assets.
This last solution was often preferred because of its speed, and for an equity reason, in
order to avoid the concentration of gains in few winners (i.e. the nomenclature) during
the fast privatization, giving purchase power to the population, and guaranteeing a
second trade by investment funds. By the way, mass privatization through vouchers
presented several problems linked to the eligibility (who should get the vouchers), their
use and their trading, and the creation of dispersed ownership. In Russia, vouchers
could be exchanged directly for shares in companies; in Czech Republic, financial
intermediaries controlled the majority of shares, and the delays in reforming the banking
sector made such a privatization costly; in Poland vouchers were exchanged for shares
in government created funds. The mechanism of trading was very different in the
interested Countries: it was computerized in Czech Republic, while in Russia the
company board could choose, giving financial incentives for managers-workers buyout.
Most important, mass privatization was an endogenous process, guided by workers
councils in Poland, and internal managers/oligarchs in Russia, which opted for
managers-employee buyouts, according to their direct interests.
Privatization in Hungary occurred mainly through assets auctioned off to foreign
investors, the rest being owned by insiders, while in the former Czechoslovakia the
SOEs were privatized to strategic investors (i.e. Skoda to Volkswagen). Instead, in
Russia and in the most of the FSU, the assets were mainly owned by insiders (workers
and managers).
As a consequence of the difficulties to liberalize prices and privatize the SOEs, also the
macroeconomic system didn’t stabilize. In particular, the initial surge in inflation was
attributed mostly to the price adjustment occurred after the price and exchange rate
liberalization, and to the weak current monetary and fiscal control. While inflation at
consumer price level declined in the CEEc, it remained at high (3 digit) levels in the
FSU and Russia in the first years, because the persistence of the rouble zone until the
end of 1993 prevented them to pursue truly independent monetary policy (Dąbrowski,
1997). In fact, right after the system change, the most of the ex Soviet Republics (except
the Baltic countries) continued to use the rouble as common currency, without referring
to a common Central Bank anymore. Moreover, the weak institutional environment
didn’t help in the fight against inflation but it created a temptation to moral hazard
behaviours, i.e. conducting expansionary monetary policies (Dąbrowski, 1999), and
retarding the introduction of proper fiscal policies, preventing from the decrease in
public debt. In 1992, the median inflation rate was nearly 100 percent in the CEEc, and
well over 1 000 percent and rising in the Baltic countries, Russia, and other countries of
the FSU (IMF, 1994). After the end of the rouble, inflation slightly declined in Russia,
but it jumped again during the financial crisis in 1998 and 1999 (Table 1.1.3).
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1.2 Beyond the numbers of economic transition
After the beginning of the transition process, output fell everywhere in the interested
countries, but at a different pace. The CEEc experienced a U-shape pattern of GDP and
employment, and high employment to output elasticity: GDP fell sharply and recovered
consistently during the 1990s, and the pre-transition level was reached just at the end of
that decade. Instead, employment experienced a more gradual fall and recovery path.
Consequently, labour productivity recorded a lower decline, and recovered fast. Instead,
the FSU showed a L-shape pattern of GDP and employment, with a low responsiveness
of employment to output: GDP declined sharply and then remained lagging behind,
while employment declined much slowly, determining a huge decrease in labour
productivity and real wages, low unemployment and low labour reallocation.
We must keep in mind that the lack of proper statistical information on the pre-reforms
period  could  determine  the  over  or  underestimation  of  the  GDP  and  employment  fall
(i.e. for unemployment rates in Ukraine, where no surveys were available)4.
The different GDP-employment pattern followed by the two groups of countries is
showed by Figure 1.2.1 For the CEEc, employment followed the fall-and-recovery
pattern of GDP (both reach 85% of their pre-transition value), while in the FSU
employment declined slowly, and GDP collapsed (50% of the original value). In fact,
the total employment-to-output elasticity was estimated to range between 0.2 and 0.8 in
the first years of reforms in the CEEc (Svejnar, 1999), but it is insignificant in the FSU.
It is interesting to note that, in the CEEc, only GDP returns to the pre-transition level
after 10 years of transition, while the other indicators lie well behind. Finally, the figure
also  shows  the  pattern  of  labour  productivity,  which  grows  during  the  years,  as  GDP
growth is much higher than the employment one, especially in the CEEc.
Employment was mainly concentrated in state large heavy industries, while
cooperatives dominated in agriculture (private small size initiative was tolerated for
agricultural  production  directed  to  self-consumption,  as  a  difference  with  the  ex-
Yugoslavia, where small plots of was distributed to private households by the State). A
centre-periphery development model prevailed during the former Communist period,
thus employment mainly concentrated in large urban agglomerates.
4 Few methodological contributions are provided on data reconciliation between the former planned
economic system and the transition periods, and it’ hard to deal with comparisons.
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Figure 1.2.1: Employment and output adjustment in East European Countries (CEEc)
and Former Soviet Union (FSU)
Note: Year of start of transition = 100. Start of transition: 1991 = 100 for FSU; 1989 = 100 for Poland; 1990 = 100
for all CEEc. GDP in 1995 U.S. dollars. Average employment in a year.
Source: EBRD, Transition Report (1995); Boeri et al., 2002.
The differences between the U-shaped and L-shaped path in the CEEc and in the FSU
can be explained by several factors, connected to the magnitude and characteristics of
important variables (e.g. hidden unemployment, informal economy), the different
reforming strategies, the real wages adjustments in a period characterized by high
inflation rates (or hyperinflation), and the effects of the institutional determinants in
transition.
Labour market adjustment played a role in transition, especially with regard to job
creation and job destruction in transition. The way the process of churning (i.e. the
workers which reallocated from the declining sector to the rising ones) was enforced in
the CEEc and in the FSU had an important effect on the labour market adjustments. In
the CEEc, labour shedding from the public sector was consistent and caused increases
in labour productivity and wages recovery, thanks to the labour force which reallocated
in the private sector. Instead, in the FSU reforms lagged behind, and the labour market
was more “flexible”, allowing wages to fall down quickly. In the FSU, only an exiguous
share of the labour force reallocated, mainly young and well skilled people, while the
most of workers opted for keeping their job in the former SOEs, accepting lower wages.
Then, privatization often resulted in inside-privatization, benefiting ex-managers and
workers of state enterprises. Several reasons contributed to the choice to remain in the
former position. Workers had to face the general fall in living standard conditions and
the spread uncertainty about the future; the fear to loose the welfare provisions
(sanitation, pensions) which the SOEs offered in place of the state; the differences in
regional wages (higher in metropolitan areas than in the countryside). Then, political
pressures (Shleifer et al., 1994), the paternalistic behaviour of the management
(Autkutsionek et al., 1996), the high costs of lay-off (Garibaldi et al., 1998), and the
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attacks to firms reputation in case of lay-offs (Linz et al., 1998) contributed to maintain
the employment level (and labour hoarding) high in the FSU.
Although it was difficult, due to the lack of continuous data for the transition period,
and the heterogeneity of experiences in the CEEc and in the FSU, to define a model of
job creation (JC) and job destruction (JD), Lehman et al. defined the following:
Et-Et-1 = firms entering the market + expanding firms (hiring workers) - exit firms
(closing down, bankrupt) - contracting firms (firing workers).
It emerged that reallocation occurred inside the same sectors (job to job reallocation)
but from state to private firms, thus liberating (in a “creative destruction” perspective)
productive labour force and resources from the declining sector (Brown et al., 2001).
Brown and Earle tests whether job reallocation is enhancing productivity, as predicted
by the Schumpeterian theory, and they find strong positive association after the
beginning  of  the  reforms.  Moreover,  new  private  firms  showed  better  employment
performance than the privatized ones, with SMEs creating more jobs, unlike the
situation at that time in Western countries.
The high inflation rates experienced in transition pushed down real wages in the FSU,
especially between 1995 and 1998 (when wages decreased by three times): firms
opposed to wages indexation, and wage arrears were widely practiced by firms
experiencing liquidity problems, after the end of soft budget constraints. The role of the
informal sector which was higher in economic terms in the FSU than in the CEEc
(Khomenkho, 2007) also influenced that outcome.
In the CEEc, real wages fell promptly and then recovered slowly, reaching 83% of their
initial level in 1998 (Figure 1.2.2). Instead, they dramatically decreased in the FSU
(twice as much as in the CEEc), reaching 53% of their pre-transition value, slightly
recovering from 1997. Thus, “employment” was preserved but wages collapsed,
preventing restructuring.
26
Figure 1.2.2: Trend in real wages in the CEEc and in the FSU
Note: Start of transition = 100, adjusted by the Consumers Price Index
Start of transition: 1989 for Poland, 1990 for all the other CEEc (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Slovakia, Romania), which account for 93.5% of the GDP of CEEc. 1991 = 100 for the FSU
(Russia and Lithuania), accounting for the 69.5% of the total GDP of the FSU.
Source: Boeri et al., 2002
Another issue in labour market in transition countries is represented by self-
employment. Its trend can be explained by push and pull factors (Davis et al., 2000).
The former ones realize when an economic agent sees more income opportunities in
self-employment than in firms (both public or private) because of the higher human
capital and productivity. Instead, workers can be pushed in self-employment by the low
level of unemployment benefits (e.g. in Estonia), which make self-employment a less
unsure labour opportunity than going on the market.
By the way, both blocks of Countries experienced a pronunced increase in unemployed,
which was not allowed and thus officially “unknown” in the previous system, where
people were not allowed to be unemployed. In fact, the system promoted the presence of
“labour hoarding” (OECD, 1996), i.e. employment kept in excess of what needed to
reach a determined output. This form of hidden unemployment was estimated to range
between 30 and 60 per cent of state sector employment in the early 1990s which became
the alternative form of unemployment. Thus, unemployment was inevitable in
transition. In fact, it was expected that hardening the budget constraints of state firms,
the process of privatization and prices liberalization would determine an outflow of
workers from the dying public to the growing private sector, with the exit from the
public sector exceeding the entry in the private at the beginning (even if the magnitude
of the process was hard to define). Due to the fact that job destruction (from state firms)
would have been faster than job creation (in the private sector), the introduction of
unemployment subsidies was necessary together with new employment legislation,
coming at a cost, mainly for the new private firms. At this regard, Aghion et al. (1994)
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analyzed the issue represented by “fiscal externality” (i.e. the fiscal burden which
occurs in case of high unemployment) which could depress job creation in the young
private system. Fiscal externality is important because it allows for differential taxation
of public and private enterprises: higher taxation is assumed for the SOEs, while
(realistic) problems of tax collection are foreseen in the private sector.
A reversed U-shaped path was expected for the unemployment trend, which should
have been rising at the beginning of transition, and later on declining due to scale effects
in the private sector (i.e., unemployment is just determined by mechanical factors, no
economics intervenes).
It was demonstrated in the equation below (1) how overall unemployment can grow
(ΔU positive) even if the jobs created by the private sector are higher than the
employment shed from the public sector (Boeri, 2000).
ps EgEsOIU .. -=-=D                                          (1)
where s is  a  proportion  of  employment  in  state  enterprises  (Es), g are the new posts
created by the private sector (Ep) per any job existing at the beginning of the period.
This theory rooted on the assumption of fixed labour supply, which implies that people
can be employed (in public or private firms, Es or Ep) or unemployed (U), without
considering the possible outflow from the labour market
Therefore, unemployment composed the core of the optimal speed of transition and it
was influenced by the tightening of the budget constraints for the SOEs, by the
development of the private sector, and by the government and workers’ behaviour from
a macro and micro perspective.
The role played by workers is explained by the micro-foundations of these models, and
refers  to  the  presence  of  moral  hazards  and  to  adverse  selection  which  represent  two
sources of involuntary unemployment, because employers in the private sector set
wages at the efficiency level. In the case of high unemployment, workers’ behaviour is
analyzed as a determinant of the speed of transition. In fact, if unemployment increases
too much at the beginning of transition, and labour shedding to the private sector is
slow, workers will start opposing reforms (Blanchard, 1997).
The  dynamics  of  unemployment  are  presented  in  Table  1.2.1.  Unemployment  reached
its peak sooner in the CEEc (in average after 3-4 years from the start of transition,
except in Czech Republic), while it took longer in the FSU. As confirmatory of the
faster reform path followed by the CEEc, the average unemployment rate is much
higher in these Countries (from 13% in Poland and Slovakia to 4.7% in Czech
Republic) than in the FSU, where is stands around 2.4% (except in the Russian
Federation, where it stops at 7.2%). This difference can be explained by the faster
reform path followed by the CEEc, which introduced market liberalization, privatization
and labour market reforms at the beginning of the transition process, and the quality of
reforms implemented. For example, privatization in the CEEc was characterized by the
cession of former SOEs to foreign investors and by the inflow of FDI, while in the FSU
insider privatization prevailed.
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Table 1.2.1: Unemployment dynamics in transition
Country Level of first peak
in unempl. rate
Years from the









Czech Republic 9.4 9 26.8 4.7
Hungary 13.9 2 47.6 10.9
Poland 16.4 4 39.0 13.5
Romania 9.2 3 46.6 9.6
Slovenia 15.4 3 54.1 8.9
Slovak Republic 14.6 4 49.5 13.6
FSU
Russian Federation 13.3 7 32.0 7.2
Ukraine 4.3 8 n.a. 2.4
Belarus 3.9 5 n.a. 2.3
Kazakhstan 14 7 n.a. 2.5
Notes: the start of transition was in 1989 in Poland, in 1990 in the other CEEc, in 1991 in the FSU
Sources: column 1-3: EBRD (1998, 1999, 2000). Column 3-4: ILO statistical database.
Thus, job creation and job destruction represents a huge issue for transition. As noted by
Lehmann, changing the behaviour of workers and firms is a long-term process and most
of  the  NMS  have  spent  at  least  a  decade  before  the  EU  accession  improving  the
performance of their labour markets by reforming their institutions. Moreover, the
labour  market  reform is  a  fundamental  step  to  assure  a  smooth  transition.  In  fact,  the
reallocation of labour from declining to expanding firms and sectors contributes to
higher labour productivity levels in a genuine fashion (thus not only by labour shedding,
Rutkowski, 2007), and to the creation of new jobs, as in the case of the EU accession. In
the former planned economies, employment was mainly concentrated in heavy
industries, which were state owned. The production of services and consumers goods
was neglected, because supply didn’t arrange according to demand, as in a market
economy, and small and private business was not allowed (except in agriculture, e.g. in
Poland and Hungary). Thus, the transition process was characterized by the reformers’
ability to stimulate the reallocation of labour from state-owned and heavy industries to
the newly created private, small scale and consumers oriented business sector. In fact,
the different reform path which characterized the CEEc and the FSU is also reflected by
the change in relative importance of the main economic activities; the move from public
and cooperative to private ownership after privatization; the decline in firm size. The
change in employment from the agricultural to the industrial and services sector, and the
increase in private small size activities is therefore regarded as an evidence of reforms
in the decade 1989 -1998 in the CEEc and in the FSU (Table 1.2.2).
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Table 1.2.2: Structural change in employment
Note: “Agriculture” (first column) includes agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing. “Industry” (second
column) includes manufacturing, mining and quarrying, electricity, gas and water, construction.
“Services” (third column) includes finance, insurance, real estates and business services; community,
social and personal services; wholesale trade and transportation. Fifth column: the number for Slovakia
refers to 1997, the number for Romania to manufacturing only.
Sources: Boeri et al, 2002; first and third column OECD Short Term Economic Indicators for CEEc,
EBRD (1999) for FSU. Fourth column: WB (1998). Fifth column: EBRD (2000) and OECD (1999).
Sixth column: EBRD (1999). For Slovenia: Statistical office of Slovenia.
In Table 1.2.2 it is important to look both at the group aggregates, and at the
singularities between the two groups, because they shed the light on important country
peculiarities. In the CEEc, the fall of employment in industries (-10%) is replaced by
the increase (+10%) of the service sector, while agriculture shows a limited negative
trend (-0.4 %). If we look at the situation in the single countries, agriculture is the main
employment sector in Romania (12%), while it decreased the most in Hungary (-9%)
and in Czech Republic (-6.2%) in favour of services (respectively +15 and +12%). In
the FSU, the highest decrease in industrial employment happened in Ukraine and
Kazakhstan (quite -13%), together with a sustained increase in the service sector
(+10%) and agriculture (respectively + 2.3 and 3% circa). In Belarus, the decrease in
agricultural and industrial employment is compensated by the increase in the services.
The share of employment in the private sector in 1997 ranges between 80% in Hungary
and 52% in Ukraine, with employment in smaller firms (<100 employees) reaching 50%
in Hungary and just 13% in the Russian Federation, highlighting the not homogeneous
path of the change in firm ownership in the different interested countries. Non-
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agricultural self-employment is reported for few countries, and it ranges between 16%
in Poland and 1.4% in Ukraine.
Thus, Table 1.2.2 shows the need to consider transition countries not as a homogeneous
block, and the importance of the introduction of targeted policies in transition,
accounting for the structural economic peculiarities. This point was, as demonstrated
later on in this work, mostly neglected in the process of policy drafting and
implementation, and often led to the introduction of unsuccessful policies which even
worsened the conditions of the loosing areas from the transition process. This is the case
of agricultural and rural areas, where the highest poverty rate in the CEEc is located,
and the few past development promises were often unattended.
The role of reforming institutions in transition was later on studied as a determinant of
the (not so positive) results obtained in the first transition decade. In particular, the
following institutional features were examined: labour unions, fiscal policy (tax based
income policy), minimal wages and employment protection legislation.
Labour unions found it difficult to change their role in the reforming process. In the
former system they acted as a transmission belt from the Central Planner to the firm,
thus they were not prepared for the role of contracting wages and employees firing. As a
consequence, their membership decreased, as their presence in the coverage of
collective bargain (only 30% in Czech Republic and Hungary), while segmentation
among sectoral labour unions emerged. A tax based income policy was introduced in
order to slow down the increase in wages, but it had a limited effect, also due to the
difficulties in setting up a fiscal control authority, and in assuring its functioning (Boeri,
2000). Thus, they were often removed, as in Czech Republic in 1995, in the Slovakian
1996. Minimal wages were introduced, at different levels in the CEEc (quite 50% of the
average wage) and the FSU (25% circa in Russia). Minimal wages constituted the basis
for the calculation of other social benefices, but they were hard to enforce due to weak
institutional bargaining power and the lack of labour inspectors’ networking. Moreover,
the employment legislation was introduced, but its functioning was linked to the new
born courts and their capacity building.
The  duration  of  unemployment  benefits  and  their  level  (Boeri,  1997)  impacted  on  the
probability of finding a job, especially for the “hard to employ” population (older,
unskilled  people).  In  the  CEEc,  unemployment  benefits  were  higher  than  in  the  FSU
and more targeted to the lower end of the wage distribution.
The way these reforming policies were introduced contributed to determine different
levels of earnings and income inequality: in fact, the Gini index increased much more in
the FSU than in the CEEc, and Vodopivec (2004) mainly explains it with the role
played by unemployment benefits in containing inequality in the CEEc, where they
acted as a de facto minimal wages (Boeri, 1997).
While analyzing the previous tables and figure, we must remember the difficulties met
by economists in data analysis, given the lack of accountable and comparable data. In
fact, GDP decline was overestimated (EBRD, 1994), especially in the manufacturing
sector (which prevailed over agriculture and services in the planned economy) due to
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the difficulties in finding comparable data in transition, thus, analysts often used pre-
transition prices. The activities of new private small and medium enterprises were
imperfectly measured (often through energy consumption, as in Poland and Bulgaria,
where they resulted similar to the EU average). The measure of registered employment
in transition had low credibility, because it depended on the incentives to submit it, and
the household surveys were introduced just since 1992.
The numbers presented and explained in this chapter show clear differences in the path
followed and  in  the  performances  obtained  by  the  CEEc and  the  FSU.  Thus,  ten  year
after the beginning of the transition process, a preliminary assessment of the results was
provided (Stiglitz, 1999; Boeri, 2000), focusing on the reasons why the reform process
was not as successful as expected, and it even failed in several countries (i.e. Russia). In
particular, a clear reformers’ responsibility in the misunderstanding of the market
economy was recognized, because of their excessive reliance on neoclassical economic
models and their limited knowledge of the reality they where going to intervene, and a
general misunderstanding of the reform process, i.e. the importance of the pace and
sequencing of transition, and the underestimation of the political pressures. The role of
the institutional reforms (Boeri, 2000), the design of a new social contract able to gather
citizens’ support and commitment to reforms, and the introduction of a democratic
decision process were largely neglected by the promoters of transition reforms. A clear
example is provided by the way privatization was prompted and enforced, which in
most countries prevented a sound development of the private sector. In fact, the private
sector emerged mainly from fast and mass privatization, without the previous
introduction of an efficient legal framework (for bankruptcy, for the transfer of assets),
able to allow for the introduction of competition, and without the previous
establishment of a clear institutional context, which would generate confidence in
foreign investors in order to attract FDI. Moreover, in the reform process the initial
conditions were neglected, especially in the business sector, where the new managers
lacked the required expertise and were still linked to the old production model (where
ownership and control gathered in the same hand), while a new, decentralized model of
corporate governance was needed.
Therefore, in most cases privatization (as several other steps of the transition process)
has been an incentive for the creation and maintenance of private (internal and foreign)
interests, “the grabbing hand into the velvet glove” (Stiglitz, 1999).
1.3 Rising inequality in transition countries
The neo-classical adjustment policies provided to developing Countries stated that
economic growth matters, because income and poverty moves together. Thus, fast
growth was associated to fast poverty reduction, while increases in poverty levels were
acute in declining economies, such as the CEEc and Central Asia. Rising inequality, as
a consequence of a concentration of the new richness produced, was not contemplated.
Several studies published by the World Bank (Ravallion et al., 1997; Dollars et al.,
2000) on poverty reduction strategies, asserted that the measures of inequality would
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have showed no tendency to get better or worse as a consequence of economic growth:
thus, the rich and the poors’ incomes were to rise together. The evidence provided by
Russia, where the current economic growth based on the export of first raw materials
benefited only elites, reports a different story: Russia has become the most unequal
country in the world. In the last two decades, the example of transition countries shows
that even in periods of sustained economic growth income inequality can spread, and
poverty  can  increase  (Förster  et  al.,  1997).  Moreover,  rising  poverty  in  the  CEEc and
CIS in transition affected rural areas where between 25 and 33 percent of the population
was found to live below subsistence levels, based on expenditure measures5 (Davis,
2001).
In front of the evidence of rising income inequality in transition since the late 1980s
(Milanovic, 1989, Commander, 1997), policy makers in Washington took it for given,
considering it a price to be paid for sustained growth (Rosser et al., 2000). In fact, in the
excessive “equality” of the former Communist system, the right incentives for growth
would not have realized. How much inequality can a politically, socially and  economic
dismantled society can afford, before the end of social solidarity, the insurgence of
social discontent and turbulences, the increase in criminality and black economy, was
not contemplated. Indeed, transition countries show that fast increasing inequality is
accompanied by negative consequences in terms of poverty, living conditions and
public health, social capital and rule of law, mining the effectiveness of the reforms
introduced for development. Thus, transition countries moved soon from the “unjust
equality” to “just inequality” (Csepeli et al., 1992).
Another critical point, which was never considered before the transition experience, is
that high income inequality, where poverty spreads fast, could lead to increase the size
of underground and non observed economy.
Unofficial or hidden economy was already present in the former Communist period,
especially in the agricultural sector, due to the continuous shortages of basic goods on
the official market that people fought through barter. The size of underground economy
could vary considerably, due to the lack of a stated method to measure it6. Thus,
Milanovic (1998) found that in the CEEc underground economy was estimated to
account  for  10-15%  of  GDP,  but  in  ex-Yugloslavia  it  reached  also  50%  of  GDP.
Different levels are shown by Rosser et al. (2000), who found evidence for sixteen
transition countries for 1994 of a strong relation between the size of the underground
economy (in output produced) and the level of income inequality (measured by Gini
index), which are reported in Table 1.3.1.
5 Davis reports that, in expenditure measures, 10% of the population in transition countries is persistently
in extreme poverty, implying malnutrition and other poverty health-related problems (such as
alcoholism).
6 Analysts  tried  to  assess  the  share  of  underground  economy  in  transition  countries  in  several  ways,
according with the limited data available, mainly relying on households and firms electricity consumption
(Rosser et al., 2000a; Lackó, 2000; Johnson et al., 1997). Electricity consumption is taken as an index of
true economic output and compared with officially measured GDP to come up with an estimate of the
share of the informal sector.
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Table 1.3.1: Underground economy (UndEco) and Gini index in selected transition
countries
Country UndEco (%GDP) Variation UndEco Gini index Variation Gini
Bulgaria 29.4 6.7 .340 .110
Czech Rep. 17.2 11.2 .239 .035
Estonia 24.6 5.7 .329 .127
Georgia 62.2 37.7 .560 .270
Hungary 28.1 1.1 .243 .02
Russia 38.5 23.8 .446 .186
Slovakia 15.4 9.4 .200 0.0
Slovenia 25.0 -1.7 .251 .036
Source: Rosser et al., 2000
Variation for both underground economy and Gini index between 1989 and 1994.
The Gini index7 increased fast, and its coefficient moved from 25-28 in the pre-
transition level to 35-38 during the transition process. By the way, the level of
inequality captured by the Gini index is influenced by the low accountability of the
transition and pre-transition statistics, and to the unofficial income differences accorded
to members of the Party.
Slovakia, Slovenia and Czech Republic could avoid critical inequality levels during
transition thanks to the introduction of policies targeted to the old and new poor
(unemployment benefits, retraining courses, extension of social security and indirect
redistribution measures). It follows that these countries had smaller underground
economies and greater macroeconomic stability (to which higher tax revenues from
formal economy contributed) associated to lower Gini coefficient (0.200 for Slovakia,
0.251 for Slovenia and 0.239 for Czech Republic) in comparison with Russia and
Georgia (which show Gini coefficients respectively at 0.446 and 0.530). In particular,
Slovakia shows a null increase in the Gini index in transition, also thanks to the
governments policies which were able to offset the increasing wage dispersion (Garner
et al., 1998), as a difference from Russia, where wage dispersion was found as one of
the main determinants for inequality (Brainerd, 1998).
The increase in inequality was associated to the rising poverty (which was not reported
by the official data before the system change), caused by the macroeconomic
stabilization, the restriction of government expenditures, the trade and price
liberalization policies (especially on basic food products), the rise of unemployment, the
fall in real wages and the contemporary price volatility of most consumers goods
(Davis, 2001). Milanovic (1996; 1998) finds that there could be no trade off between
growth and equality in the transition process: the introduction of a proper set of targeted
reforming policies and sound institutions could promote a harmonic growth path.
Instead, pro-growth measures which don’t account for the distributional effects can
7 The Gini index ranges between zero (perfect equality) and 1 (maximum inequality). It presents an
overall picture of inequality but it is less effective at indicating what is happening at the extremes of the
distribution than such alternatives as the decile ratio, the Atkinson index or the Theil index.
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cause increase in inequality, which would finally hurt the growth path. Milanovic
mainly links the jump in income inequality to:
- the  diversification  of  wages  occurred  with  the  removal  of  restrictions  to  SOEs
privatization, as wages paid by the former public sector were less unequal and
diversified than the ones paid by the new private one, where several former
SOEs workers reallocated;
- the increased economic role of unofficial economy and self employment;
- the arbitrary distribution of former state properties.
It is clear that in a market economy, private firms pay wages to workers according to
their labour productivity, which was low during transition: workers needed retraining to
adapt to the new productive structure, for which their human capital and the former
technologies  they  used  were  often  obsolete,  in  order  to  be  competitive  on  the  internal
and international market. These workers are just a part of the story: in fact, with
privatization unemployment was finally disclosed, and lots of people lost their job and
the facilities linked to it (social security, health care), and their pensions. Thus, income
from wages in transition differs according to the new sectors and firms, to the
unemployment conditions (length, presence of unemployment subsidies and their levels,
social safety nets), to the presence of subsistence and out of the market activities, to the
possession and use (lease, rent) of former state properties.
The way privatization occurred represented a considerable source of income inequality:
- where give-away or mass privatization to former company managers occurred,
working places were saved in place of lower salaries, while from the new power
relation a class of young oligarchs emerged;
- where effective privatizations (mainly to foreign investors) took place,
unemployment rose.
Two main issues - the lack of targeted social transfers and the change in property
relations - emerged as important determinants of rising inequality. In fact, as the Czech
and Slovakian cases show, targeting the limited government resources available for
public spending in transition could help preventing the spread of inequality and the fall
into poverty of large shares of the population. Also, the distribution of former state
properties, such as flats and land played a relevant role because it was mostly arbitrarily
in the confused transition reforming period. A clear example is the distribution of flats
to the previous occupants in Russian cities, where numerous families could receive very
small apartments in the peripheries, while old widows living alone could get spacious
flat in central Moscow. Land reforms took place in several fashions: mostly, land was
redistributed in parcelized plots to the original owners8 which have been expropriated by
the former regime. This solution often threatened land productivity and income
opportunities from agriculture in the years to come.
Finally, the role played by institutional reform is to be considered because institutions
are vital for reducing inequality and poverty, reducing social exclusion (de Soto, 2000).
8 The  definition  of  the  original  owners  vary  according  to  the  interested  countries.  For  example,  in
Hungary the restitutive law went back to 1938 in order to account for the anti-Semitic laws.
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In  transition  countries  the  process  of  institutional  transformation  was  twofold:  the  old
institutions and centres of power (the Party, the central planning agencies), which
governed the former system, had to be removed, and a new democratic institutional
system should be introduced (Nickel, 2005). In the FSU (e.g. in Russia and Ukraine), as
a difference with the CEEc, this destruction-and-creation process was slow and affected
by several disturbances, thus resulting in a low quality new institutional setting, which
contributed  to  worsen  the  problems  (recession,  unemployment)  of  transition,  and  to
increase inequality.
Despite the ideal tension toward people equality promoted by the Communist system,
inequality existed also in the planned economies, and it was hidden by the Party. In
particular, an underlying inequality was acquainted by the population:
- the existence of unreported non-pecuniary benefits for the nomenklatura elites
(Rosser et al., 2000), which could access to goods denied to the rest of the
population (e.g. quality food, clothes, cars, health care, housing, education,
holiday, travels abroad, foreign currency);
- the persistence of shortages, which created unequal conditions between sellers
and customers of different basic goods (Kornai, 1980), increasing the bargaining
power of the former ones and constraining the latter ones to stand in lines and
pay bribes;
- the diffusion of barter and unofficial economy, which advantaged farmers and
subsistence producers;
- the differential in wages according to the region and area of residence (in urban
areas wages were higher than in the rural ones).
Inequality continued to spread even in the final phases of transition and the external
policy support to growth and convergence didn’t contribute to alleviate it. In the CEEc,
open inequality spread with the economic growth taking place in the pre-EU accession
period, and assumed specific socio-demographic and geographical features.
The losers of the transition process were:
- the peripheries of the capital or large cities, the East bordering and the marginal areas
which didn’t benefit from the FDI flowing from Western countries, or from the first and
conspicuous investments in material and immaterial infrastructures co-financed by the
EU and by international donors, but they could just rely on multinational delocalization
of low value added activities;
- rural areas which experienced de-industrialization;
- the agricultural population, which lost the market access with the end of the
COMECON and suffered from price liberalization and from the end of collectivism.
A clear centre-periphery patter emerged in the CEEc:
- the capital town and the new growth poles became a sort of winners;
- the inhabitants of lagging behind areas, mainly aged people, low skilled workers who
lost  their  job  in  transition  and  were  not  able  to  retrain,  middle-age  women  were  the
losers.
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1.4 The need for data reconciliation
Economic policy in the CEEc and in the FSU before the system change was made
according to the directives coming from the Communist party: all the aspects of
economic activity were established and five-year plans were set to translate economic
policies  into  programs.  According  to  the  policies  disposed  by  the  central  planner,  the
State Planning Committee (Gosudarstvennyy planovyy komitet, Gosplan) formulated the
output targets for the planning periods. Targets were then refined by the regional
planning bodies for each economic unit: industrial enterprises, state farms (sovkhoz) and
collective farms (kolkhozy ; kolkhoz) had their specific output plan. In order to fulfil the
plan, the process was “controlled” at every stage by a huge bureaucratic system
composed by regional and sub-regional ministries and committees, in which corruption
and a perverse system of incentives set-up dominated. In fact, as information flowed up
and down, it underwent several adjustments.
Thus, at the end of the 1980s, when the national statistical offices of the CEEc and the
FSU started to work on data reconciliation, in order to make their aggregates
comparable  with  the  System  of  National  Accounts  (SNA),  important  differences
emerged.  In  the  former  system  only  a  few  key  indicators  were  reported,  based  on
“bridge tables”, without providing the required cross-checks inherent to sound national
accounting, i.e. the harmonization of data from income, production, and expenditure
approaches (WB, 1992).
Therefore, the data used for composing the indicators reported above were published
mainly  in  the  second half  of  the  1990s,  because  of  the  need  of  the  national  statistical
office to adapt them to the SNA from the material product system (MPS) used in the
former Communist block (Khomenko, 2007).
Statistical adaptation constituted a serious issue for understanding what was happening
in transition and the magnitude of the change, in order to plan reforming policies. The
main characteristics of the statistical system in the Communist period (often neglected
by transition studies) regarded the role of services, prices and inflation, and the
“corrections” which makes it hard to compare the aggregates. Several accounts
overestimations and underestimations occurred, which often exaggerated growth,
influencing  the  Western  misconceptions  about  the  real  size  of  the  CEEc and  the  FSU
economies. Moreover, crucial pieces of information, particularly on block-wide
economic agents, could be omitted because they did not pass through the subordinate
statistical systems.
MPS differed from SNA because the production and sale of several services were
excluded from the production accounts (OECD, 2006). Within the MPS, the Net
Material Product (NMP) was the aggregate most similar to our GDP: it included the
services linked to goods production, e.g. the transports and trade, but it excluded the
ones provided to households (education, healthcare, restoration) which were treated as
government transfers to households, or transfers between households.
Prices in the CEEc and the FSU were not based on the equalization of producers’
marginal productivity and consumers’ marginal utility, because they were fixed by the
37
Central Planner. Thus, in the planned economies, prices were an accounting mechanism
only established by the Planner for all goods and services according to the role of the
product in the plan. In comparison with the market economy, consumption goods were
overvalued and capital goods undervalued by the system of “plan prices”, in function of
the investment strategies, because the Central Planner aimed at diverting resources from
consumption to investments. Moreover, this system caused shortages, wastes and
oddities: grain cost much more than bread, leading farmers to feed livestock with bread.
MPS statistics were expressed in volumes rather than in current prices, which were in
“comparable prices”. Statisticians, in order to get deflated volumes, used as deflators of
current prices figures the price indices which considered price changes just in case of
identical goods. Statisticians followed only the price movements of new goods, thus
understating inflation. Producers were required to maintain price stability. In order to do
so, often “new” goods were created, which just as “new” slightly changed from the
previous models in minimal details, but their price rose. By the way, as statisticians only
considered price changes for identical goods, they did not report the increase in the
comparable price index, while they overstated growth. This system supported the
political will of the Central Planner, to show the Western countries and the non-aligned
countries a powerful Communist bloc.
1.5 Reforming agriculture in transition: the CEEc and FSU perspectives
This chapter deserves a particular attention to the path followed by agriculture in
transition countries, given the important role that the sector plays in the development
path of a country, and thus by the policies introduced. Agricultural production in rural
and  peri-urban  areas  provides  food  and  non-food  commodities  (fibre,  cacao...),  it  is  a
source of rural labour and demand for the agri-food industry, thus composing the first
voice of income for rural population. Moreover, especially in developing countries,
according to the Engels’ law the higher share of consumers’ income is spent on food
(Swinnen et al., 2006). Thus, agricultural policies detain a main role in promoting
poverty-reduction strategies, contributing to the achievement of positive economic
performances (Perkins, 1994; Green et al., 1998) and to the introduction of sustainable
and diversified income opportunities in rural areas. Therefore, studying the agricultural
reforms  introduced  in  the  transition  process,  and  their  effects  and  results  obtained  till
now, could contribute to better understanding the current challenges of agricultural and
rural areas in transition countries, and their development perspectives.
The  analysis  of  the  process  of  transition  in  agriculture  followed by  the  CEEc and  the
FSU highlights similarities in the policies introduced but also relevant differences in the
timing and degree of policy enforcement, which can explain the different results
obtained after 20 years of agricultural transition. This is particularly the case for
agricultural and rural areas in the CEEc which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, which
fared the worse off from transition and which are still lagging behind in the process of
convergence with the EU average. In fact, in agricultural and rural areas the highest
level of poverty in EU is still located (Bertolini, 2008), marginalization increased even
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after the EU enlargement (Monasterolo, 2011). Here, in fact, the instruments introduced
in the pre-accession period and later on under the EU Cohesion and the CAP framework
were not able to contribute effectively to solve the development bottlenecks, because
they didn’t addressed the specific area problems (Csáki, 2009), which were often
inherited by the unfinished transition process. A comparative analysis of the linkages
between  the  need  for  agricultural  reforms  and  the  policies  enacted  in  the  reality  of
transition could provide useful insights for the introduction of more targeted
development policies, in order to decrease development divergence within and between
the countries. Thus, an overview on the evolution of the agricultural accounts in
transition is provided, following a comparative approach. Then, the model of agriculture
in transition is compared with the previous socialist one, with attention to price and
market liberalization, farm restructuring, and the change in the relationship between
incentives and public support. Then, the effects of the reforming policies will be
illustrated, with particular attention to the role of land reform and its impact on the
agricultural development in Hungary, which is chosen as a case study for the
peculiarities of its agricultural and rural areas.
This analysis moves from the important findings in the literature of agricultural
economics in transition provided by Cs. Csáki, J.F. Swinnen, Z. Lerman, K. Macours,
W.M. Liefert, S. Davidova, E. Serova. I already pointed out the problem of data
availability and comparability in transition countries: it is particularly in the agricultural
sector that the lack of disaggregated accounts prevent for understating the magnitude of
the phenomena analyzed, in particular the role of hidden unemployment, labour
reallocation and productivity.
The trend of the main indexes of agricultural transformation in transition show common
features, as well as country peculiarities while comparing CEEc, FSU and the Baltic
countries.  As  evidenced  for  the  whole  economy,  in  the  first  years  of  transition  gross
agricultural output (GAO) fell in almost all the countries, and a slight recovery started
some years later. The timing and degree of the fall-and-recovery path explains much
about the different outcomes of transition in agriculture between the groups of countries
(Table 1.5.1). In the first 5 years from the beginning of transition, GAO fell the most in
the Baltic countries and in the FSU, while after 10 years a low level of growth was
recorded just in Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. The output fall (col. 1) stops
earlier in Romania and in Slovenia (after 3 years), while in needs quite 10 years in the
Baltic countries, in the FSU and in Slovakia. The lowest GAO level in transition was
recorded by Latvia (just 37% of the pre-transition value), while it stopped at 77% in
Poland and at 75% in Czech Republic and Romania. The change in output was often
considered as the main measure for assessing the success of agricultural reforms. By the
way, production was subjected to such a distortions (i.e. subsidized inputs and outputs)
and negative incentives (lack of accountability in collective and state farms) that its
variation could have been mainly caused by the change in policies, i.e. prices
liberalization, that allow for production adjustments, according to the supply and
demand.
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Table. 1.5.1: GAO adjustments in transition






Avg. Growth GAO 5-
10 years
FSU
Belarus 9 57 -9,3 -1,3
Russia 8 58 -8,7 -0,5
Ukraine 9 51 -7,3 -4,4
Baltic countries
Estonia 8 41 -11,3 -5,2
Latvia 9 37 -12,9 -5,2
Lithuania 9 64 -7,3 -0,1
CEEc
Czech
Rep. 8 75 -5,6 0,5
Hungary 6 69 -6,9 0,8
Poland 5 77 -5,2 2,1
Slovakia 10 68 -5 -2,5
Bulgaria 7 57 -8,7 -0,6
Romania 3 75 -1,4 -0,1
Slovenia 3 65 -4,1 -0,5
Source: adaptation from Swinnen et al., 2006 and FAO statistics.
Economists consider unemployment as the best proxy for the introduction of transition
policies; in the agricultural sector, labour productivity could serve this role. By the way,
when comparing disaggregated measures in transition countries, we must be aware of
the limits of data availability and accountability. While agricultural labour productivity
(ALP) would be better calculated as Total Factor Productivity (TFP) or output per
agricultural work unit (AWU), because it weights misreporting in unemployment
indexes, it can often be calculated as output per farm worker. In several transition
countries, surveys and data sources don’t distinguish between full-time and part-time
employment in agriculture, thus underreporting increases in labour productivity when
part time work (i.e. on family subsistence plots) is high (Swinnen et al., 2006).
Moreover, Lerman et al. (2004) evidenced how agricultural labour force is often
underemployed in the FSU: several rural workers were, in the middle 1990s, still
officially employed in collective farms (or what remains of them), but they spent a lot
of time working at their own small land or in side activities, which are not reflected in
official statistics. Instead, increases in agricultural workers in some countries (i.e.
Romania) are linked to the lack of labour reallocation opportunities after the decline of
the industrial sector, as well as by pro-births demographic policies.
If we account for the difficulties in working with official data on labour use in transition
countries, the use of ALP in order to show changes in labour productivity can explain a
lot of the reform path followed. Just like output, also labour productivity experiences an
initial fall in the CEEc, but later it start rising (Table 1.5.2). In fact, the reduction in
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labour use in the CEEc (-35% in the first five years, with -57% in Hungary and -46% in
Czech Republic) and in the Estonia (-58%) contributes to recovery in ALP (+11.8% in
Hungary, +6.8 in Estonia after 10 years from the beginning of transition). At the same
time, FSU, Romania and Bulgaria, where initial output fall was less pronounces,
experience increases in labour use, and decreases in ALP: -10.3% in Russia, -7.3 and -
7.7% in Bulgaria and Romania respectively after 10 years.
Table 1.5.2: Change in ALP in transition










Belarus 4 69 -6,4 3,6
Russia 10 62 -8,7 -0,5
Ukraine 9 52 -8,4 -3,1
Baltic countries
Estonia 1 76 6,8 3,2
Latvia 6 46 -11,5 3,7
Lithuania 5 62 -9,2 4,6
CEEc
Czech
Rep. 0 100 4,7 7
Hungary 0 100 11,8 4,7
Poland 3 96 -0,2 7,8
Slovakia 0 100 1,9 3,8
Bulgaria 7 58 -7,3 -1,7
Romania 9 59 -7,7 -1,2
Slovenia 3 61 -3,2 -0,4
Source: ILO, WB, national statistics.
Although TFP is calculated just for some years and for some countries, due to the lack
of proper statistical information, Macours et al. (2000) find that TFP moves accordingly
to the partial indexes: it declines in the CEEc in the first years of transition, but it
recovers there fast after 1992, as also in Estonia and Lithuania (Lerman et al., 2003).
TFP estimations for the FSU are more ambiguous (some studies report increases while
others a fall) as they are subject to the differences in sampling.
Agricultural yields follow the trend showed by ALP: they fall in the first years of
transition in the CEEc, with the exception of Romania where increases in livestock
yields overcome the fall in crops (Swinnen et al., 2006). In the FSU, yields fall at the
beginning of the 1990s (also -25%) and continue to decline after 5 years (e.g. in
Ukraine). The change in quantity (and quality) of inputs, such as fertilizers, tractors use
and land, much contributed to the change in agricultural yields. In fact, in the planned
system production inputs where directly provided by the State or heavily subsidized
though the soft budget constraints that characterized the collective and state farms. At
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the  turn  of  transition,  with  the  liberalization  of  prices,  the  end  of  subsidies  and  the
privatization of land production costs increased. Thus farmers chose to reduce the use of
inputs, and also their quality decreased (i.e. substituting the chemical fertilizer
previously used).
Table 1.5.3: Growth of input use in agriculture (index =100 in the first year of reform)
Fertilizers Tractors Land Labour
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
FSU
Belarus 25 40 92 62 98 97 86 73
Russia 11 9 82 61 98 98 100 92
Ukraine 24 11 92 68 100 99 106 102
Baltic countries
Estonia 17 20 106 109 107 106 40 35
Latvia 21 53 82 89 99 97 79 77
Lithuania 10 16 118 137 100 100 113 103
CEEc
Czech Rep. 29 24 58 82 103 103 54 44
Hungary 15 18 72 61 94 95 43 37
Poland 35 38 114 113 99 98 89 97
Slovakia 17 15 89 77 100 100 71 60
Bulgaria 25 14 69 51 98 98 92 99
Romania 27 17 106 110 100 100 118 110
Slovenia 56 52 56 118 91 83 95 87
Source: FAO
As  shown  in  table  1.5.3,  the  use  of  fertilizers  after  5  years  of  reforms  plummet
everywhere, and after 10 years of transition it starts to recover consistently just in
Estonia. Some countries use more tractors already after 5 years of transition (Estonia,
Lithuania, Poland and Romania), but after 10 years the index grows just in Lithuania,
Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia, while it falls considerably in the FSU. The use
of  land  is  not  subject  to  big  changes  in  the  first  10  years  of  transition.  After  5  years,
employment in agriculture falls everywhere except in Lithuania, Ukraine, Romania, and
a general decreasing trend is common to all the examined countries after ten years from
the start of transition.
Data provided in this table will be useful later in order to explain the move to
subcontracting activities of former state or collective farms, in countries (such as




ASSESSING THE ROLE OF AGRICULTURE ON CONVERGENCE IN THE LIGHT OF THE EU
MEMBERSHIP: THE CASE OF HUNGARY
2.1 The quest for convergence in the enlarged EU
The quest for growth has been vehemently pursued by development economists in the
last century since the search for the determinants of the wealth of nations was initiated
by Adam Smith in 1776. Then, it passed through Lewis’s “surplus labour” model,
Rostow’s stylized facts and Kutznet’s critiques, the neoclassic visions by Gerschenkron
(1962) and Gomulka (1971), till the opposition coming from the endogenous and new
economic geography growth theories.
Within the two main economic visions which characterized the divided World till the
fall of the Berlin Wall, the free market based capitalist model and the planned economy,
which characterized the Communist block, different growth remedies were proposed. In
particular, Western economists working for International Organizations and Funding
Institutions (such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) have been
struggling to translate the neo-classic economic principles, highlighted by the Solow-
Swan model (1956), into reform policies for developing countries. Their objective was
the introduction of correcting economic policies able to prompt a process of sustained
growth9 which would have helped lagging behind countries to catch up, closing the gap
with Western economies. The elixir for growth has been identified in several means,
from foreign aids to conditional loans and debt forgiveness, but none of them has
delivered its promises (Easterly, 2002). Although some initial results could be recorded,
as the East Asia experience shows, they have been shortly dismantled by the financial
and economic crises which recurrently characterize the international market. The
growth remedies failed in the tropics (the first experiment), in most of African countries
and in the ex-communist countries, where they were applied by supporters of the big-
bang approach to growth (Lipton et al., 1990; Sachs et al. 1994; Balcerowicz, 1995).
All their pro-development prescriptions were based on the need to fill the “financing
gap” with the required investments coming from Western donors, where based on the
Lewis’s assumption of the centrality of rapid capital accumulation, because growth was
directly proportional to investments. Interestingly, already in the early 1920s Soviet
economists introduced the same idea, conceptualized by Kovalevskii in “Planned
Economy” in 1930, which based the Soviet growth on a growth proportional to
investments idea. This theory was promptly applied in the ex-URSS though forced
investments in machinery and heavy industry, where the excess labour from rural areas
would have been pulled to work.
9 The economic growth rates in developing countries should have been much higher than the ones
recorded in the Western ones, in order to close the economic gap, as explained by neo-classical
economists.
43
Cohesion was also a central issue in the foundation and enlargement of the European
Union10 (EU), till the development in 1989 of a proper set of policies and instruments
under the Structural and Cohesion Policy framework, aimed at decreasing development
inequalities between the former Objective 1 (now Convergence) regions, and the bulk of
faster growing ones (the so called blue banana) though economic convergence. The first
results about catching up in the EU-15 since the second half of the 1980s showed a slow
convergence performance together with the persistence of a core-periphery pattern at
the regional level (Petrakos et al., 2005), where inequality spread (+10%) (Pose, 2002),
and even some evidence of club convergence, despite the amount of EU budget devoted
to it. Integration in the EU-12 appears to have reduced disparities across countries but
not across regions within countries (Overman et al., 2002), especially in the
Convergence regions, where the most of funds were allocated (Quah, 1996),
highlighting  the  case  of  an  equity/efficiency  trade  off,  and  a  debate  on  the  role  of
Cohesion funds in the beneficiaries Countries (Sapir Report, 2003). This is also the case
of the NMS: in fact, after quite a decade from the accession, between EU-27 nations
inequalities are gradually diminishing while regional inequality increases, with the
capital towns able to attract FDI and develop, while agricultural and rural areas,
especially at the Eastern and Southern borders, lagged behind (Monasterolo, 2008).
Thus, monitoring and evaluating the efficiency of policies for cohesion and convergence
became a priority during the last EU Eastern enlargement, occurred on 1st May 200411
because the NMS brought to the EU about 500 millions of new citizens, and they were
characterized by very different structural features and problems unsolved in transition,
inducing a redistribution of the EU budget from the former beneficiaries to the new
comers, especially under the CAP. In fact, at the time of the membership the accessing
countries presented lower economic performance: Hungary could reach 60% of the
average EU-25 p.c. GDP, the level of the poorest regions in the EU-15 such as Iperios
(Greece), while Latvia stopped at 30%. The same data was even lower for Bulgaria and
Romania, which joined the EU in 2007 (quite 25% of EU GDP).
The case of Hungary is of particular interest because it was considered the “best
performing” transition country (WB, 1997), and it was also included among the first
block of CEEc negotiating the EU accession, but since 2008 the country is undergoing
severe economic (and political) troubles which hinder its EU membership. Moreover,
the  country  represents  a  good  example  of  how  the  lack  of  institutional  and
implementing abilities, together with low EC control on community funds, could vanish
the EU value added, especially in the most in need peripheral and rural areas, increasing
the internal gap.
10 The  objective  of  the  European cohesion  policy  is  defined in  Articles  2  and 4,  and Title  XVII  of  the
Treaty establishing the European Community. Cohesion policy should contribute to promote economic
and social progress as well as a high level of employment, and to achieve balanced and sustainable
development, and Article 158: in particular, the Community aims to reduce the disparities between the
levels of development of the different regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions or
islands, including rural areas.
11 The Treaty of the European Union Enlargement was signed in Athens on 16/04/2003.
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Previous analysis investigated income-level convergence in the enlarged EU following
different methodologies: Paas et al. (2007), Matkowski et al. (2006) use parametric
methodologies; Ertur et al. (2006) use exploratory spatial analysis; Ezcurra et al. (2007)
adopt a non-parametric approach, highlighting the role played by neighbouring regions
for explaining the dispersion in the distribution of GDP per worker; Chapman et al.
(2010) use non-parametric and spatial regimes analyses. They mainly find evidence of
catch-up during the integration process, but also a new North–West/East polarization
pattern which replaces the previous North–South one for the EU-15. In particular,
Matkowski et al. (2006) tests that there is a clear β-convergence in income levels among
eight EU accession countries in the period 1993-2005, and income differences between
individual countries tend to diminish. Åslund et al. (2007) find that economic growth in
the last decade has, on average, been higher in the NMS than in the EU-15, and they use
this as evidence of catch-up and convergence between the two blocks of countries, but
they forget to highlight that most of this growth in the NMS has been concentrated in,
and around, capital cities (Gorton et al. 2009).
Moreover, Chapman et al. (2011), following the approach developed by Rodriguez-Pose
(1998), analyze the relevance of socio-economic and specialisation groups in affecting
the within countries convergence in the EU-27, using the sigma convergence and a
spatial approach. They find that socio-economic clusters explain divergence in regional
p.c. GDP within NMS, where regions specialised in knowledge-intensive services and
urban regions are the better off from the integration process, while regions specialised in
agriculture, in low tech industries have been falling behind.
By the way, they don’t address the growth path at a disaggregated territorial level where
the most of inequality realizes, and they don’t look at how sub-regions perform together
in  the  NMS,  thus  preventing  from  further  efficiency  analysis  of  the  EU  funds.
Moreover, although the role of performing agriculture in NMS for convergence has
been asserted, the path followed by agricultural and rural areas in the NMS during the
EU integration process is still much unknown, while there is wide interest from policy-
makers about productivity convergence in agriculture12 (Stilianos et al., 2010), as for the
impact of CAP support.
Therefore, this chapter contributes to:
- assess the process of convergence among the NMS regions (NUTS 3 level)
using a non-parametric approach (stochastic kernel);
- assess whether convergence in p.c. GDP (PPS) between 1997 and 2008 occurred
among Hungarian counties (NUTS 3) applying a non-parametric approach of the
convergence (stochastic kernel), in order to evidence the evolution of the growth
distribution followed by the statistical units, comparing the results with the
evidences from the previous convergence analysis at the country level;
12 Agricultural labour productivity in Nuts 2 regions in the enlarged EU has been studied testing for β and
club convergence (Stilianos et al., 2010), which don’t allow to understand the internal distribution
dynamic between the initial and final year of analysis.
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- perform a preliminary impact analysis of CAP introduction on the convergence
using a conditional convergence model (Quah, 1997)13;
- analyse the contribution of the performance recorded by the agricultural sector
for the economic convergence, applying a σ-convergence analysis14 on
agricultural labour productivity (ALP) of the Hungarian countries between 2000
and 2007, because it was identified by the literature as the most explicative
variable for performing transition in agriculture (Swinnen et al., 2006; 2009).
The choice for using both non-parametric and parametric approaches was moved by the
limited availability of official data, and also by the complementary information they can
provide on the process of convergence. In fact, while the parametric approach shows the
distribution  of  the  average  dynamic  of  the  sample,  the  non-parametric  one  underlines
the movements of the single statistical units with respect to the initial period.
2.2 Methodology
Parametric models were used for the analysis of convergence since the middle of the
1980s: the concept of β-convergence was studied by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991,
1992), while σ-convergence was studied by Mills (1986), Lichenberg (1994), Carree
and Klomp (1997) among the others. Parametric approaches move from the neoclassic
growth models15, and are based on the estimation of synthetic indicators: β-convergence
assess whether poorer economies grow faster than the more developed ones, and the σ-
convergence, based on the concept of variance, studies the average dispersion of the
economic performance in the considered time period (Sala-i-Martin, 1996).
The main idea behind this convergence hypothesis is that, given the same exogenous
technology, countries with low per capita income and low capital per worker would
provide higher returns to capital, which would attract more foreign capital, insuring a
higher accumulation rate and faster growth.  The condition is that the economies
concerned are open to international markets. According to Solow’s results, (i) an
economy starting from a low p.c. GDP level (and low capital per worker) tends towards
a steady-state and grows faster than the economy starting from a higher income and
capital level; (ii) economies approaching different steady-states need not converge.
The basic equation which describes the drive of the economy towards a steady-state in
the Solow model is:
13 Decoupled payments per farm are weighted for the Single Area Payment System (SAPS) payments per
county was chosen as conditioning variable, in order to include only payments directly affecting farm
income (as a difference from investments or program related payments, which impact on farm income
just in the medium to long term).
14 We recur to this parametric methodology due to the lack of time series data for the variable
Agricultural Working Units (AWU).
15 See the Solow-Swan model (1956) which considers closed economies characterized by exogenous
saving rates, production functions with a decreasing productivity and constant returns to scale, similar
consumption/production preferences and technology, and tend towards the same steady state, where the
growth rates tend to be inversely correlated to the initial p.c. GDP (Sassi et al., 2011).
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k t = sf(kt)- (n + x + S)kt or gk=s
where: k - capital per unit of effective labour, k - increase of capital per effective labour
unit, gk - growth rate of capital, n  - growth rate of population, x - rate of exogenous
technical progress, δ– rate of capital depreciation, s  - saving rate, f ( k) - production
function.
According to the neoclassical production function output is proportional to capital, thus
similar equations characterize the dynamics of GDP per unit of effective labour
(Matkowski et al., 2006).
Figure 1 (a) proves (i) in the parts of the equation (1b). The growth rate equals the
vertical distance between the curve sf(kt)/kt and the line n + x + δ. This convergence
model is limited to the situation when both economies tend to reach the same steady-
state: the economy starting from capital level k0 and reaching the steady-state capital
value k* would reveal a decreasing growth rate. In this case, less developed economies
would grow faster than more developed ones.
Figure 2.2.1 (a): Unconditioned β-convergence
By the way, Solow also proved the existence of a “conditional” β-convergence, where
the two countries reach different steady state levels, thus never converging. Let us
consider  two  countries:  a  poor  one  and  a  rich  one,  with  different  saving  rates.  Since
saving rate in the rich country is higher, its steady-state value of capital is also higher
than in the poor one. This is shown in Figure 1b. Although the rich country starts from a
higher capital level, now it also reveals a more rapid growth, because it tends to a
different steady-state than the poor country. In this case, both economies would not
converge.
 (n + x + S),
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Figure 2.2.1 (b): Conditional β-convergence
Therefore, it is important to estimate the value of the parameter β, because it determines
the speed of convergence toward the steady state, as from the following equation:
The parameter β shows what part of the distance from the steady-state the economy is
covering during a time period: if β = 0.02, the economy covers annually 2% of the
distance.
The hypothesis of unconditional β-convergence is specified as it follows: the equation
shows that the average per capita income growth rate, y, in a time period from 0 and t, T
the years included in the time period, is given by the following equation
with j regions, μ error term and B the constant.
b decreases when T increases, and for a sufficiently long time period it tends to vanish,
because the growth rate decreases with the increase in income. Thus, the parameter of
convergence has to show a negative sign, in order to support the neoclassical model
(Barro, 1991; Baumol, 1986; Barro, Sala-I-Martin, 1992; Quah, 1993).
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The σ-convergence looks at the distribution of the variable in a certain time period.
There is σ- convergence when the variance of a variable/indicator decreases in the time
period considered.
Three tests were calculated to assess the presence of σ – convergence:
- 1T , calculated by Lichenberg (1991, 1994), consists of a comparison between variance






1σˆ   is the variance between the considered countries at the starting year;
2
Tσˆ   is the variance at the final year.
T1  distributes  as  an  F  test  (n-1;  n-1),  where  n  is  the  number  of  observed  statistical
units16. Carree and Klompt (1997) demonstrated that using T1 a high probability of
committing II type error (rejecting the true convergence hypothesis) exists17, which
leads to evidence no variance change between the two time periods. In order to avoid
this problem, Carree and Klompt provided two other tests, 2T and 3T ,  to  verify  the
equality of the two groups’ variances in time:
-  is basically a likelihood test, and distributes as a c 2 (1)


























1σˆ   is the variance at the starting year;
2
Tσˆ   is the variance at the final year;
2
1Tσˆ  is the covariance between the initial and the final year.
- 3T  is a correct distribution of 1T , and it distributes as N (0,1)
where:
πˆ  is estimated by the following OLS regression:
16 In this case, n is the number of countries at time 1 and at time t.













i = 1,…, N ; Y is a generic indicator and u is the error component,
      π is function of the β parameter of the β – convergence.
Caree and Klomp (1997) also provide the significance level which allows us to accept
or reject the hypothesis of quality of variances between the two years considered, and to
assess the presence of convergence.
The first condition for convergence is πˆ <1,  and  then  the  significance  of  the  tests 1T ,
2T and 3T .
If πˆ <1, and the value of the statistical test is above the one correspondent to the chosen
significance level18,  it  is  possible  to  reject  the  null  hypothesis  of  variance  equality
between the  two groups  in  the  two years,  assuming the  presence  of  σ –  convergence.
Instead, the value of the statistical tests is lower, we cannot reject the null hypothesis,
and we assume the equality of the variance distribution and the lack of convergence.
If πˆ >1, 3T cannot be calculated, and we have a precondition for divergence, which
takes place if the 2T value is above the significance level.
β - convergence and σ-convergence different from a conceptual point of view: in fact,
the presence of the latter one implies the presence of the former one, but the opposite is
not true. Thus, β- convergence is said to be condition necessary but not sufficient for
assessing the presence of σ - convergence19: income differences between countries can
rise and at the same time less developed countries may develop faster (Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 1992).
The increase in time series data availability, and the limits showed by synthetic
measures in assessing convergence: apart from relying on the neoclassic assumption of
stable economic growth (Quah, 1993), they are not able to catch the dynamics of the
internal distribution (Quah, 1996) neither to underline the existence of a subgroup of
regions presenting different dynamics of growth from that of the average of the sample
(Bernard et al., 1995; Quah, 1997), and they return different and often opposite results
according to the data and number of regions analyzed. In particular, the estimation of β
is characterised by a systematic tendency towards 2 percent (Canova et al., 1995), while
σ-convergence is high influenced by the presence of outliers, which leads to an
underestimation of convergence. Finally, it was demonstrated that an initial evidence of
catching-up can subsist together with an increase in sub-regional divergence, as a trade-
off between national and sub-regional convergence evidenced by the inverted U curve
by Williamson, due to the concentration of economic activities in specific areas, or
growth poles (agglomeration economies, Viesti, 2004).
18 The probability associated to the critical values corresponds to α= 0.05.
19 Convergence depends on the β parameter and also on the R² value of the regression equation, thus on
the variability around the regression line (Lichtenberg, 1994).
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Thus, since the 1990s the endogenous growth school developed new, non-parametric
approaches to the analysis of economic convergence20. Among them, Quah’s
econometric model based on the stochastic kernel presents several advantages, because
it  provides  a  dynamic  analysis  of  per  capita  GDP  density  function,  looking  at  the
evolution  of  the  cross-country  distribution  of  p.c.  GDP  in  PPS.  The  stochastic  kernel
can be considered as a kind of transition probability matrix (or Markovian matrix)
where classes are defined in a continuum, because it estimates the whole marginal
density function of for the variable (p.c. GDP in PPS) though the years. It also allows
assessing the long term perspectives of the distribution of the chosen variable: in fact,
the final output is an ergodic income distribution estimated on the observed variations in
the analyzed period. As a difference from the parametric methods, this dynamic analysis
is able to evidence the presence of two main characteristics:
- persistence, or if the classification of regions according to their p.c. GDP doesn’t
change (rich economies stay rich, and the poor ones stay poor);
- polarization, better known as the phenomenon of twin peaks or convergence
clubs, where countries move toward different groups, diverging (the opposite of
what is required for convergence)21.
Let us define:
        Ft the distribution of incomes (p.c. GDP) at time t
  Ft+1 the distribution of incomes at the following time.
There is an operator M (the stochastic kernel) that maps the evolution of the distribution
from time t to time t+1. The operator M can be defined by:
Ft+1=M+Ft (1)
Repeated for the distribution of all the analyzed years, it is possible to obtain an
operator  M  which  describes  the  transition  of  the  distribution  from  time t to time t+s.




20 The introduction of non-parametric models able to observe the path followed by the statistical units in
the time period considered was possible also thanks to the increase in statistical information.
21 Twin peaks phenomenon, within persistence, are the most frequent features observed in Quah’s analysis
on economic convergence (1993).
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If r→∞, then we obtain an estimate of the limit distribution of incomes at the end period
which allows us to exploring the changes occurred in the observed period, the
distributive characteristics of p.c. GDP (i.e. if the evolution in the future shows a similar
trend to the previous years), and to assess if convergence takes place.
Through the graphic representation it is possible to follow the movement of the
distribution though the years:
- on axis t1 the  possible  values  of  the  p.c.  GDP in  PPS for  each  statistical  unit  at  the
initial period are reported;
- axis t2 shows the possible values in the long term (a not specified period in the future);
- the axis “kernel” reports the estimates of the kernel function.
The  graph  should  be  read  starting  from the  main  diagonal  of  level  (t1,  t2),  where  the
points are determined from the same values at time t1 and at time t2.
Two extreme cases can occur:
- the straight line at 45 degrees defines a situation of persistence: if the kernel surface is
entirely distributed along this diagonal, the observed countries don’t change their
position in time;
- the alignment of the kernel surface along the secondary diagonal indicates that the
evolution  of  the  distribution  of  p.c.  GDP determines  a reversal of  the  initial  situation
(in the long term, poor regions get rich and vice versa).
Perfect convergence occurs  when  the  kernel  surface  is  parallel  to  axis t1 around a
single modal value: all the units distribute around the same income level at time t2,
because in the long run poor regions would grow more than the richest ones, until all the
regions show similar income levels. The process of convergence is represented by a
counter-clockwise rotation around the main diagonal line, and in two directions: in case
of income values below the average, rotation of the peaks disposed under the main
diagonal; modal rotation above the main diagonal line in case of wealthier regions.
The concept of conditional convergence was introduced (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995)
which considers for the structural differences of the economies, looking for the
variables which are able to influence the convergence path22, in order to derive useful
insights for political economy. Introducing conditioning in the convergence analysis, we
move away from the hypothesis of a single steady state according to which every region
convergence, thus leaving the perspective for catching up of poorer regions. It is
possible to better specify the absolute β-convergence model conditioning the path



















22 Assessing the presence of conditional convergence would mean that, if all the economies start from the
same initial conditions, they would follow the same growth path, while if starting from different levels
they would reach specific steady states to each economy.
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where Zi,t represents the variables able to influence p.c. GDP growth.
This approach observes only the relation between the statistical units analyzed, in their
average values. In order to overcome this limit, Quah (1997) provides a methodological
framework for the analysis of the distribution of conditioned p.c. GDP, assessing how
the conditional variable influences the distribution function of the conditioned one (p.c.
GDP in PPS). In fact, explaining the dynamics of the conditioned distribution
corresponds conceptually to analyze the effects of the conditioning on the distribution
of the study variable (Quah, 1997).
Moving from the parametric approach of β-convergence, it is possible to analyze
whether  the  conditioning  variable  Z  explains  the  variable  of  interest  Y23, highlighting
possible differences in the two expected values E(Y|X,Z) and E(Y|X), for the respective
distributions Y|X,Z and Y|X. When the two distributions are linear,
E(Y|X,Z)=βX+ γZ (4)
it is possible to test if the regression coefficient γ = 0
Quah explores the possibility for equality of the conditioning distribution of Y|X,Z and
Y|X24, and the transformation of Y in Y|Z, which can be represented mathematically by
the stochastic kernel, the operator which models the changing distributions, and thus the
effects of conditioning (Quah, 1997). In case of equality of the two distributions, Z
doesn't explain Y25.
Therefore, the stochastic kernel can perform the following operation:
Fz,t=M*Ft (5)
where Fz,t is the distribution of variable Y conditioned to variable Z at time t and Ft is
the unconditioned distribution of Y at time t. The operator M provides information on
the origin of the evolution of the distributions through the years. It observes how the
distribution changes when passing from an unconditioned variable to a conditioned one;
then,  the  stochastic  kernel  is  applied  to  the  residuals  of  the  time  series  of  the
conditioned distribution, providing results for the convergence analysis. The use of the
stochastic kernel still leave to the researcher the choice for the conditioning variable to
include, according to the structural and development peculiarity of the areas analyzed.
2.3 The sample and the data
The composition of the sample, and the time period, depend on data availability at
NUTS 3  level.  As  a  difference  from previous  convergence  analysis  on  NMS,  here  we
look at the convergence pattern at the sub-regional level, in order to derive policy
23 It works also when X is included in the model.
24 In case X is a null variable, we would study the relationship between the conditional distribution Y|Z
and the unconditioned distribution of Y.
25 The variations in Z don’t influence the distribution of Y.
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implications and suggestions from the results. P.c. GDP is still considered the main
indicator of growth, and thus it is adopted as explanatory variable to estimate the
process of convergence.
The non-parametric convergence analysis on all NMS counties (NUTS 3) uses Eurostat
data for p.c. GDP (PPS) available from 1999.
The  non-parametric  analysis  on  the  twenty  Hungarian  counties,  p.c.  GDP  (PPS)  from
1997 (year when the EC agreed on the enlargement negotiation procedures at the
Luxembourg European Council, and initiated the participation in Community
programmes as pre-accession strategy for the candidate countries) to 2008 (chosen as
final  year  due  to  data  availability).  Data  on  the  p.c.  GDP  PPS  (Purchasing  Power
Standard) at NUTS 3 level are provided by Eurostat. This variable allows us to better
compare the wealth levels of different statistical units, accounting also for the different
level of prices (Leonardi, 1998).
It was quite difficult to gather statistical information on the payment provided under the
CAP to Hungarian farms at a sub-regional level. Moreover, we wanted to include the
CAP payments which directly contribute to farm income: in fact, support to
investments, or provided under specific programs (i.e. rural development, Leader
approach) would show effects on farm income just in the medium term. Thus, it has
been decided to weight the data on the decoupled payment support at the regional level
in Hungary (data provided by the FADN/RICA database) from 2004 (the year of CAP
introduction in NMS) to 2008 for the number of successful applications for SAPS
support, provided at the county level by the Hungarian Payment Agency
(Mezőgazdasági és Vidékfejlesztési Hivatal, MVH). Then, the obtained value is used as
conditioning variable in the conditional convergence analysis of GDP growth.
Agricultural labour productivity (ALP) has been chosen as explicative variable for the
performance of the agricultural sector in former transition countries, according to the
last findings of the literature (Swinnen et al., 2006; 2009). The indicator is calculated as
gross agricultural value added (GAVA) on annual agricultural working units26 (AWU),
and both measures are available at NUTS 3 level (Eurostat). A parametric approach (σ-
convergence analysis) has been chosen to calculate convergence of ALP between 2000
and 2007 among Hungarian counties because time series for AWU are not provided.
Data on GAVA and AWU at NUTS 3 level are also available on Eurostat.
2.4 Analysis and results
2.4.1 Assessing convergence between the NMS: a non-parametric approach
Previous studies on convergence in the CEEc evidenced the presence of convergence of
countries towards the EU average, but the persistence and even increase in divergence at
the sub-regional level. By the way, no convergence analysis at such disaggregated level
26 The working hours used by ISTAT and OECD at the national level is a better measure of working time
in agriculture, but at more disaggregated level data are available only for AWU or for people employed in
agriculture. AWU is preferred because it allows partially considering for part time work.
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(NUTS 3) was provided for all the CEEc. The stochastic kernel applied to the study of
the marginal density functions provides an image of the evolution of the distribution of
the analyzed variable according to the statistical units composing the sample, in the time
period considered. The convergence analysis on NUTS 3 regions belonging to all NMS
shows a marginal density function that is clearly multi-modal in all the three time
periods considered (1999, 2003, 2008).
Figure 2.4.1: Marginal Distribution of p.c. GDP (PPS) in NMS (NUTS 3) in 1999
h= 0.164
Source: own elaborations on Eurostat data
Figure 2.4.2: Marginal Distribution of p.c. GDP (PPS) in NMS (NUTS 3) in 2003
h= 0.166
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Figure 2.4.3: Marginal Distribution of p.c. GDP (PPS) in NMS (NUTS 3) in 2008
h= 0.165
Source: own elaborations on Eurostat data
The marginal distribution in 1999 displays a main peak composed by two bumps, one
below  the  NMS  average  and  the  other  between  1  and  1.5.  On  the  right  side  of  the
distribution, a long cue characterized by the presence of a bump around 1.7 times the
average develops in other two small bumps, which include the best performing counties
in NMS (at 2.9 and 3.7). In comparison with the previous analysis conducted just on the
Hungarian counties, for the NMS (NUTS 3) the marginal distribution functions shows a
lower  relevance  of  the  richer  counties,  on  the  right  end  of  the  distribution,  on  the
general trend (very low intensity peaks corresponds to the highest modal values). In
2003, the main group grows both in intensity and in modal values (between 1.5 and 2
times over the average) following a general increase in p.c. GDP, while the distribution
shows a tendency towards unimodality and asymmetry on the right end. Between 2003
and 2008 the distribution changes only slightly: in 2008 there are a main, high intensity
peak characterized by important internal volatility (ranging from 0.5 till 3 times higher
than the average), and a smaller peak on the right (3.5 times higher than the average).
The stochastic kernel and the contour plot (respectively Figure 2.4.4 and 2.4.5) display
the  presence  of  two groups  of  counties.  The  group down on  the  left,  at  lower  income
levels, presents a double process: a subgroup of counties, set around lower modal
values, displays a weak clockwise rotation, while the second one is disposed around the
main diagonal, showing persistency. These counties, which belong to the main peak
displayed by the marginal distribution functions above, are experiencing different speed
growth rates towards the NMS average p.c. GDP value: the poorer ones don’t always
move together, while the better off ones mainly remains on their average level. Instead
the other group, composed by the richest counties, is characterized by a clear anti-
clockwise rotation and it disposes parallel to t1, showing internal convergence around
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Figure 2.4.4: Stochastic kernel of p.c. GDP (PPS) in NMS (NUTS 3)
Source: own elaborations on Eurostat data.
Figure 2.4.5: Contours of p.c. GDP (PPS) in NMS (NUTS 3)
Source: own elaborations on Eurostat data
2.4.2 Country convergence versus sub-regional divergence in Hungary
After performing a convergence analysis between the NMS, it is interesting to compare
it, using the same methodology, with the convergence path followed by the counties
which compose Hungary.
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A very different situation emerges. The analysis of the marginal density functions are
provided for the distribution of p.c. GDP (PPS) at the county level in Hungary27 for the
first year (1997), the middle year (2003) and for the last year (2008) of the time series
analysed. From the marginal density distribution it is possible to observe the shape
assumed by the variable in a fixed year, the trend followed by the statistical units, and if
they polarize in one or more different groups. The marginal density functions provide a
first evidence of the dynamics of the statistical units.
On axis x, the  values  of  p.c.  GDP  on  the  national  average28 for the 20 Hungarian
counties are displayed; on axis y, the estimates of the density function corresponding to
different values assumed by the variable are shown.
The peak displayed on the graph represents a grouping of counties around a specific p.c.
GDP value, and its height depends on the number of the units which belong to the
group: if the peak is very concentrate around a single modal value of the axis x, then the
counties composing it are very homogeneous. A tendency towards unimodality of the
statistical units represents good internal cohesion29: perfect convergence occurs when
the highest concentration is around a single point (all the counties display the same p.c.
GDP level).
Figure 2.4.6: Marginal Distribution of p.c. GDP (PPS) in Hungary (NUTS 3) in 1997
h30= 0.172
Source: own elaborations on Eurostat data.
The marginal density function for p.c. GDP in 1997 evidences the presence of three
peaks: the highest one is centred on the average value (1), the second one around a level
27 The limited number of statistical units should be considered, when analyzing the intensity of the peaks.
28 Thus, a value equal to one represents the average value of the Country.
29 At the opposite, multimodality represents polarization of counties in different groups.
30 The smoothing parameter (or bandwidth) h has been computed as an average between the h proposed
by Silverman 5/1)(9,0 -= nAh ; where A is the minimum value obtained between the standard deviation
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50% higher than the average. The third, small and extreme peak sets around a modal
level 2.3 times higher than the average. The first, high intensity peak is characterized by
a relevant internal variability, ranging from values 50% lower than the average to values
40% above the average level. The other two peaks show lower intensity, because they
are composed by fewer counties.
A second estimate of the marginal density function is provided for 2003. The situation
changes a lot between 1997 and 2003. In 2003, the distribution shows a main peak
characterized by high internal volatility, whose values range between 60% less and 70%
more  than  the  average.  It  is  still  possible  to  observe  a  small  peak  of  counties  on  the
right, ranging now from 2.5 and 2.7 times over the average level.
Figure 2.4.7: Marginal Distribution of p.c. GDP (PPS) in Hungary (NUTS 3) in 2003
h= 0.207
Source: own elaborations on Eurostat data
Between 1997 and 2003, the most of the counties increase their economic performance,
and this result could be induced by the mutual contribution of the end of the transition
period and the introduction of the EU pre-accession funds. From 2003 to 2008 no great
changes take place (Figure 2.4.8): in fact, there is still a main peak, whose intensity
decreases (smaller), while its modal value increases, ranging now from 0.5 to 1.9 times
higher than the average. As a difference from the rest of the observations, the counties
composing the peak on the right still improve their performance, stabilizing around a
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Figure 2.4.8: Marginal Distribution of p.c. GDP (PPS) in Hungary (NUTS 3) in 2008
h= 0.243
Source: own elaborations on Eurostat data
The  analysis  of  the  stochastic  kernel  shows  the  evolution  of  p.c.  GDP:  two  peaks
emerges, which highlight a tendency towards homogeneity within the two groups
(Figure 2.4.9)31 and a relevant polarization between them.
Figure 2.4.9: Stochastic kernel of p.c. GDP (PPS) in Hungary (NUTS 3)
Source: own elaborations on Eurostat data
A clearer interpretation of this dynamics is provided by the contour plot (Figure 2.4.10).
The two groups of counties dispose parallel to t1: in the long term they tend to
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convergence within themselves, while assessing at different GDP levels (polarization).
The first group of counties, down on the left, converges around the average value of the
country, but shows a weak clockwise tendency. Instead, the second group, composed by
the richest counties and disposed high on the right, sets around much higher values.
Moreover, it shows a clear anti-clockwise rotation, and a relevant convergence trend.
Figure 2.4.10: Contours of p.c. GDP (PPS) in Hungary (NUTS 3)32
Source: own elaborations on Eurostat data
2.4.3 Evaluating the role of CAP introduction on the convergence path of
the Hungarian counties
During the 2004 enlargement, the CAP introduction (in its policies, instruments and
budget)  in  NMS  was  a  debated  issue  in  the  EU.  In  fact,  as  the  NMS  were  more
agricultural (in terms of % agricultural land, and percentage of the sector on GDP), and
their agricultural and rural areas were interested by important development delays, CAP
was expected to play a relevant role for convergence.
After several  years from the enlargement,  we can analyze the role of CAP support  on
the growth and convergence path of the Hungarian counties.
An  estimate  of  the  distribution  of  p.c.  GDP  in  the  Hungarian  counties  conditioned  to
CAP payments (decoupled subsidies, SAPS and national top-up payments) is provided.
The marginal density functions of p.c. GDP (PPS) for NUTS 3 units in 2004 (the year
of the CAP introduction in NMS) and in 2008 (last year available) are very similar in
shape and values (Figure 2.4.11 and 2.4.12).
32 The numbers report the highest concentration of statistical units around a mean value.
61
Figure 2.4.11: Marginal distribution of conditioned GDP in Hungary (NUTS 3) in 2004
h= 0.259
Source: own elaborations on Eurostat data
Figure 2.4.12: Marginal distribution of conditioned GDP in Hungary (NUTS 3) in 2008
h= 0.244
Source: own elaborations on Eurostat data
Moreover, the comparison with the distributions of the previous unconditioned non-
parametric convergence analysis for Hungarian counties in 2003 and 2008 don’t show
relevant changes, neither in the shape of the distributions or in the values. The
conditioned distribution in 2004 is unimodal: a main high intensity peak ranges between
values 50% lower and 2 times higher than the average. A smaller peak can be found on
the right, 3.2 times over the average. In 2008, the marginal distribution looks pretty
similar, even if the intensity of the main peak increases, and the small peak on the right
decreases its performance, around values three times higher than the average. The
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Figure 2.4.13: Stochastic kernel of p.c. GDP and conditioned in Hungary (NUTS 3)
Source: own elaborations on Eurostat data
The contour plots (Figure 2.4.14) still shows polarization in two groups, both aligned
parallel to the axis t1, on different p.c. GDP levels. The poorer group (on the left)
converges internally around the average value, while the richer one converges around
values three times higher than the average.
Figure 2.4.14: Contours of conditioned GDP in Hungarian counties (NUTS 3)




























































Source: own elaborationss on Eurostat, FADN and MVH data.
A  serious  limit  for  the  conditional  convergence  analysis  was  represented  by  the  short
time series of available data, and the low number of statistical units analyzed. Moreover,
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the FADN data on the CAP support themselves are not fully representative of the farm
reality in the EU-27. In fact the FADN, the European system of sample surveys, collects
structural  and  accountancy  data  relating  to  farms,  with  the  aim to  monitor  the  income
and business activities of agricultural holdings, and to evaluate the impacts of the CAP.
By the way, its sample is only composed by farms which exceed the minimum
economic  size  of  1  ESU  (1,200  Euros):  this  threshold  was  chosen  to  catch  the  most
relevant part of the economic activity, but it fails to assess the structural and economic
situation of smaller, and poorer, farming realities, which are not reached by public
support. Nowadays, the FADN covers a sample of 39% farms (78 000 holdings) in the
EU-27, disaggregated at the regional level, and it represents the 95% of direct payments
expenditures but just 50% of the beneficiaries.
The comparison between the conditioned and unconditioned analysis shows that,
despite weak improvements of the poorest counties, the CAP payments were not able to
influence the convergence of lagging behind areas, which are mostly mainly agricultural
and rural (7,4% of employment in the primary sector). This result confirms the issues
which were raised, since the accession period, by academics and policy makers from
NMS  about  the  lack  of  targeting  and  efficiency  of  CAP  funds  for  the  new  MS.  As
Gorton  et  al.  (2009),  Csáki  et  al.  (2010)  evidenced,  the  NMS  had  to  adapt  to  a  CAP
structure and function designed to fit the needs of the EU-15, while agricultural and
rural areas in EU-10 had to face serious structural and productivity challenges.
In Hungary, the level of decoupled payment increased in every county: decoupled
payments more than doubled in absolute levels, ranging between +102% in Dél-
Dunántúl and +178% in Közép-Dunántúl (Table 2.4.1), and their share on total
subsidies (Table 2.4.2) increased everywhere, between 47% (Észak-Magyarország) and
89% (Dél-Dunántúl). By the way, the low nominal level of decoupled payments in
comparison  with  the  EU-15  average  and  the  lower  share  directed  to  the  worst
performing counties (i.e. Észak-Magyarország, Dél-Alföld) could have contributed to
the limited role played by the CAP for the convergence.
Table 2.4.1: Evolution of decoupled payments per farm in Hungary (EUR), 2004-2009
Region 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 var 09/04 %
Közép-Magyarország 3,781 4,203 5,438 5,149 7,321 7,697 104
Közép-Dunántúl 5,227 6,711 7,701 11,276 13,342 14,509 178
Nyugat-Dunántúl 4,881 5,435 6,904 7,983 9,600 11,258 131
Dél-Dunántúl 5,184 5,766 6,702 7,140 10,625 10,457 102
Észak-Magyarország 3,179 4,197 5,910 6,726 7,004 8,150 156
Észak-Alföld 2,788 3,397 4,362 4,582 5,553 6,797 144
Dél-Alföld 2,525 2,439 3,145 3,624 4,398 5,574 121
Source: own elaborations on FADN data
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Table 2.4.2: Rate of decoupled payments on total support to farms in Hungary (EUR),
2004-2009
Region 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Var 09/04 %
Közép-Magyarország 36.5 39.0 45.7 44.7 47.7 54.6 50
Közép-Dunántúl 32.8 35.8 41.3 35.7 38.4 52.1 59
Nyugat-Dunántúl 32.5 32.6 42.3 43.7 47.2 59.5 83
Dél-Dunántúl 30.4 28.1 36.2 39.3 41.3 57.6 89
Észak-Magyarország 43.1 37.1 46.4 45.7 53.0 63.3 47
Észak-Alföld 35.9 37.5 44.0 40.5 49.7 57.1 59
Dél-Alföld 36.7 37.5 43.7 43.6 49.4 57.9 58
Source: own elaborations on FADN data
The  lack  of  targeting  emerges  from  the  correlation  analysis  of  the  distribution  of  the
SAPS funds to successful applications33. In fact, looking at the applications for public
(SAPS and TOPUP) payments within the Agricultural and Rural Development
Operative Program (AVOP) in 200534, it emerges clearly that land size and the area of
provenience affects both the quality and quantity of demands. As a difference from the
EU-15, in Hungary he land size limit for being eligible to SAPS payments was set at 0.3
(instead than 1 ha). Farmers with 0.3 – 1 hectare presented the lowest number of
applications and the most was refused by managing authorities. By the way, also in this
category there are better performing Counties, as Somogy, where 90% of applications
were approved, although just 9 were presented. At the opposite, several applications
came from Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok and Heves but they did not succeed. The number of
presented applications increases with the average land size, and reached the most for the
land size class 1-5 ha. Bigger farm size also influences the quality of applications: the
bigger the farm, the most successful the applications. The most of applications for an
area lower than 5 ha came from one of the most backward and rural areas, Szabolcs-
Szatmár-Bereg. Instead, for farm size over 100 ha, the most came from better off
agricultural areas, as Fejér and Bács-Kiskun, till Pest county for over 1,000 ha.
Following the previous findings from Katona Kovács (2007), which found no
significant correlations between SAPS payments, p.c. GDP and unemployment rate, and
the results from Elek et al. (2008), which evidenced a negative correlation with farmers’
age and education, a correlation analysis between the number of applications received,
the payments (TOPUP + SAPS), farmers’ age, average farm size and farm location in
less favoured areas (LFA), is provided at the county level. We found no significant
correlation between applications (or payments) and farms size and farm location in
LFA, while we recorded significant - but negative - correlation between applications
received, payments and farmers’ age (over 55 years old). Therefore, the younger is the
farmer, the higher the number of successful applications and payments for the county.
33 This analysis and the comment to the results was performed together with PhD candidate Francesco
Pagliacci and presented to the 122nd EAAE Seminar hold in Ancona (It) on February 2011.
34 The only public data available refers to 2005. Source: Hungarian Agricultural and Rural Development
Agency.
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2.4.4 Agricultural policy reforms and agricultural labour productivity in
Hungary: a successful story?
The pre-accession PHARE and SAPARD instruments before, and the direct support to
farmers income after the EU membership, were aimed at increasing agricultural
productivity and competitiveness, in order to solve the structural bottlenecks which
remained from the transition process in lagging behind areas. In fact, since its
introduction in the NMS the EU support to agriculture was mainly composed by
investments for the modernization of the agri-food sector at the farm level, while less
attention was devoted to rural development and the related poverty issue. Therefore, it is
important to assess whether the preference accorded by the EC to direct payments for
ensuring “a fair standard of living for the agricultural community” (CEC, 2002), and the
support to a family farming model of agriculture, reached its goal looking at the
indicator which was considered at the base of the performance of the sector: agricultural
labour productivity35.
The awaited convergence in productivity performance didn’t take place, especially in
the most agricultural and rural areas, where (official) employment in agriculture is 8%
in 2010 (Dél-Dunántúl), increasing since 2008 by 18.8% (Table 2.4.3), and the role of
agriculture on GDP reaches a double digit (11% in Dél-Alföld, in 2008, Table 2.4.4).
These values are much lower for more regions more active in the service sector, as
Közép-Magyarország (where Budapest is located), and for the North-Western border
regions, which were able to attract FDI and to renovate the industrial production.
Table 2.4.3: Employment in agriculture 2008-2010 (% of the total)
2008 2009 2010 2010/08 %
Hungary 4.3 4.6 4.5 3.4
Közép-Magyarország 1.0 1.0 1.0 5.7
Közép-Dunántúl 4.3 4.3 4.2 -3.0
Nyugat-Dunántúl 4.0 5.4 4.7 17.3
Dél-Dunántúl 6.6 8.0 7.9 18.8
Észak-Magyarország 3.7 3.5 3.8 2.5
Észak-Alföld 6.7 6.9 6.8 1.1
Dél -Alföld 9.5 9.8 8.9 -5.9
Source: own elaborations on Eurostat data
Table 2.4.4: GVA produced by the agricultural sector (% of the total)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008  2008/04 %
Hungary 4.81 4.20 4.00 3.97 4.25 -11.72
Közép-Magyarország 1.02 0.74 0.69 0.68 0.77 -24.65
Közép-Dunántúl 4.79 4.69 4.64 4.75 4.85 1.32
Nyugat-Dunántúl 5.85 5.30 4.65 5.18 5.57 -4.81
Dél-Dunántúl 9.33 9.39 9.53 8.45 8.85 -5.13
Alföld és Észak 9.47 8.24 8.12 8.11 8.86 -6.42
35 Calculated as gross agricultural value added/ agricultural working unit.
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Észak-Alföld 9.33 8.24 8.25 8.47 9.25 -0.87
Dél-Alföld 11.76 11.36 11.31 11.22 11.84 0.69
Source: own elaborations on Eurostat data
The results of the σ-convergence analysis performed on agricultural labour productivity
(on which the CAP support was supposed to have a positive impact) in Hungary (NUTS
3 level) from 2000 till 2007, which shows divergence in the productivity of the twenty
Hungarian counties (Figure 2.4.15).
In fact, π > 1 (1.157) thus 3T  is N.D., while 2T is higher than the critical value36
(22.521).
There is a positive divergence (Table 2.4.5): all the counties improve their performance,
but among the lagging behind ones just Komárom-Esztergom and Vas are growing
faster than the most productive one, Budapest, while the other counties form a group at
lower levels. The average growth rate of labour productivity ranged between 2000 and
2007 reached 19%, with the highest positive peak recorded by the county of Vas
(+25%), followed by Veszprém (+24%), and the lowest by Budapest (+14%). Thus,
from the analysis performed in this chapter, it emerges the Hungarian counties were
able to exploit the CAP and EU funds provided by the EU membership very differently:
counties which were able to successfully apply for the CAP payments and actively use
them could better develop their agricultural sector, promoting productivity. Although
the several limits linked to data availability (time series, disaggregated payments,
number of counties), this analysis would provide clearer and more comprehensive
results  if  data  on  structural  and  cohesion  funds  provided  after  the  EU  enlargement  to
Hungarian counties were available.
Table 2.4.5: Critical values for σ-convergence test (agricultural labour productivity)
Convergence Divergence




with α=0.05 with α=0.05
Source: own elaborations
The overall increase in agricultural labour productivity evidenced by the analysis is
mainly due to the declining agricultural labour (in AWU), which decreased by 79%
between 2003 and 2007, moving from 582 000 to 459 000 units (Csáki, 2009), while the
NMS average agricultural labour decreased by 85% in the same period, moving from
710 100 to 603 500 AWU.
36 α= 0.05
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Source: own elaborations on Eurostat data
In conclusion, the results of the non-parametric convergence analysis (stochastic kernel)
on the 20 Hungarian countries between 1997 and 2008 show clear polarization: a small
group of counties headed by Budapest grows fast, while the other one, composed by the
most of the mainly rural and less developed counties tend to converge among
themselves at lower income levels, confirming previous descriptive analysis (Csáki et
al., 2010). The marginal distribution functions show a tendency of the high intensity
peak, composed by lower income counties, to move towards the same modal value
between 1997 and 2003, while this trend is less evident between 2004 and 2008.
Moreover, the CAP introduction in Hungary (NUTS 3 level) was not targeted to the
most agricultural and rural counties: in fact, the marginal distribution of p.c. GDP (PPS)
conditioned to direct payments, is very similar to the unconditioned ones for the same
years (2004 and 2008). Therefore, it is not a surprise that convergence in agricultural
labour productivity among the Hungarian counties between 2000 and 2007, calculated
with a parametric methodology (σ-convergence) due to the lack of time series, didn’t
occur, with Budapest (an urban county) recording the best values, while the lowest
growth in agricultural labour productivity is recorded by the most lagging behind and
rural counties (Nόgrád, Heves, Borsod).
As a difference from the Hungary, the convergence analysis applied to the NMS at the
NUTS 3 level evidences the presence of multimodality: convergence realizes between
the most of the statistical units around the average NMS level of p.c. GDP (PPS), while
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just few areas (the capital towns) set on much higher p.c. income levels, comparable
with the EU-27 average.
Finally, we must underline the preliminary explorative role of these analyses, which
have been influenced (in the methodologies and time period chosen) by the persisting
limitations of official statistics, especially at disaggregated levels.
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CHAPTER 3
CAP REFORMS AT A GLANCE
3.1 CAP support, farmers’ income and distribution inequality: more than a
question of measurement
One of the main CAP objectives, the achievement of “a fair standard of living for the
agricultural community”, was already stated in the 1957 Treaty of Rome, before the
CAP launch in 1962. During the several reforms occurred from the 1980s, the
preservation of farmers’ income was a main blocking issue: the introduction of the
decoupled support (based on the Single Payment Scheme, SPS) was considered by
farmers and producers organizations as a limited compensation. The slow but
continuous decrease of the CAP budget on the total EU share, and the EU enlargement
to 10 NMS where agriculture and rural areas still played a relevant role, turned the
attention on the relapses on farmers’ income. Direct payments, decoupled from
production, were introduced to solve the distortions caused by market support and to
make farmers more market oriented in their production choices. They became the main
support instrument within the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF): in 2011,
up to a total of EUR 56,4 billion (in payments appropriation), EUR 42,9 billion went for
direct aids and market related expenditures, while the remaining 13,5 for Rural
development, environment & fisheries. Direct aids and market expenditures represented
30.2% of the EU budget, while Rural development 11.1%. There are several policy
instruments which impact the economic situation of farmers but, as showed by Figure
3.1.1, direct payments are often the main one.
Figure 3.1.1: Direct payments and total operating subsidies as a percentage of
agricultural income (avg. 2007-2009)
Source: FADN, 2011
70
The share of direct payments on the total is (average 2007-2009) was considerable
higher in the EU-15 (more than 30%) than in EU-12 (20%); they represented the most
of subsidies in Denmark, Netherlands and Italy, while they share the lowest in Finland,
Slovenia and Latvia.
After the 2004 (and 2007) enlargement, a main issue emerged in relation to direct
payments: the distribution inequality between Members States due to the reference
criteria chosen. The difference in direct payments between NMS and the EU-15
reported in Table 3.1.1 is the result of hard debate among previous EU members
(discussion from which the new comers were excluded) in the years before the 2004
enlargement: the initial position based on the exclusion of NMS from direct payments,
EU-15 agreed for a partial phasing in of payments from 2004 to 2013. By the way, even
in 2013 a relevant differential in payments per hectare will persist, in favour of already
agricultural better off countries (for structural conditions, investments, productivity).
For the first complete programming period (2007-2013), the EU-1037 could opt for the
Single Area Payment Scheme (SAPS), and their governments could pay  farmers a
Complementary National Direct Payment (CNDP) for those sectors which were already
supported  by  the  CAP38.  From the date of the EU accession, three types of support are
available for producers: low market support; single area payment scheme (SAPS); rural
development support and top-up payments (paid from the national budget as an
integration of SAPS, till 30%).The maximum amount of direct area payments, based on
reference yield39, under the Single Area Payment Scheme (SAPS) and Direct Payments
by National Contribution (CNDP) was around EUR 298/ha in 2010 (an upward trend
has begun since these two countries joined the EU in 2004) and it will be fixed at this
level until the end of the programming period. Thus, in 2013 the average direct payment
for EU-10 will be EUR 250/ha, and EUR 300/ha for the EU-15 (Table 3.1.1).
Table 3.1.1: Direct payment granted per hectare, in EUR/ha (SAPS+CNDP)
Country Reference yield 2004 2006 2008  2010 2011-13
Hungary 4.73 149.5 174.3 238.4 298 298
Poland 3.00 104 122.9 151.2 189 189
EU-10 4.00* 138.6 163.8 201.6 252 252
EU-15 4.77 300.5 300.5 300.5 300.5 300.5
EU-10/15, % 83.8 46.1 54.5 67.1 83.8 83.8
Source: EC DGAgri, *Popp-Udovecz, 2007
37 EU-10 includes all the countries which joined the EU in 2004. EU-12 includes also Bulgaria and
Romania, which joined the EU in 2007.
38 Based  on  this  rule,  Hungary  has  created  11 different “topup” envelops for the year 2005.
39 Average value of the yield recorded in 1995-1999. Therefore, payment per hectare will be lower for the
NMS than in the EU-15 because the transition process resulted in lower yields.
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Farmers  from  the  NMS  are  poorer  in  comparison  to  their  colleagues  from  the  EU-15
(for simplification my comparison is based on averages), but they have to meet the same
EU standards and obligations (leaving out some small exceptions).
The gap between the EU-15 and the EU-12 is even bigger (in average EUR 300/ha and
EUR 200/ha respectively), as showed by Figure 3.1.2 where it is also possible to read
the differences in the distribution of direct support both between and within the Member
States. The highest allocation in EUR/ha in 2013 will occur in the Netherlands, Belgium
and  Italy  (Malta  being  an  outlier  due  to  the  very  limited  size  of  arable  land),  but  the
highest inequality among the beneficiaries within Member States will take place in
Czech Republic (more than EUR 40,000/beneficiary) and in Slovakia (more than EUR
25,000/beneficiary). Moreover, within the same country direct payments allocation vary
according to the region (NUTS 3) and structural characteristics, as evidenced by the
analysis of SAPS applications provided in paragraph 2.4.3.
Figure 3.1.2: Average direct payments per beneficiary and per hectare in 201340
Source: DG Agri
Thus, in the NMS the CAP introduction was conceived mainly as a matter of inequality,
and few months after the enlargement, farmers’ protests exploded. And the numbers
support them: Figure 3.1.3 shows the difference in amount of decoupled payments per
ha in the EU-15 and the NMS, because the rate of payment each farmer was eligible for
was based on previous support receipts (linked to the individual farmer or regional
productivity). As explained in Chapter 1, at the time of accession the NMS still
presented development delays linked to the unfinished transition process, especially in
agriculture, which constituted the main activity of the poorer areas, and was mainly
characterized by low productivity, due to parcelization, lack of investments and spread
subsistence. Thus, the choice to use production level based on historical or regional
performance as reference was much penalizing for the NMS. The situation is not going
40 This figure is based on the national envelopes of Member States after full phasing-in of direct payments
in the EU-12 and the number of potentially eligible hectares in IACS for 2008.
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to change even in the next programming period: in fact, calculations based on EC
proposals and eligible hectares in 2009 show that since 2017 EU-15 farmers shall
receive EUR 293/ha, and the NMS shall receive only EUR 218/ha. This distribution
goes not only against the EU Treaty and the CAP guidelines, but it is also in
contradiction with the function of direct payments (income support), which is
highlighted by the EC as justification of their existence. If they were supposed to cover
such a role, the higher direct payments per hectare should be directed to poorer farmers
in lagging behind countries (the NMS), while the maintenance of the status quo favours
the EU-15.The data on the distribution of direct payments in 2010 per Member State
published by DG Agri in 2012 confirm it: the EU-15 farmers received quite 90% of all
direct payments, owned more than 70% of the potential eligible area and utilized
agricultural area, and the 80% of livestock units in the EU-27 (Figure 3.1.3). This
imbalance in transfers could occur because, since Agenda 2000, the future NMS were
policy takers: they couldn’t influence the reforms agenda, given their low bargaining
power. Thus, the existing EU legislative corpus, which reflected the evolution of the
needs and priorities of the EU-15 during the years, was introduced in the NMS though
emulation (Gorton et al, 2009). The imbalance doesn’t realize only in the different
amounts paid to the two groups of countries, but also in the budget differences between
the  two  CAP  pillars:  while  in  the  last  decade  the  EC  officially  pointed  the  policy
attention on RD in order to promote multifunctional agricultural and rural areas, the
most of measures remains farms-centric. Since the launch of the SAPARD pre-
accession program, aimed at helping the accession countries with the CAP requirements
of the Acquis Communitaire,  quite  70%  of  the  total  EU  contribution  was  directed  to
three common measures: processing and marketing of agricultural and fisheries
products, investments in agricultural holdings and development of rural infrastructures.
Figure 3.1.3: Distribution of direct payments*, potential eligible area**, utilized
agricultural area and livestock units***, EU-27=100%
* 2010 Financial Year
** IACS 2009
*** 2007 Farm Structure Survey
Source: DG Agri.
Source: DG Agri
* 2010 Financial Year
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** IACS 2009
*** 2007 Farm Structure Survey
Source: DG Agri
Among the EU-15, the better off countries in 2010 were France, Germany and Spain,
respectively with quite 24%, 16% and 15% of direct payments (EU-15=100%), while in
the EU-12 the most of direct payments (EU-12=100%) went to Poland and Hungary,
respectively with around 38% and 17% (Figure 3.1.4). Poland detained also the highest
number of livestock units (43%), and the highest potential eligible area and utilized
agricultural area, followed by Romania and Hungary.
Figure 3.1.4: Distribution of direct payments*, potential eligible area**, utilized
agricultural area and livestock units in EU-12***, EU-12=100%.
* 2010 Financial Year
** IACS 2009
*** 2007 Farm Structure Survey
Source: DG Agri
Moreover, in 2010 in the EU-15 there were the most of beneficiaries, 4,694 versus
3,143 in the EU-12 (Table 3.1.2): they received in average EUR 7,487 (83% of the
total), quite 5 times more than their counterparts in the EU-12 (EUR 1,552). Quite the
total of beneficiaries (96%) in the EU-12 received less than EUR 5,000, while this
average stops at 71% in the EU-15, where they represented only 12% of direct
payments (40% in the EU-12). Thus, direct payments are both unequally distributed
between the EU-15 and the EU-12 (in favour of the former), and within the EU-15,
where 79% of farms gets 88% of direct payments.
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Table 3.1.2: Number of beneficiaries and average amount, 2010
2010 EU-12 EU-15
number of beneficiaries (.000) 3,143 4,694
average amount
(EUR/beneficiary) 1,552 7,487






According to the last DG Agri report (2012), in 2010 in the EU-15, 80% of beneficiaries
received between 14% (Portugal) and 55% (Luxemburg) of direct payments. At the same
time, in the EU-12 80% of beneficiaries received between 4% (Slovakia) and 37% (Slovenia)
of direct payments. Being the support mainly based on area and livestock according to
historical reference yields, the distribution of direct payments between beneficiaries in the
two groups reflects the differences in farm size (smaller in the EU-12) and in farm structures
(most of livestock units are in the EU-15).
In Hungary, the beneficiaries of direct payments were 182 830 (2.3% of the EU-27) for a total
amount of EUR 821,206 000 (on a total EU-27 amount of 39,685,106 000), thus an average
amount of EUR 4,491 per farm. 87.3% of beneficiaries received less than EUR 5,000, which is
limit that in the legislative CAP proposal after 2013 identifies an active farmer. These farmers
received 21% of total direct payments and the remaining 79% circa goes to 12% of
beneficiaries, which will be able to be considered active farmers. Farms receiving more than
EUR 150,000, which will be interested by capping after 2013, are 0.4% and will get 29.4% of
direct payments. 0.15% of beneficiary farms received more than EUR 300,000 (18.4% of total
direct payments): according to the new regulations they will be excluded by direct payments
and  their  quota  will  be  moved  to  pillar  II.  For  a  brief  comparison,  in  the  EU-27  81.1%  of
farmers received less than EUR 5,000, which represent 15% of expenditures for direct
payments. 0.2% of farmers received more than EUR 150,000, and 0.05% more than EUR
300,000, getting respectively 11% and 5.6% of direct payments. In Hungary more farms
receive less than EUR 5,000 in comparison with the EU-27, but at the same time the share of
farms receiving more than EUR 150,000 is higher than the EU-27 average, highlighting a clear
polarization of the distribution of direct payments.
3.2 Understanding the poverty issue in agricultural and rural areas
When introduced in 1962, the CAP was endowed with several objectives (art. 39 of the
Treaty of Rome):
- to provide enough supply of food at reasonable prices for consumers (to
overcome the food shortages of the 1950s, achieving self-sufficiency);
- to increase productivity, especially the labour contribution, though support to
mechanization and use of factors of production;
- to stabilize markets;
- to ensure fair standard of living for farmers.
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In fact, the development path which characterized the six EU founding members
(Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) was mainly
driven by industrialization, while agricultural areas were lagging behind. Moreover,
farmers were mainly affected by poverty, and the CAP introduction was expected to
contribute to convergence in income between urban and rural households, supporting
incomes from agricultural activities. Thus, the original CAP covered both economic and
social objectives.
During the years, the CAP has slightly modified its goals, including also public health
(Article168 (1)), consumer protection (Article169 (2)), economic, social and territorial
cohesion (Article175) and environmental protection (Articles191and 192(3)). Moreover,
it faced the relevant socio-economic structural changes occurred in the agricultural and
rural areas, and at the several EU enlargements which led the EU to include now 27 MS.
Being the initial conditions notably changed, many voices advocates reforms, both in
the CAP objectives (in order to better answer the current challenges, i.e. climate change
and food safety), and in the amount of funds dedicated, in percentage of the EU budget
and in nominal terms. In 2012 the CAP costs about 57 billion Euros per year,
representing more than 40% of the total budget, or 0.5% of GDP in the EU, but the CAP
budget in percentage of the EU total declined progressively during the last two decades,
since its peak in 1988 (70% of the EU budget).
Is the money spent for CAP every year effective in creating value added for the poor
agricultural population? And which are the characteristics of the protagonists
agricultural poverty, a feature stressed by the EC (EC, 2010) but still widely undefined?
A clear definition of the matters of discussion has been never provided. In fact, even if
we dispose of several data about agriculture in the EU (e.g. the EU aggregate
Economics Accounts for Agriculture provided by Eurostat, the FADN/RICA data at
farm level), it is not possible to address clearly who forms the agricultural community,
what should be a fair living standard, and who are the poor farmers in the EU.
Therefore, it should be a small surprise that the CAP is highly inefficient at targeting
(OECD, 2011) the areas and the farmers most in need, without promoting farm
productivity and performance. In particular, two issues are very pressing: the
introduction of a system for measuring the incomes of farm households, and to state the
dimensions of inequality of payments distribution.
As for incomes, it has been evidenced (Hill, 2010) that there is no shortage of
measurements of the income from agricultural activities (the production of goods to be
agricultural), but they are not able to address the level of the income of farm households
and its change. At the same time, little information is available on the whole income
actually received by farmers, also due to the limited possibility to access the regional
data about CAP payments41.
Two main approaches are used to analyze farm income:
41 It is worthy to note that several statistics, also related to the CAP payments, are provided at the Country
level, but much less information is available at the disaggregated level.
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- In  the  EU,  Eurostat  provides  the  activity  accounts  for  agriculture:  through  the
aggregate Economics Accounts (which provide the net value added for Member
State),  and  the  FADN/RICA  micro  data  at  farm  level,  it  accounts  for  all
agricultural production, but fails to capture all non-agricultural activities non
strictly related to production.
- The accounts for institutional units which give information on households self-
employed in farm businesses. They include important information about income
from  social  transfers,  extra  agricultural  activities,  other  part-time  or  self-
employment, property incomes, but present the problem of deciding which are
the mainly agricultural households42.
Although the important limits evidenced, the EU is still using these approaches because
they are easier to measure (it is easier to assume that farmers and their families are
mainly/just engaged in agriculture); because they don’t violate the internal political
equilibrium and don’t go against administrators and politicians’ interests (several
political pressures prevented FADN to include extra-agricultural income related
questions in the micro-surveys); because of the low data quality and limited availability
(UNECE 2005; WYE-FAO, 2007).
In  the  late  1980s  Eurostat  started  working  at  a  project,  the  Total  Income  of  the
Agricultural Households, aimed at building up a set of accounts for agricultural
households by disaggregating each households sector account in the Member States.
Data were diffused untill 1992 but later on the project was abandoned because of the
lack of interest showed by the EU-15.
Lately, the OECD was working on agricultural household income information (OECD,
2005), as also the FAO (Wye Handbook, 2007), but progresses stopped at the EU level,
and the European Court of Auditors stated that there is no satisfactory information to
decide if the CAP objective of achieving a fair standard of living for the agricultural
community was met.
In the EU, agricultural income is as measured as real factor income per full-time worker
(annual working unit, or AWU). Latest analysis provided by DG Agri states that in the
last decade, agricultural income in EU-15 showed very modest development43 (Figure
3.2.1) while it increased considerably in EU-12, thanks to the gradual phasing in of
direct payments.
42Currently, households are classified as mainly agricultural if their main income source (for the whole of
just its head) is farming or households where any member gets some income from self-employment from
farming (Hill, 2008).
43 DG AGRI-FADN (2010): Developments in the income situation of the EU agricultural sector.
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Figure 3.2.1: EU development in agricultural income (income per AWU in real terms)
Source: EC, 2011
During the last decade, farm income per worker increased in nominal terms for all the
EU-27, but at different pace: in fact, since 2004 in the NMS farm income rose faster,
+11% in EU10 (excluding Bulgaria and Romania, where it soared +200% between 2007
and 2008), while the EU-15 recorded +4% (FADN, 2011).
It is also forecasted that in the medium-term the EU agricultural income (under a
constant policy assumption) will follow a similar trend, increasing moderately in the
EU-15 and growing fast in the EU-12, thanks to the full phasing in of direct payments
(which will remain lower than direct payments accorded to the EU-15), an assumed
higher value of production, and the decline in farm labour (DG Agri, 2009).
The data above, together with the ones provided by Eurostat (2012) on the change of
real income in agriculture per AWU, show that the crisis of food prices was beneficial
for farm incomes since 2007 (except for a negative peak in 2009). Between 2005 and
2011, also the EU-27 real agricultural income per worker increased (+18.3%), while
agricultural labour input fell (-15.2%). Fixing 2005=100, in 2011 the real income in
agriculture per AWU was 187 in Estonia, 174 in Hungary, 144 in the UK, 137 in
Denmark and 125 in Sweden, with the EU-27 average at 118. In particular, in 2011, the
EU agricultural real income per worker has increased by 6.7% compared to 2010 levels
(Eurostat Newsrelease, December 2011), resulting from a rise in real agricultural
income (+3.9%) due to higher commodity prices, and from a decline in the number of
farm workers (-2.7%). If we rely on the OECD-FAO Agricultural outlook 2009-2018,
where the long term estimates show rising agricultural prices and incomes, the EC fears
for falling agricultural income in the EU-27 in the next years seem unjustified, even if
considered in a scenario characterized by high volatility of commodity prices. Already
at  the  end  of  2010  the  EC  clearly  stated  in  its  Official  Communication  that:  “After  a
decade of mere income stagnation, agricultural income dropped substantially in 2009
adding to an already fragile situation of an agricultural income significantly lower (by
an estimated 40% per working unit) than that in the rest of the economy, and income per
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inhabitant in rural areas is considerably lower (by about 50%) than in urban areas”. For
the EC, the main cause of agricultural income stagnation (or even the risk of decline) is
represented by the instability which characterizes commodity prices on international
market since 2007, influencing input and output prices, and the connected change in
production levels, due to yields instability.
Moving from the analysis of the percentage change of the agricultural income in the
EU-15 and EU-12 (Figure 3.1.2), to the analysis of the values of the agricultural
incomes in comparison with the average growth path followed by the economy, a quite
different scenario emerges (Figure 3.2.2)44. The average agricultural income increased
(Figure 3.2.2) mainly between 2003 and 2004 (the enlargement year) in the EU-10
(Romania e Bulgaria excluded), as a difference with the EU-15, but starting from very
different levels. In 2009, the EU-10 farmers (which exclude Bulgaria and Romania)
remain poorer than the rest of the society, their income reaching only the 30%, while in
the EU-15 farmers incomes are quite the half of the average income in the economy.
By the way, we must underline a main methodological limit of this analysis: the
measurement of farmers’ income from agricultural activities differs substantially from
the calculation of the average wages in the economy. Another important issue is
represented  by  the  lack  of  reliable  data  on  full-time  equivalent  statistics  for  the  total
economy, which bases the calculation of the EU-15 and the EU-10 averages on the
selection of just a small number of countries, distorting the results (Jambor, 2012).
Figure 3.2.2: Evolution of agricultural income as a % of average income in the
economy
Source: DG Agri, Eurostat
The same scenario appears when looking at the income per worker between Member
States (Figure 3.2.3): in 2007 the highest level was recorded in Denmark, the
Netherlands,  Belgium and UK,  and  the  EU-15 average  is  57% higher  than  the  EU-27
44 As also evidenced by the EC, these figures should be interpreted with care owing to conceptual
differences between the measurement of farmer’s income from agricultural activities and average wages
in the economy, and that, due to the lack of reliable data on full-time equivalent labour statistics for the
total economy for some MS, only some of them have been considered to calculate the averages.
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one. In the EU-15 only Greece and Portugal showed values below the EU average,
while  in  the  EU-10 all  the  countries  set  below (53% below the  EU-27 average),  with
Romania and Bulgaria performing the worst (85% below the EU-27 average).
Figure 3.2.3: Income per worker by Member State, 2007
Source: EU FADN - DG AGRI
This relevant difference in income per worker also emerges at the regional level, with
higher values recorded in Benelux and Northern Germany, and lower values are in
Eastern Europe, Greece and Portugal (FADN, 2011).
Although the EC continues to show the negative difference in agricultural incomes in
comparison with the rest of the economy, stating that poverty and vulnerability are
characteristic of people living of agriculture in rural areas, recent studies on the topic
provide evidence that both in the EU (de Frahan et al., 2008) and in the USA
(USDA/ERS Briefing room, February 2012) the average farm household income is
greater than the average non-farm household income. In particular, de Frahan et al.
analyse 12 OECD countries (Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, United Kingdom and United States) and they find
that the average farm household income is greater than the average non-farm household
income45; lower average farm household income tends to occur sporadically for some
years in only six of the selected countries; the incidence of poverty tends to be less
severe among farm households than non-farm households but the intensity of poverty
tends to be more severe among farm households than non-farm households in most
countries (in general there are relatively fewer poor farm households compared to non-
farm households).
45 The distinction between farm and non-farm households is made according to the household’s income
sources. Here a narrow definition of farm household is used, where household’s farm self-employment
income is greater than 50% of its factor incomes. A non-farm household is defined as a household whose
farm self-employment income is null.
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The contrasting positions on farmers’ income and living conditions don’t take into
account a much debated feature: the contribution of subsistence farming to households’
real incomes. The predominance of small scale subsistence and semi-subsistence farms
is a reality in the NMS even after the EU membership.  Although their  role in the area
and their characteristics are debated (whether they are a free or forced farmers’ choice;
an inefficient solution or a tool for diversification), last studies (Davidova et al., 2009)
find that they aren’t a transition phenomenon but a long lasting tendency in the short to
long term. Moreover, the subsistence production is able to push a relevant share of
subsistence and semi-subsistence farms above the poverty line. At the same time, the
CAP strategy in the NMS is not clear: direct payments are accessible also by small
farms (minimum 1 hectare), they are farm centric and they aim at providing income
support, but they mostly benefit larger and richer farms in more developed regions.
The definition of subsistence farming is not univocal, according to the approach used
(consumption versus production). The classification provided by Mosher in 1970 uses
the 50% of output sold as threshold for identifying farms as mainly subsistence/semi-
subsistence, or mainly commercial. The SCARLED Project defines subsistence farms as
the holdings producing mainly for own consumption with less than 1 ESU. In each
country, subsistence production is imputed a monetary value, calculated accounting for
the share of farms’ unsold output valuated for each product at market prices (as a proxy
of the opportunity cost of the village or regional average price). This methodology has
been chosen due to the lack of adequate data, and it relies on the Farm Structural Survey
provided by Eurostat for the EU-27. In fact, Eurostat doesn’t report farms below 5ha,
therefore it is not possible to obtain the number of farms allowed to get SAPS
entitlements in NMS (equal or over 1ha).
Income dependency on subsistence production highlights the presence, together with the
reliance on unearned income (land rent) and transfers (public or remittances from
abroad) of vulnerability in rural areas, which opens the way to rural poverty (Bogdanov,
2007). The poverty threshold varies across the EU Member States, as it is set at 60% of
the national equivalized median income. Rural poverty is associated to location in
remote areas, farm size and land ownership: the lowest farmers’ income is recorded for
people owning a small plot (below 1ha) or being landless, and located in loosing or
remote areas which don’t provide any income diversification opportunity (Petrovici et
al., 2005). Therefore, measures for poverty alleviation should be a central point in the
Rural Development Policy (RDP) in the NMS, focusing on improving education,
vocational training, microfinance and diversification activities (Van den Berg, 2001).
The introduction of CAP direct payments in the NMS in its current income-support
shape will not contribute to improve poor farmers’ living conditions, either because they
are not eligible (according to the minimal size of land required) and because the
payments are not subjected to the introduction of diversification and off-farm activities.
The case studies analysis provided by Chaplin et al. (2004) on several NMS shows that
farmers consider direct payments only as an income support instrument, thus decreasing
their willingness to diversify by creating off-farm businesses, or entering the market.
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The limits of measuring farm income go together with another important issue, the
inequality in support distribution: the OECD found lately (2011) that the single
payments are still skewed towards bigger and already wealthier recipients, and benefits
tend to be capitalised into land values thus not reaching active farmers46. The support is
very unequally distributed across the EU: 25% of farms, which are the largest ones,
receive 75% of payments. The latest FADN analysis (2011) on farm income
development in the EU links the differences in income levels to the differences in the
Member States productive orientation, the significant diversity in farm structure, the
farm  technical  strategy  and  the  natural  conditions.  Moreover,  it  affirms  that  direct
payments play a crucial role in farm profitability, because they increase significantly the
share of farms able to cover their total costs. Therefore, the introduction of better
measures  to  analyse  farm  income  and  the  provision  of  more  information  on  the  CAP
payments would contribute understanding the real magnitude of poverty and inequality
among farmers, and to better target the future CAP measures accordingly.
The changes in farm income according to farm specialization and farm size are shown
in Figure 3.2.4: the highest income per worker is recorded (average 2004-2006) by pig
and poultry farms, followed by milk producers, while it is lower for fields crops and
mixed farms.
Figure 3.2.4: Income per worker by farm type, average 2004-2006
Source: EU FADN – DG AGRI
At the same time these latter farm types, together with grazing livestock farms, receive
the most of direct payments, well above the EU-25 average (grazing livestock farms
46 In the NMS, land parcelization, the limit of landownership set to 300 ha, and the prohibition for cooperatives to
own land, introduced with the land reform after the system change (i.e. in Hungary), induced small farmers to rent
land, thus receiving both the renting fee and the decoupled payment (SAPS).
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receive 46% of direct payments, well above the average level of 31%), while the lowest
support is provided for wine and horticulture (Figure 3.2.5).
Figure 3.2.5: Share of direct payments in income by farm type, average 2006-2008 in
EU-25
Source: EU FADN – DG AGRI
Moreover, the bigger the farm size, the higher the income, especially for farms over 100
ha (Figure 3.2.6).
Figure 3.2.6: Income per worker by farm economic size (ESU)
Source: EU FADN – DG AGRI
While over 40% of the EU farms set in the income class below EUR 5,000, there is a
smaller share (around 3%) of farms which shows an income above EUR 70,000 (in
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average 2007-2008). This 3% of richest farms produces 18% of the EU agricultural
output, while farms till EUR 5,000 reach 7%.
3.3 The long reform path: the CAP between dated barriers and future visions
There  is  a  well-known  citation  from  a  famous  Italian  book  written  by  Tomasi  di
Lampedusa, “The Leopard”, where the protagonist, the Prince of Salina, affirms that “if
we  want  things  to  stay  as  they  are,  things  will  have  to  change”.  This  sentence  nicely
adapts to the path followed by the reforms of the CAP budget since 1988, when the so-
called “agricultural budget guideline” was established, which fixed the increase in CAP
expenditure below 74% of the EU GDP growth. In 1992, the Mac Sharry Presidency
introduced several modifications, such as cut support prices (-15% for beef, -30% for
crops),  and  a  partial  decoupled  system of  payments,  to  be  compensated  by  direct  aids
per  hectare.  The  refinement  of  the  EU  balance  discipline  determined  a  change  in  the
relation between EU budget and CAP: from unidirectional (CAP choices impact on the
EU budget) it became bidirectional (also budget problems affect CAP). Partial
decoupling and the continuation of set-aside, which became obligatory since 1992,
encouraged extensive agriculture and together with the introduction of agro-
environmental measures (completed by cross compliance in 2003), the CAP started to
approach the environmental challenge. In 2003, the CAP Medium Term Review (MTR)
– or Fischler reform - fully decoupled support from production, froze the national
allocations  of  CAP funds  and  preventing  from redistribution  among States,  which  are
now responsible for policy implementation at the national level. The CAP MTR is
considered a turning point for European agriculture because it introduced (Swinnen,
2008):
- the single farm payment (SFP) on the basis of historical entitlements, in order to
decouple support from production, making the CAP fit for the WTO Doha
Round.
- cross compliance, linking SFP to farmers’ respect of environmental, animals and
food quality standards, and modulation, which allows the Member States to shift
funds from pillar I to pillar II by reducing transfers to the larger farms.
- Reform of market organizations, especially for dairy and rice.
- Strengthening of the financial discipline.
Moreover,  the  Fischler  reform saved  the  CAP budget  from the  cuts  needed  to  finance
the costs of the 2004 EU Eastern enlargement, with the decision to freeze the budget
(i.e. only 1% nominal budget increase was allowed) and to introduce direct payments
gradually in the NMS. In this way, the CAP MTR preserved the former CAP financial
endowment till 2013, limiting the redistributive power of the reform package, and only
marginally  affecting  the  previous  political  equilibrium.  This  result  was  obtained  after
quite a decade of internal debate among the EU-15 which was often guided by the main
CAP beneficiaries (France, Greece, Spain), blocking the development of a distribution
policy among the Member States based on more equitable and objective economic
criteria (e.g. p.c. GDP, agricultural share on GDP and employment in agriculture).
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With decoupling, the EC aimed at facing internal and international pressing issues: the
need to ceil the budget for the CAP, which reached also the two-thirds of the EU budget
at the end of the 1980s rising taxpayers’ complaints; the accomplishment of the requests
coming from the international arena (and WTO negotiates in particular) for lower price
distortion and internal market support (i.e. production subsidies, tariffs). The urgency to
reform the support was also advocated by the CAP opponents due to the changing
demographic and production conditions of agricultural and rural areas, and to the lack of
policy targeting (i.e. to poor small farmers in depressed areas). In fact, in the last
decades, the importance of the primary sector on GDP decreased (from 6% of GDP in
1970s to less than 2% in 2007, even if it was around 4.5% in NMS in 200747), and rural
population declined48.
Decoupling had several implications for competition in global food and agricultural
markets, as well as in WTO agricultural trade talks (especially at the Uruguay Round
where the US and the Cairns Group of agricultural exporters, headed by Australia,
pressed  the  EU  for  reforms):  first  of  all,  it  allowed  the  EU  to  move  the  most  of  the
support from the highly distortion amber box to the green one49. In fact, decoupled
payments are fixed payments, not tied to specific production or activities: they reduce
farmers’ income risk since payments are based on a fixed factor (the 2000-2002
historical payments on area and yields basis, or on a per head basis for livestock
payments), leaving farmers free to produce according to the market signals and
incentives50. Only few coupled payments remained, for suckler cow, goats and sheep
premium,  for  which  the  Member  States  could  maintain  the  previous  level  of  coupled
support (DG Agri). Since the 1992 CAP reform, cumulative prices decreased by 70%
for rice and durum wheat, and by more than 60% for beef and soft wheat (Figure 3.3.1).
47 Csaki, Cs., A. Jambor (2009): The diversity of effects of EU membership on agriculture in New MS.
Policy Studies on Rural Transition No. 2009-4. FAO
48 The classification of the population in rural or urban, and the connected flow of public support, is a
much debated issue. A better area classification would allow introducing better targeted policies, reducing
the waste of public money.
49 WTO, Agriculture Negotiations Backgrounder on Domestic Support: Amber, Blue and Green Boxes.
www.wto.org
50 Examples of this were provided in 2008, when farmers switched productive plots to crop cultivations,
due the notable increase in crop prices (wheat, maize, rice) in 2007.
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Figure 3.3.1: Cumulative reduction in prices support between 1991 and 2009
N.B.: in percentage
Source: EC (2010)
Figure 3.3.2: Change in net production surplus (% of consumption)
Source: DG Agri (2010)
The reduction of the coupled support had also an important effect on the quantity of the
commodities produced. The net production surplus decreased relevantly between 1990
and 2008 in all the sectors (excluding butter, pork and cheese), and it also became
negative for beef (Figure 3.3.2).
The CAP Health Check in 2008 promoted other corrective measures: the gradual
increase in milk quotas, which were set to expire in 2015; the abolishment of set-aside51;
more  funds  (till  10%  of  direct  aids)  for  modulation,  to  be  reinvested  into  Rural
Development for climate change, renewable energy, biodiversity and innovation
51 Since 1992, arable farmers were required to leave 10% of their land fallow, both to preserve the land in
good agri-environmental conditions, and to limit the production potential.
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programmes; the promotion of more compelling cross compliance; the introduction of
art. 68 which allows the Member States to retain till 10% of their national budget
ceilings for environmental measures and marketing; an increased support to young
farmers. The results from the past CAP reforms are illustrated in Figure 3.3.3.
Figure 3.3.3: Evolution of CAP expenditures in the reform path
Source: DG Agri (2010)
Export subsidies and market support, which prevailed since the creation of the CAP,
started to decrease in 1992, in favour of rural development and coupled direct payments.
In 2005 direct payments were introduced, and rapidly took the place of coupled
payments, while market and export support continued to decrease, and rural
development measures stood still. Figure 3.3.3 also shows the progressive decrease,
since 1995, of the EU budget allocated to CAP, which now represents 0.45% of the EU
GDP,  in  favour  of  the  structural  and  cohesion  policy.  In  fact,  the  EU  budget  for  the
programming period 2007-2013 shows fast growing allocations for the section
“Sustainable growth”, which includes the policies for cohesion, and stagnating
allocations for the CAP (“Preservation and Management of Natural Resources”), which
becomes  the  second  voice  of  the  budget  (Table  3.3.1).  Moreover,  within  the  CAP
section,  the  most  of  the  budget  is  directed  to  pillar  I  (market  related  expenditure  and
direct payments), while financial endowments for pillar II grows slowly.
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Table 3.3.1: EU Budget for commitments, 2007-2013 (in million EUR)
Commitment
























1,273 1,362 1,518 1,693 1,889 2,105 2,376 12,216
3a. Freedom, Security
and Justice 637 747 867 1,025 1,206 1,406 1,661 7,549
3b. Citizenship 636 615 651 668 683 699 715 4,667
4. EU as a global
player 6,578 7,002 7,440 7,893 8,430 8,997 9,595 55,935
5. Administration 7,039 7,380 7,525 7,882 8,334 8,670 9,095 55,925
6. Compensations 445 207 210 862
Total commitment
appropriations 124,457 132,797 134,722 140,978 142,965 147,546 152,312 975,777
as a percentage of GNI 1.02% 1.08% 1.16% 1.18% 1.16% 1.13% 1.12% 1.12%
Source: EC, 2011
3.4 The CAP towards 2020: a tool for a wider Europe?
According to the OECD “Evaluation of Agricultural Policy Reforms in the European
Union” (OECD, 2011b), the European support to farm incomes has decreased
substantially over the past 20 years (from 39% annually over the 1986-88 period, till
22% over the 2008-10 period). Among the main reasons, the OECD evidenced the 25
years of CAP reform, aimed at making the EU agricultural sector more competitive and
less distorted, and the high commodity prices, which since 2007 automatically push
down income support. Moreover, the CAP started to focus the policy attention on new
challenges and objectives, such as the environmental sustainability of the agricultural
activity and the strengthening of monitoring and evaluation in order to increase policy
effectiveness. As the OECD director of Trade and Agriculture, Ken Ash, evidenced, this
period of expected growth in demand and higher real commodity prices offers important
opportunities to the re-orientation of CAP away from broad income support and towards
investments for a competitive agro-food sector. In fact, after the last EU Eastern
enlargement, the European agriculture is more diversified, and its concept of land use
and farm production system is changing towards agro-environmental sustainability, in
order to meet the sustainability challenges and to account for new tendencies, such as
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the new producers-consumers relations based on proximity of production-consumption
places and food transparency, and the growing citizens’ requests for public goods
preservation and quality of life (urban and rural green). These novelties come together
with  the  different  development  trends  recorded  by  expanding  urban  areas,  and  the
functional and geographical redefinition of peri-urban areas.
This change in policy orientation was also invocated by the EC in the regulations for the
programming period 2014-2020. It identifies food security, environmental and climate
change, and territorial balance (with particular attention to rural areas) among the main
topics on the agenda, to be achieved through redistribution, redesign and better targeting
of support, to add EU value and quality in spending. This attention also answers the EC
need to justify in front of taxpayers – in an international scenario characterized by
economic recession and financial disorders – the still relevant budget allocated to CAP
(more than EUR 60 billion, 41% of the total EU budget in 2012)52. Thus, the new CAP
framework for the period 2014-2020 raised the attention of many analysts from different
sectors: would the EC continue and strengthen reforms towards a multifunctional,
sustainable, safer and more equitable agriculture?
The EC Communication (November, 2011) “The CAP towards 2020: meeting the food,
natural resources and territorial challenges of the future” provides half solutions, and
left many – especially in the NMS – unsatisfied. In fact, formally the EC focuses on the
following  issues:  the  introduction  of  a  green  payment  for  greening  the  CAP;  the
convergence of funds payments among the Countries, the need to assure the support
only to active farmers and a capping for the aids for a less unequal distribution of
support; a simplified scheme for small farmers; a consistent revision of the structure of
the RD policy but without main changes in its overall budget. By the way, the financial
allocation and the redistribution of measures between the first (and wealthier) and the
second pillar leave space for comments.
The seven legislative regulations included in the legislative proposal regard: direct
payments and the rules governing its application in 2013; the change in support
measures for the wine sector (moved to the single payment scheme; the introduction of
one CMO and the linked set of aids and restitutions; support to RD; the financing, CAP
management and monitoring (horizontal regulation) including the dispositions which
are shared by the two pillars; the end of modulation of direct payments thanks to higher
flexibility of pillar I and II funds. By the way, putting principles into action is always
more demanding especially for a sector that the EU Member States (MS) still feel of
strict national domain and interest.
The search for a more equal and balanced distribution of CAP support involves several
changes as regard as pillar I:
- Modification of direct payments: the proposal follows the need to better
distribute payments both among MS, and between farms (currently the most of
direct payments flow to the biggest farms located in Central-Northern Europe).
52 The nominal budget is increasing while it is decreasing in percentage of the total EU financial
commitments.
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Referring to the former issue, a convergence mechanism was introduced,
disposing that MS with an average payment per hectare over 90% of the EU
average shall finance (for 1/3 of the difference) the other countries which set
below that average. Thus, since 2014 twelve countries will benefit from higher
payments53. Among the main contributors there is Greece, whose maximal will
decrease by 14% in 2017; the Netherland (-8.2%); Belgium (-7.7%); Italy (-
6.9%). Then, a flexibility mechanism which allows the MS to move till 10%
yearly of their national ceiling from pillar I to pillar II is introduced. By the way,
the enhanced flexibility in funds disposal would not easily promote any
improvement in the effectiveness of the rural development measures, because
RD budget is left unchanged by the proposal. A more equal distribution of
payments among farmers within the MS is advocated before 2019, when the
reference values will have to be equalized, but still subject to regionalization.
- Definition of active farmers, in order to avoid payments to benefit landlord and
retired farmers who rent the land, is provided. The MS can exclude farmers from
payments if  direct  payments are below 5% of their  total  income from off-farm
activities in the year54, and if their arable land is not actively worked. This
solution leaves the annual issue of the calculation of off-farm activities, and their
relation with the mainly agricultural activities, unsolved. In fact, direct payments
will still be determined by the number of hectares and by the economic
relevance of the off-farm activities.
- Minimal requirements to access direct payments: a yearly threshold of direct
payments above EUR 100 and farm size over 1 hectare are set, but the MS can
adapt this level according to their structural characteristics, especially where the
property is highly fragmented. This is in particular the case of several EU-12,
where a lot of active farmers, especially in lagging behind areas, couldn’t access
direct funds because they owned 0.3 ha or less (in terms of contiguous plots).
- Capping aids: the introduction of a compulsory upper ceiling for direct
payments to large richer individual farms ("capping"), already included in
Agenda 2000 as a voluntary choice by the MS, is now enforced. In particular,
payments will be reduced by between 20% (for payments between EUR
150,000-200,000) and 70% (for payments between EUR 250,000-300,000), and
they will be cancelled for quotas above EUR 300,000. This provision should
contribute to better distribute the CAP funds, trying to target direct payments in
order to decrease their currently inefficient distribution, and it would help
defending the public image of the CAP and EC role in the eyes of European
taxpayers.  By  the  way,  several  open  issues  remain  on  the  table:  the  exclusion
ceiling are still very high, if we consider that high levels of payments inequality
53 Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, UK).
54 This  limit  doesn’t  apply  to  farmers  who  received  less  than  EUR  5,000  in  direct  payments  in  the
previous year.
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occurs at much lower financial level, and no statement is made about the
distribution of the amount of money made available from this solution.
Moreover, the amount of money interested is very low, between EUR 278
million and EUR 835 million for the whole EU27 which represents 1-2% of the
total amount of direct payments (it is also relatively low when compared to the
current amount resulting from modulation, stated around EUR 3 billion for
2013). Thus, it seems that the capping strategy is not so relevant for agricultural
performance purposes, as it is for the EC’s objective to “clean” the CAP image.
An important contribution of the 2014-2020 legislative proposals is represented by the
division of the SFP into several components, with the inclusion of a compulsory
greening payment for environmental good practices and solutions, and the continuation
of the support for young farmers. The coupled payments under art. 69 (CE) n.
1782/2003, art. 68 (CE) n. 73/2009, and the support for less favoured areas (LFA) till
5% of national ceiling are on voluntary basis. Coupled support ranges between 5% and
10% of national ceilings, interests selected products (oilseeds, bovines...), and it is
direct to areas where this production is endangered but covers a relevant socio-
economic function. The introduction of a single Common Market Organization (CMO)
should decrease bureaucracy, improving its role as safety-net.
Conditionality and risk management are still included in the regulation for the next
programming period. Conditionality, both at program and instruments level as well as
Member States level is strengthened, in order to assure higher accountability and
effectiveness of the EU support, and to target financial resources to fiscally sound
Member States. Main changes involves risk management, which is moved from pillar I
to pillar II. Although this solution can contribute to decrease the overlapping of
measures and instruments between the two pillars (without considering the already
existing duplications between the CAP and the Cohesion policy), the low financial
endowment disposed for pillar II endangers the effectiveness of the measure. In fact, the
CAP budget distribution between the two pillar reports minimal changes (Table 3.4.1);
therefore it will be difficult to reach a critical level of financing for the new priorities
included in pillar II.
The breakdown of the multi-annual financial framework (MFF) in Table 3.4.1 shows
the shape of the EU financial framework from 2014 till 2020. The amount of
commitment appropriations reaches EUR 1,025,000 million (1.05% of GNI) and EUR
972,198 million in payment appropriations (1% of GNI).
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Table 3.4.1: EU Budget for commitments and payments, 2014-2020 (in million
EUR)
Commitment

















42,244 41,623 41,029 40,420 39,618 38,831 38,060 281,825
3. Security and
Citizenship 2,532 2,571 2,609 2,648 2,687 2,726 2,763 18,535
4. Global Europe 9,400 9,645 9,845 9,960 10,150 10,380 10,620 70,000









6 144,002 145,085 146,368 147,344 148,928 150,718 1,025,000
as a percentage




1 141,278 135,516 138,396 142,247 142,916 137,994 972,198
as a percentage
of GNI 1.01% 1.05% 0.99% 1.00% 1.01% 1.00% 0.94% 1.00%
Source: own elaborations on EC (2011)
Figure 3.4.1: Distribution of commitment appropriations in MFF 2014-2020
Source: own elaborations on EC (2011)
The total budget is to be divided between five headings (Figure 3.4.1): quite half of the
money (48%) is directed toward “Smart and Inclusive Growth”, which includes the
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structural and cohesion funds, while the CAP (“Sustainable Growth: Natural Resource”)
comes second, with 37%. The relevant difference in financings between pillar I and
pillar II persists: pillar I will get EUR 281,825 million (27% of total budget), and pillar
II EUR 101,102 million. The commitments for “Sustainable Growth” increases during
the seven years program (+18%), while the CAP budget decreases (-10%), driven by
pillar I, while pillar II remains unchanged (+0.1%).
The support for Rural Development in the next programming period (COM (2011)627)
is left unchanged in terms of its share on the total CAP budget, even if the proposal
doesn’t give information on the distribution among the MS, just stating that it will take
into account the current distribution (but not its structure). In fact, the three priority axis
which characterized the period 2007-2013 disappear and they are replaced by six
priorities, in order to avoid the overlapping of policy instruments (currently several
measures do tackle more than one goal) and to promote value added creation from the
additionality of multidimensional and interrelated measures, following an holistic
approach. The EC establishes, within the new regulations for structural funds, that the
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) will work in cooperation
and complementary to CAP pillar I and the other structural funds (ESF, EFRD) and will
be part of a single Common Strategic Framework (CSF). It will be implemented
through contracts at the national level, and when more regional RDPs exist, they will be
coordinated by a National Framework, in which the regions cooperate in order to meet
the  national  goals.  Each  MS  must  provide  at  least  25%  of  its  budget  for  each  RDPs
within the EAFRD for environmental and climate change, and 5% for LEADER.
For sure, the EC doesn’t simplify the management and coordination of RD measures: in
fact, the list of measures is still high (25), and their specification quite vague (some of
them were simply gathered together under one name or title).
In comparison with the current programming period, some measures have been
discarded, among which:
- Early retirement;
- Adding value to agricultural and forestry products;
- Meeting standards based on Community legislation.
At the same time, the possibility of this new setting to contribute achieving some results
in rural areas is still endangered by the limited financial resources, which don’t allow
reaching a critical financial threshold for the effectiveness of measures. Moreover, some
important open issues are left on the table, starting with the identification and
classification of rural areas (the EC has developed its own methodological tool in 2010,
based  on  cells  grid,  but  its  legal  framework  still  refers  to  the  OECD  classification  of
rural areas) to the introduction of clear (also for the policy makers who will use them)
monitoring and evaluation indicators. In fact, nowadays the Common Monitoring and
Evaluation Framework (CMEF), includes 160 qualitative and quantitative indicators for
analysing rural development policies. In conclusion, the EC still maintains in the facts
its vision of RD as a matter of agriculture, despite the publicized interest for
multifuctionality and diversification of rural areas.
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Table 3.4.2: Peculiarities of the two CAP pillars in 2014-2020
Characteristics Pillar I Pillar II
Co-financing No Yes
Typology of intervention Yearly payments Multi-annual contracts
Payments management Centralized (Agea) Peripheral (States, Regions)
Systemic approach No (farm alone) Possible, within the food chain
Adaptability One fit for all EU Fitting regional realities
Selective No Yes
Conditionality No (only environmental) Yes
Clear objectives No (income, risk…) Quite (objectives-measures)
Targeted No (per ha) Yes (selection of projects)
Tailored No (historical reference) Yes (tenders)
Source: own elaborations on Sotte, 2012
As a difference from pillar I, RD is characterized by higher conditionality of payments
(which interest only the greening ones in pillar I), flexibility and a regional/national
management system. Moreover, RD support is more targeted to the measures and
projects selected to meet the priorities and tailored to the local reality (Table 3.4.2).
Among the five most important policy instruments identified by the EC for RD we find:
- Advisory services, farm management and farm relief services;
- Investments in physical assets;
- Farm and business development;
- Co-operation;
- LEADER.
The  emphasis  is  placed  on  the  creation  of  an  advisory  service  (again!  Its  first
introduction dates back 1972) focused on the agricultural activity, and on the
investments in physical assets, in order to improve the performance of agricultural
holdings. An interesting point is the proposal of a measure (“Co-operation”) for
strengthening the relations between the agri-food sector and the research centres, in
order to improve innovation (e.g. through new tangible and organizational technologies)
and competitiveness. The importance of knowledge transfers for higher competitiveness
is also underlined by two measures – “Knowledge transfer and information actions”,
and “Investments in new forestry technologies and in processing and marketing food
products”. This latter one represents another area of interest for the EC, the promotion
of quality products, food chains and risk management in agriculture in endangered and
at risk areas, covered by the following measures:
- Quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs;
- Payments to areas facing natural or other specific constraints;
- Restoring agricultural production potentially damaged by natural disasters and
catastrophic events and introduction of appropriate prevention actions;
- Setting up of producers groups;
- Risk management;
- Income stabilization tool.
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Thus, the EC looks at actual and challenging priorities (e.g. food chain development),
but the instruments are often dated (setting up of producers groups), while the income
stabilization tool is much undefined.
The most of the measures linked to environmental sustainability are included in pillar II,
but they are not covered by an adequate financial assistance:
- Afforestation and creation of woodlands;
- Establishment of agro-forestry system;
- Agro-environment-climate programs;
- Organic farming;
- Natura 2000 and Water framework directive payments;
- Investments improving the resilience and environmental value of forest
ecosystems;
- Forest-environmental and climate services and forest conservation.
Although the EC set a lot of attention to the issue of poverty, which according to the EC
(2010) is mainly located in rural areas (2010 was the European year for combating
poverty  and  social  exclusion,  and  it  was  stated  that  17% of  EU citizens  cannot  afford
the basics), just two measures address it:
- Basic services and village renewal in rural areas;
- LEADER.
In conclusion, the CAP 2014-2020 seems another lost opportunity for a more
sustainable and well balanced development of rural areas, while RD is still considered
as the second rib of an agricultural  sector where the interests of agri-food lobbies still
prevail. Moreover, the important search for higher effectiveness and efficiency of policy
measures mainly remains in the shadow.
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CHAPTER 4
THE CHALLENGE OF CAP INTRODUCTION IN HUNGARY: ISSUES AND PLAYERS
4.1 The EU perspective: instruments and support measures for agriculture and
rural development in Hungary
The Hungarian way towards the EU accession was quite long and complex, as the
timeline below shows (Box 1).
Box 2: EU-Hungary relations: a timeline
26 September
1988
Signing of the Agreement on Trade, Economic and Commercial Co-operation between
the European Commission and Hungary
8 August 1989 Opening of diplomatic relations between Hungary and the European Union
8 June 1990 The EU representation opens in Budapest
16 December
1991
The Europe Agreement establishing association measures between the EU and Hungary
is signed
1 March 1992 Trade related aspects of the Europe Agreement come into effect
28 October
1992




The European Council decides in Copenhagen that Central and Eastern European
association countries may apply for the EU membership
26 January
1994
Establishment of the Hungarian EU Parliamentary Committee
1 February
1994
The Europe Agreement of association between Hungary and EU becomes operative
1 April 1994 Hungary submits application for membership of the EU
31 March 1998 Opening statements of accession negotiations between Hungary and the EU
9 July 1999 The Hungarian government submits the National Programme for Adoption of the
Acquis Communitaire to the European Commission
8 November
2000
The European Commission publishes ‘Enlargement Strategy Paper’
5 September
2001
The European Parliament report on Hungary and EU enlargement
13 December
2002
At the European Council in Copenhagen Hungary’s accession negotiations  is
considered completed
1 May 2004 Hungary joins the European Union
Source: Chronology of the relations between Hungary and the EU, www.kum.hu
After the official start of the negotiation process for the EU accession in 199855,
Hungary introduced the National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis Communitaire
in 199956.
Between 199957 and 200358, the EC was in charge to monitor the progresses made by
Hungary in meeting the membership requirements in the Chapters of the Acquis. The
55 EC Comprehensive monitoring reports on the future Member States, 2003.
56 EC Hungary Regular Report 1999.
57 Year of the first Regular Report of the Commission on Hungary’s Progress toward Accession.
58 Year of the EC Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Hungary’s Preparation for Membership.
96
sectors where the adjustment to the EU regulations and legislation were harder to obtain
include Agriculture and rural development, Statistics and Economic and monetary
policy, all still under completion at the time of the EU membership.
As for Agriculture and rural development, the priorities were divided in short and
medium  term  (to  be  fulfilled  before  year  2000  or  2003  respectively),  and  the  EC
evidenced in particular:
- the alignment to the Acquis concerning veterinary and phytosanitary standards,
controls at the external borders, the respect of agri-environmental practices and
biodiversity;
- the ability to introduce the institutional managing mechanisms and the
administrative structures necessary for the control of the agricultural markets
within the CAP;
- the implementation of structural and rural development measures;
- the adoption of veterinary and phytosanitary prescriptions;
- the modernization of the food processing industry;
- the restructuring of the agri-food sector59.
Still in 2007, a relevant issue was represented by the persisting lack of statistical
information, at disaggregated level, regarding the agricultural production structure and
its change during the years which represented an obstacle for conducing impact
assessment analysis on the pre-accession funds in the period 2004-2006.
The last EC monitoring report before the accession of Hungary in the EU60, in the
section regarding Agriculture and rural development, highlighted the progresses made
by the country in meeting the most of the requirements derived from the accession
negotiations, especially the institution of FADN/RICA, the alignment of public support
to agriculture, the certification of products quality and the promotion of organic
production, the respect of zootechnical measures, while delays persisted in the
veterinary and phytosanitary control measures. By the way, the most important delays
were recorded in the institution of a functioning Paying Authority and the disposition of
an Integrated Management and Control System, in the design of rural development
programs and in the institution of producers’ organizations. Thus, the EC deserved
doubts on the ability of the institutional management to adequately fulfil the tasks
required by the CAP introduction in Hungary, and to manage the funds directed to pillar
I (especially SAPS payments) and pillar II. This issue negatively impacted on the
effectiveness of CAP implementation in the country, because it prevented farmers to
obtain the funds for which applied, with no consideration for the time required by the
sequence of the agricultural production (Csáki et al., 2010).
In the EU pre-accession period, PHARE (1990-2003) was the main support program,
with the aim to strengthen the Hungarian public administration and the institutions,
allowing them to effectively function inside the EU; to promote the convergence of the
59 http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/it/s40003.htm
60 EC Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Hungary’s Preparation for Membership. 2003
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Hungarian law with the European Union’s legislation; to contribute to the economic and
social cohesion. The PHARE promoted the development and restructuring of
institutions, the launch of investment, especially with regard to infrastructures.
In the field of agricultural and rural development, the SAPARD (Special Accession
Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development) program61 was launched for the
NMS by Agenda 2000, in order to assist the country with institutional and structural
change in agriculture; in the preparation for the CAP implementation, clarifying the
objectives and the instruments; in the provision of financial assistance for specific rural
development project.
Although it was financially less consistent than PHARE, its relevance among farmers is
evidenced by the high number of applications (8 828) coming from the Hungarian
farmers. Moreover, the SAPARD experience constituted the basis for the creation of the
Agricultural and Rural Development Operational Programme (ARDOP62) and the
National Rural Development Plan (NRDP63), which included the Hungarian priorities,
instruments and funds for agriculture and rural development in the first programming
period 2004-2006.
The SAPARD payments were mostly (94%) concluded in 2006, two years after the EU
membership. Between 2003 and 2006, the SAPARD total commitments for Hungary
amounted at HUF 63,259 million, while payments stopped at HUF 59,057 millions.
SAPARD was meant to be implemented in the pre-accession period, but the most of the
payments were provided in 2005 and 2006 (Table 4.1.1) due to the delays in setting up
and management of the national Paying Agency. Moreover, the most of payments were
directed to the first two measures – Agricultural enterprise development and Food and
fishing processing development. Among these measures, funds were also directed to
agricultural production, processing industry and investments in large farms and
infrastructure with a goal of preparing large farms for the market economy competition
once in the EU, often in conflict with the limits imposed to large farms by the national
legislations in the NMS (as in the case of Hungary).
The innovativeness represented by the introduction of a second CAP pillar for Rural
Development, which would have come together with new resources and a new model
for the rural development policy, remained mainly on the paper. In the case of the NMS,
a contradiction emerged from the EC indications, which promoted a decentralized and
bottom-up approach to RDP, while the adaptation to the Acquis for the CAP
introduction required the creation of a centralized management and control system in
agriculture, focused on agri-food competitiveness and productivity (Nemes, 2003).
61 Established by Council Regulation 1268/1999 in June 1999.
62 MoARD (2005): Agriculture and Rural Development Operational Programme (2004-2006).
63 NDRP, 2006.
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Table 4.1.1: Commitments and payments of SAPARD programme
PaymentMeasures Commitment





24,431 424 6,454 13,363 2,807 23,048 94
Food and fish processing
development
18,348 358 4,559 8,109 3,670 16,696 91
Village development and
reconstruction, protection and
conservation of rural artefacts and
cultural heritage
5,751 0 0 2,600 2,822 5,422 94
Diversification of activities 472 0 0 319 99 418 89
Development of rural
infrastructure
14,183 694 3,341 5,806 3,558 13,399 94
Technical assistance 74 1 53 0 20 74 100
Total 63,259 1,477 14,407 30,197 12,976 59,057 93
Source: MoARD
The ARDOP was the successor of SAPARD, and it was endowed with more money
(HUF 105,2 billions), which was not enough to cover the financial commitments of the
successful applications (6 400 up to a total number of 11 158). The financial
performance didn’t improve from SAPARD, and minor rate of payments was recorded
at the end of the program (90.5%).
The most of the 2004-2006 budget and the most of payments were, as in SAPARD,
directed to measures related to competitiveness in agriculture (especially to agricultural
investments), while rural development measures gathered 25.4% of the budget, and the
most of valid contracts signed. At the opposite, LEADER+ obtained 4.3% of total
budget,  below the  minimum 5% share  prescribed  by  the  EC.  Moreover,  the  payments
are lower in amount and slower when the beneficiary is not directly involved in
agriculture (the case of multifunctional rural areas and rural development, LEADER+),
and when the project are more complex and with a higher socio-economic impact (e.g.
the expansion of rural income-generating opportunities).
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56,423 2,567 63,762 2,421 56,026 99.3
1.3. Structural support
for the fishing sector
1,447 43 1,409 39 931 64.3
1.4. Start-up support for
young farmers
1,848 280 1,967 267 1,838 99.5
1.5. Support for further
training and re-training
1,159 38 1,291 34 756 65.2
2.1. Development of the
sale and processing of
agricultural products
14,947 149 15,435 139 12,983 86.9
3. Development of rural
areas
26,754 3,181 27,387 1,804 20,104 75.1
3.1. Expansion of rural
income-generation
opportunities










5,696 243 5636 240 5,196 91.2
LEADER+ 4,576 2,200 5923 923 1,988 43.4
4. Technical assistance 2,660 142 2,736 137 2,636 99.1
AVOP total 105,238 6,400 113,988 4,841 95,274 90.5
Note: Budget, allocations and amount of payments in million HUF (1EUR=265 HUF)
Source: MoArd
The NRDP, instead, was a temporary rural development instrument set up for the switch
from SAPARD to post-accession rural development instruments (2004-2006) to help
the administrative, financial and programming transition, and to complete the SAPARD
payments. It was financed by the EAGGF Guarantee Section and it was based on
specific transitional rules. It mainly covered commitments and liabilities undertaken by
farmers for several years, and it included support measures in the form of
reimbursements to farmers on the basis of prior applications. NRDP measures for 2004-
2006 were allocated a budget of HUF 163 billion (available for use until the end of
2008), of which a total of HUF 25 billion was rescheduled for SAPARD projects and
direct payments (direct farmer support).
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In the current programming period 2007-2013, one third of EU total contribution to
rural development goes to the NMS of which 48.8% is allocated to convergence,
highlighting the case of overlapping measures with the cohesion funds. Hungary obtains
14% of the support for the CEEc (quite 50% is allocated to Poland), and it adopts the
New Hungary Rural Development Program (NHRDP)64 as Rural Development National
Strategic  Plans  (RDNSP),  which  contains  all  the  measures  that  were  previously
included in the ARDOP and in the NRDP. A National Rural Development Network
(NRDN) is also introduced, in order to facilitate and manage the execution of NRDSP.
The NHRDP follows the division in four axes of the EU program:
Axis 1: improving the competitiveness of agriculture, food processing and
forestry;
Axis 2: improving the environment and the countryside;
Axis 3: improving the quality of life in rural areas and diversification of the rural
economy;
Axis 4: LEADER.
The most of the payments for the period 2007-2013 goes to Axis 1 (48%, HUF 8,577
billion,), followed by Axis 2 (31.5%, HUF 5,898 billion), for a total of EUR 18,701
billion for the whole period for the four Axis, including technical assistance. LEADER
(Axis 4) obtains 5% of the whole amount. In comparison with the average values of the
NMS, where the distribution of funds between Axis is more equilibrated (Table 4.1.3),
the Hungarian funds allocation favours Axis 1 and penalized Axis 3 (measures related
to the quality of life in rural areas), while in the EU-15 the highest share goes to Axis 2.
Table 4.1.3: Distribution or EAFRD Funding between Axes for NMS and EU 15, 2007-
2013 (%)
Country Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4
Hungary 48 32 14 5
Average NMS 40 38 20 5
Average EU-15 32 50 10 6
Source: own elaborations on DG Agri data
The NHRDP contains more than forty measures but the Ministry concentrates the most
of the resources (three-quarters of the programme’s funds) on six measures: in particular
on the modernisation of agricultural enterprises and agri-environmental management,
which will absorb about half of the support, respectively 41.3% and 13.6% of total
expenditures (Figure 4.1.1).
64 New Hungary Rural Development Program (2007-2013) (2007):
   http://www.fvm.hu/doc/upload/200702/nhrdp_070220.pdf (March 3, 2007)
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Modernisation of agricultural enterprises 389.9 30.2 476.5 866.4 41.3
Agri-environment management payments 284.3 22.0 0.0 284.3 13.6
Adding value to agricultural and forestry
products
60.8 4.7 113.0 173.8 8.3
Afforestation of agricultural land 64.3 5.0 27.5 91.8 4.4
Infrastructure related to the
development and adaptation of
agriculture and forestry
53.8 4.2 29.0 82.7 3.9
Main measures subtotal 931.3 72.2 741.7 1,673.0 79.8
Measures total 1,289.8 100.0 806.5 2 096.3 100.0
Share of expenditure, % 61.5 38.5 100.0
Source: NHRDP
4.2 An overview on the Hungarian agriculture in transition toward the EU
Hungary covers an area of 9 303 000 ha, of which 83% used for agriculture, which had
an historical role in Hungary, both under the Austro-Hungarian Empire and under the
socialist system, when the sector offered subsistence for the thousands of farmers who
remained in the countryside during the planned policy of heavy industrialization. At that
time, agriculture was integrated into the planned economy and considered dependent
from the cities, which were invested in heavy industrialization plans.
Hungarian agriculture was a “bright spot” in the declining Communist economic
system. The country was an important producer and exporter of agri-food products, and
even during the transition process the country trade balance remained positive. The
agricultural sector was the second largest contributor to the State budget in 1980; it
received a low level of public support in comparison with the other ex-satellite States,
and offered subsistence to thousands of farmers. The sector was also interested in the
introduction of embryonic forms of market (following Lange’s market socialism),
which determined the full functioning of the collective system, i.e. exchange channels
which allowed some private products to be sold on the public market, moving away
from simple self-consumption of overproduction (Kornai, 1986). Agriculture, including
processing, trade and other industrial activities on large farms, produced 17% of GDP
and employed about the same percentage of the labour force. However, also the
agricultural  sector  was  hit  by  the  default  of  the  centralized  system  based  on  distorted
incentives, which characterized the years of the Soviet Union (Anderson et al., 2008).
Thus, since the 1990s the agricultural share on GDP and employment fell, and rural
regions were particularly affected (Debatisse, 1998): in the early 1990s, 45% of
unemployed people lived in villages, especially in the lagging behind Eastern parts of
the country. They were mainly unskilled labour previously employed in the cooperative
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farms and in big state companies65.  Moreover,  in  the  transition  process  rural  areas
increasingly depopulated, because of the significant transfer of the active population
from agricultural rural areas to other sectors and attractive job opportunities mainly
located in the main cities. The transition process led to a reform of the public support to
agriculture also in the CEEc: the high level of direct and indirect state support provided
to both farmers and consumers in the pre-reform period encouraged production and
spurred consumption. As a consequence, during the transition process, in Hungary
agricultural production declined sharply (OECD Report on Transition Countries, 2002)
following cuts in state support66 and poverty increased, especially in rural areas67.
The transition path toward a market economy was characterized by declining
investments and productivity68 also due to the end of soft budget constraint (Kornai,
1980) and the disruption of the terms of trade for producers, which was caused by the
loss of the former common market (Macours et al., 2000). Moreover, inequality in
living conditions spread, creating a winner and  two losers:  the  capital  and  the  main
cities belonging to the first group, and rural areas and Eastern peripheries to the second.
Looking for the optimal and successful transition path (EBRD, 1997; WB, 1997), two
main approaches emerged: big bang versus gradualism (Sachs et al., 1994; Roland,
2000).
According to the relevant literature (Csáki et al, 2004; Liefert et al., 2002; Swinnen et
al., 2006), the reform of the agricultural systems of the transition economies has
involved four main elements:
· market liberalization, after the end of the productive plans which asserted
which goods were to be produced and their quantity, paying no attention to
consumers’ preferences;
· farm restructuring, which concerned the property status, management and
organization, and required the launch of a privatization process, and land
reform. Market liberalization can foster farm restructuring, as farmers can
see an opportunity for a new activity, growth in productivity and
profitability;
· change in upstream (supply of agricultural inputs) and downstream
product (transportation and distribution) operations, capable of
ameliorating the productive performance of all the actors of the agri-food
chain;
65 Data were provided by the National Labour Centre, Budapest.
66  In 1990, public support for agriculture ranged from 5 to 10% of the GDP in most of the CEEc.
67  The data reliability of the indicators of economic aggregations of the former regime is low due to the
fact that farmers were overstating their production in order to meet the required numbers of the plan and
to get support. On the other hand, it must be added that indicators such as GDP were estimated with a
different methodology during the socialist system.
68 We  must  take  care  of  the  low  accountability  of  the  statistics  and  data  provided  before  the  system
change. Moreover, some indicators were calculated in a different way (i.e. MNP – for GDP – didn’t
include services).
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· the creation of market - friendly infrastructures as institutions and services,
including financial and banking services; market analysis; a commercial
law capable of stating clear property rights, enforcing contracts, and
helping to solve disputes. All of these deeply influence the performance of
the upstream and downstream operations.
Supporters of the shock therapy69 asserted  that  the  success  of  the  reforms was  deeply
influenced by its timing. Therefore, all the necessary interventions had to be introduced
at the same - and for the shortest - time. In the CEEc, these reforms were introduced at a
different pace, and with different results, as evidenced by the World Bank (2002) which
marked Hungary as the “best reforming performer” with 8.8 points up to 10, followed
by the Czech Republic and Estonia. The reforming process reflected on the agricultural
performance: between 1995 and 2002, the role of agriculture declined on GDP (from
6% to 4%), employment (from 8 to 6.2%), consumption (from 32.4 to 27%) and export
(from 20.3 to 6.8%). At the opposite, the share of agriculture on investments increased,
from 2.9 to 5.5% (Table 4.2.1), especially since 1998, with the introduction of the EU
pre-accession funds.
Table 4.2.1: Share of agriculture in the Hungarian economy, 1995-2002
Share of agriculture in
Year GDP Consumption Exports Investments Employment (%)
1995 5.90 32.40 20.30 2.90 8.00
1998 4.90 30.30 10.50 3.60 7.50
2000 4.60 27.60 6.90 4.70 6.60
2002 4.00 27.00 6.80 5.50 6.20
* GDP, Consumption, Export, Investments at current prices, %
Source: own elaborations on HCSO data.
The success of the process of transition was deeply linked to the introduction of a land
reform70, which would have given back the land belonging to the former collective and
State farms to the farmers, opening the way to a modern and more efficient production
system. In Hungary this process was deeply influenced by the weight of the near history
and from political pressures coming from the re-established populist and conservative
party (Smallholders’ Party). Therefore, even today the Hungarian agricultural sector is
characterized by a highly fragmented farm structure, and by dualism. In fact, in the
early 1990s, the first democratically elected government adopted a land reform aimed at
dismantling the cooperative production system and returning the land to its former
owners. The outcome of the reform was the creation of plots which were too small and
often not contiguous, thereby undermining productivity. The original objective of land
reform was to “unify the principles of landed property and the use of lands” (Szűcs et
69 From the so called big bang approach, supported at that time by the World Bank (WB) and several
experts.
70 This is a feature that the development in transition Countries shares with the development policies in
other Less Developed Countries.
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al., 2004) but this goal was largely abandoned in favour of the principle of restitution.
The restitution legislation provided for a system of land auctions in which all people
whose lands were appropriated could, after claiming government issued vouchers,
reclaim lost properties71. Applications for these vouchers had to be sent to the National
Office of Restitution (Országos kárpótlási és kárrendezési hivatal-OKKH), which
obliged collective farms to create a compensation fund for farmers who got their land
confiscated in the former Communist system.
In  addition,  a  new  law  on  cooperatives  was  adopted.  The  law  consisted  of  two  parts.
The first specified how cooperatives should be transformed, while the second specified
how genuine cooperatives should behave (Swain, 1994). The legislation aimed at
increasing the number of people who could reclaim land from collective farms, and to
accelerate the dismantling of farm cooperatives. A bankruptcy legislation for the
cooperatives and private farms was introduced, together with a ceiling for the
possession of agricultural land (300 ha), and the ban for legal entities (various types of
companies) to own land.
The  outcome  of  the  reform  measures  was  the  creation  of  more  than  one  million  new
land  owners,  with  holdings  averaging  less  than  two  hectares.  The  small  size  of  these
holdings negatively affected productivity, as in the reform period the need for
investments and modernization was high, and small farmers’ ability to borrow was low.
In 1998, the 90% of agricultural land was privately owned, but quite 40% was farmed
by companies, organizations and large ventures (also called integrators) which
cultivated land under leasing arrangements to be set yearly, under discretional
parameters. Thus, as a result of the privatization process, land became a source of
complementary income for thousands of small and part time farmers.
After a period of some uncertainty, a dramatic reduction in the number of farm
cooperatives occurred72: in 1990, cooperatives covered 5 147 thousand hectares of land,
whereas individual farmers reached 1 289 thousand hectares circa. In 2001, the situation
dramatically changed: cooperatives owned 855 thousand hectares of land and individual
farmers 4 196 thousand hectares circa (Table 4.2.2). At the opposite, individually
owned land increased from 6% (on total used farmland) in 1990 to 51% in 2002 (Table
4.2.3). According to Debatisse (WB, 1998), the initial assets of collective farms were
distributed among active members (41.5%), to pensioners (38.7%) and to people who
left the farm earlier (20%). The restructured cooperatives often transformed into
services cooperatives, marketing types of cooperation (renting machineries, labour).
Instead, privatization of state farms was completed in 1996, when 93 up to 121 state
farms were privatized, and 47% of their land was used for compensation.
71  The process of restitution went together with the agricultural privatisation in Hungary.
72  At the beginning of the reform process just 7-10% of members decided to leave the cooperative.
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Table 4.2.2: Land distribution according to property (000 hectares)
1990 1993 1995 1999 2001
Cooperatives 5 147.1 3 931.3 2 208 1 494.5 855
Economic Organizations 8 014.4 7 037.3 4 801.2 4 114 3 640.1
Individual farmers 1 288.8 2 204.6 4 034.7 4 689 4 195.6
Partnerships 2 867.3 3 106 2 593.2 2 619.5 2 785
Other n.a. 6.1 467.1 500.1 1 467.7
Total 9 303.2 9 303 9 303 9 303.1 9 303
Source: Szűcs et al., 2004
Table 4.2.3: Individually Used Farmland in CEEc (in % of the total)
Country 1990 2002
Bulgaria 13 98




Source: Csáki et al., 2006
Apart from the limits described above, the consolidation of the agricultural land market
was limited by the market sale regulations introduced. In the first years after the land
reform, legal limitations (up to three years) were set for land sales in case of land
received through compensation or from shares of collective farms, and land became
alienable only in 1996. Foreigners were banned from buying land; this provision had to
expire in 2011, but the Hungarian government asked the EC for an extension till 2014.
In fact, as land prices in Hungary are still lower than in the EU-15, Hungarian
authorities fear that a financial assault from foreign investors would occur, in a period
when land represents one of the most constrained resources worldwide. In order to be
allowed to purchase land, foreign citizens will have to prove that they have been
residents for at least three years; they actively farm for a living; they pay taxes; that the
Hungarian farmer renounced its pre-purchase option. In 2009 (Table 4.2.4), the highest
land prices were detained by the vineyards in Northern Hungary where the famous
Tokaj wine is produced (EUR 6,769/ha) and in Southern Transdanubia, characterized by
the Szekszárd and Villány wine regions (EUR 4,387/ha), where also the highest prices
for arable land is paid (EUR 2,201/ha).
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Table 4.2.4: Land price* by region and use in Hungary, 2009
Region Arable land Grassland Vineyard Orchard
Central Hungary 1,699 1,244 1,765 2,422
Central Transdanubia 1,592 949 4,051 3,035
Western Transdanubia 1,584 1,016 2,256 3,863
Southern
Transdanubia 2,201 1,060 4,387 3,667
Northern Hungary 1,651 432 6,769 4,383
Northern Great Plain 1,662 550 1,477 3,124
Southern Great Plain 1,429 779 1,665 1,780
* in EUR/ha at the 2009 average HUF exchange rate (1 EUR=HUF 280.58). Source: FADN/AKI
When Hungary joined the EU, collective forms of farming used half of the productive
land, generated 46% of the gross margin according to the Hungarian Farm Structure
Survey (2003) and accounted for the widest cultivated area among the EU-25 members.
However, compared to the other members of the EU, Hungarian cooperatives are now
undercapitalized because of the small amount of capital provided by the members and
the difficulties in obtaining credit from the banks, since rural credit lines are not well
developed. The above provisions mined agricultural development, creating obstacles for
moving from subsistence agriculture into a potentially productive system. Moreover, the
segmentation of land property and the unclear leasing conditions set in the previous
period characterized by expanding economy when young and skilled people were
moving away from rural areas, constituted an unfavourable ground for accessing SAPS
payments and for applying to EU co-financed investments, due to the low skills and
entrepreneurial vocation of aged farmers. Thus, a “dual” farming structure emerged in
Hungary, where both ends of the farming are still suffering by conversion problems:
small farms are generally too small, farmers are inexperienced and lack resources, while
the large ones still have some heritage of the collective farming system with some
embedded inefficiencies (Csáki et al, 2010).
A different situation characterized the food industry, which was promptly privatized
though liquidation attracting foreign direct investments and working capital (Debatisse,
1998), in order to prompt reconversion and modernization though foreign expertise and
technology. Thus, already in 1996, 65% of large food companies were controlled by
foreign investors, and several multinational companies entered the market: the
favourable geographic position of Hungary could help opening export routes to Eastern
Europe, Russia and Central Asia. At the end of the 1990s, the food processing industry
still reflected the orientation of the past economic regime: cereals and starch were quite
neglected, while the attention was focused on animal production, which declined in the
last two decades and was not able to organize though merging to overcome the past
over-capacity. In particular, production concentration and cooperativism remained very
weak in the fruit and vegetable sector: the compensation process based on vouchers
allowed  the  former  workers  and  managers  to  buy  some  processing  plants,  but  they
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lacked financing power to make the investments needed to modernize the sector, and to
be competitive in the EU common market.
4.3 After the EU accession: visions and reality for the agricultural sector
At the time of the EU membership, the agricultural transition toward the EU was still an
unfinished process, especially in the agricultural sector. Thus, several answers (and
funds) were awaited by the CAP and the Cohesion policy. Moreover, the enlargement in
2004 had a relevant impact on agriculture: the NMS took 7 million farmers to the EU
farmers population (6 millions) and 55 million hectares of agricultural land (+40%), but
production in the EU-27 expanded much less (by about 10 - 20 % for most products)
confirming the potentiality of developing agriculture in the NMS. Also, the regional
disparities in the EU doubled: p.c. GDP decreased by 12.5%, and the share of
population living in Convergence areas increased to 25%.
The inclusion of Hungary in the CAP implied the introduction of new provisions and
the gaining of new opportunities: the access to the single market in the EU, relatively
stable commodities prices, direct payments to be phased in gradually in order to reach
the full EU level, and rural development measures. At the same time, applying the
complexity  of  the  CAP  rules  to  the  NMS  took  other  difficulties  (i.e.  need  for  the
introduction of managing and paying institutions), and uncertain from an equity point of
view (i.e. payment per hectare based on the historical yields). In the agricultural sector,
the positive result gained by Hungary in the first years of the transition process didn’t
last long: even by 2003, right before the EU enlargement, several problems remained
unsolved. In fact, in 2004 several “transition phenomena” (Swinnen et al. 2006) still
characterized the Hungarian agriculture and food industry, mainly related to land
property, dual farm structure, productivity, food chain contracts, innovation. Thus, the
EU membership was expected to play a relevant role for the overall development of the
country and for the agricultural sector in particular, with the CAP introduction.
Figure 4.3.1: Regions of Hungary
Source: HCSO
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Nowadays, the main agricultural areas of the country are the Western Transdanubia, and
the Northern and Southern Great Plains.
In 2009, the agricultural population73 accounted for quite 10% of the total population of
10 million people. After the fall experienced in the transition process, right before the
EU membership, the share of agriculture on GDP was 4.3%, and then it progressively
declined, falling from 3.7% in 2008 to 2.5% in 2009. Agricultural (official) employment
declined more gradually, ranging between 5.5% in 2003 to 4.6% in 2009. Instead,
investments in agriculture showed a contrasting trend: from 6.1% of GDP in 2003, they
declined till 3.7% in 2007, and recovered in the following years, reaching 5.6% in 2009
(Table 4.3.1). The role of the food industry in the national economy is less relevant in
comparison with agriculture: the share of the food industry on employment and GDP
declined between 2003 and 2009, respectively from 3.9% to 3.5%, and from 2.7 to 2.1,
while in the same period investments fell from 3.6% to 2.5%.
Also as a consequence of the high volatility which characterized commodity prices
between 2007 and 2008, high inflation interested food products from 2006 to 2008,
realigning to the rest of the economy in 2009.
Table 4.3.1: Contribution of agricultural and agri-food industry to the Hungarian
economy
Share of agriculture in Share of food industry in
Consumer price index
(previous year=100)
Year Employment GDP Investments Employment GDP Investments
Food
products Total
2003 5.5 4.3 6.1 3.9 2.7 3.6 102.7 104.7
2004 5.3 4.1 4.3 3.6 2.4 3.7 106.5 106.8
2005 5 3.6 4.5 3.6 2.2 3.6 102.5 103.6
2006 4.9 3.5 4.2 3.6 2.1 3.1 107.7 103.9
2007 4.7 3.4 3.7 3.4 2 3.2 111.5 108
2008 4.5 3.7 4.7 3.3 1.9 2.5 110.2 106.1
2009 4.6 2.5 5.6 3.5 2.1 2.5 104.4 104.2
Source: own elaborations on HCSO data
These data reflect the difficulties emerged in the reorganization process that interests the
Hungarian agri-food chain after the access to the EU market. In fact, competitiveness
increased both in prices (with the cheaper Polish and Romanian food alternatives) and
products (quality certification and traceability of typical food products coming from the
EU-15). In this panorama the Hungarian farmers and food producers, which lacked a
proper organization after the system change, were subjected to the unfavourable
conditions set by the newly introduced vertical food-chain relations, dominated by
hypermarkets and multinational agro-processing companies, and the concentrated
regional procurement system, which increased the requirements for food suppliers while
73 According to FAO, the agricultural population include all persons depending for their livelihood on
agriculture, hunting, fishing, or forestry. This estimate comprises all persons actively engaged in
agriculture and their non-working dependants.
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keeping prices down, even under the production costs. The decrease in price
competitiveness is also linked to the difficulties to increase land and labour productivity
(after the end of the positive effect of initial fall in agricultural employment which
moved to other sectors), due to the limitations imposed by a dual production system
where both small farmers and big Hungarian companies have limited access to credit.
The former ones are hindered by their socio-structural characteristics (aged, lower
skills, low profit motivation), the others by unfavourable legislation which favours
small Hungarian farmers.
The EU enlarged market offered also new opportunities to Hungary, which became one
of the main exporters of agricultural and food products, in value, among the NMS
(Table 4.3.2): food export increased by 148% between 2000 and 2007, reaching quite
USD 4,500 million in value. After 2003, import growth in nominal values increased
twice faster than export, in comparison with that of 2000-2003, and reached USD 3,133
millions.  Thus,  Hungary  was  able  to  maintain  its  record  among  the  NMS,  showing  a
positive and increasing (+17.6%) agricultural trade balance between 2000 and 200774. In
the same period, trade balance in the EU-10 was negative, with the value of agri-food
import which doubled export. Nominal values of export and import increased, and while
agri-food export was characterized by agricultural raw materials, import concentrated
on processed products.
Table 4.3.2: Agri-food and beverages export and import in 2000-2007, million USD
Export 2000 2003 2007 2007/2000 (%) 2007/2003
(%)
Hungary 1,808.51 2,549.16 4,493.20 148.44 76.26
EU-10 total 3,808.51 4,552.16 6,500.20 70.68 42.79
Import 2000 2003 2007 2007/2000 (%) 2007/2003
(%)
Hungary 652.23 1,188.16 3,133.04 380.36 163.69
EU-10 7,968.89 9,726.28 14,310.50 79.58 47.13
Trade balance 2000 2003 2007 2007/2000 (%) 2007/2003
(%)
Hungary 1,156.28 1,361.00 1,360.16 17.63 -0.06
EU-10 -4,160.38 -5,174.12 -7,810.30 87.73 50.95
Source: own elaborations on UN data
In 2009, the main Hungarian export products were cereals (18% of total agricultural
export, composed for the 2/3 by maize), meat (13%), oilseeds (10%), and animal feed
(8%). The main export markets for Hungary were Germany (14%), Romania (14%) and
Italy (11%, in first position for wheat and maize). Instead, Hungarian agricultural and
food import in 2009 was composed of animal feed (10%), meat (9%), beverages, spirits
74 The only other country showing positive agricultural trade balance before and after the EU enlargement
was Bulgaria, but a much lower value levels.
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and vinegar (6%). The main trade partners were Germany (22% of import), Poland and
the Netherlands (both at 12%).
Arable land covered about 4.5 million hectares in 2009 (falling from the quite 6 million
ha in 2008), 37% of which covered by cereals (2.9 million ha). Forests covered 24.4%
of the cultivated area (1.9 million ha) followed by grassland (13%, 1 million ha) and
orchards (1.3%, quite 100 000 ha). In 2009, the land was farmed mainly by business
organizations (45%), and 36% by individual farmers.
The production concentrated in three sectors: arable crops (cereals, maize, soft wheat)
and oil seeds; horticulture; animal breeding. In 2009 (Figure 4.3.2), the Hungarian gross
agricultural output was mainly composed of crops (53.7%), followed by animals
(35.8%) and services (9.5%).
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Source: own elaborations on HCSO data
Hungary joined the EU during the most important reforming period of the CAP, thus the
demanding change in agricultural policy was conduced in a climate of uncertainty, and
great expectations. The Hungarian path towards the EU membership led to a change in
support to agriculture and rural development, both in its structure and amount.
Moreover, it required the setting up of an institutional framework to implement the CAP
(first of all the creation of an agency for the coordination of market interventions), and
adjustments for a better coordination of agricultural and regional development support
funds (Debatisse, 1998). A critical pre-accession point (Csáki et al, 2010) was the
support to agricultural production: in the case of Hungary the producer support estimate
(PSE)  was  similar  to  the  EU  levels75,  but  it  was  in  the  form  of  excessive  price  and
market supports which distorted internal prices and kept inefficient producers. Thus, the
75 As a difference from Poland and Slovakia, where it was lower, and Slovenia, where support was higher
than in the EU.
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EU accession was accompanied by increases in producer prices, which favoured crop
productions (thanks to the former EU intervention price for the main cereals) but
increased the production costs for pig and poultry producers, as the price of cereals for
feed increased. It must be remembered that the EU intervention prices work differently
from the former Hungarian guaranteed prices. In Hungary, guaranteed prices worked at
the farm level, while in the EU, intervention is at the wholesale level only (wholesale
traders, marketing cooperatives, and processing firms), and thus only wholesalers can
put farmers’ grains in intervention stocks. In this way, several Hungarian farmers could
not access them because ineligible according to the conditions, e.g. the size of their
farms,  the  tax  reporting,  the  quality  of  wheat  (Debatisse,  1998).  Then,  the  Hungarian
crop production showed delays in restructuring especially with regard to the logistic (as
in Southern Italian regions producing durum wheat): transportation was costly in
comparison to neighbouring countries, and infrastructural endowments for storage are
lacking. By the way, during the 2004/2005 exceptional crop year, over five million
tonnes of grain were procured by the EU in Hungary (the 50% of the total intervention
purchases in the EU): this solution helped stabilizing crop farmers’ incomes, but
damaged animal producers as grain-feed continued rising after the EU accession.
Compared to 1997, the performance of the different agricultural productions changed
notably year-to-year, with a generalized downward trend and some peaks in between.
Cereals followed a decreasing trend with the exceptional boom in 2004, whereas fruits
recovered between 2000 and 2004 and 2006 after significant drops in the years 1998
and 2005. Animal production showed a light recovery in 1998 and 1999, but a decrease
in 2006. After a slight increase in 1998 and a good performance in 2004, the whole
agricultural output declined in 2006 (Table 4.3.3).
Table 4.3.3: Percentage of change in agricultural production (previous year =100)
1997 1998 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006
Cereal 100 93.6 93 74.6 194.4 95.3 89.1
Veg./Horticultural 100 120.9 86.7 98.0 100.1 83.1 110.3
Fruit 100 95.7 122.4 126.5 135.6 62.7 114.0
Crop output 100 101.4 87.2 89.4 156.0 89.6 96.6
Animals 100 103.4 105.3 96.1 88.2 100.6 98.6
Animal products 100 103.6 102.4 100.0 97.2 100.0 97.4
Animal output 100 103.5 104.3 97.5 89.9 100.4 98.2
Agricultural output 100 102.0 94.3 92.9 124.1 92.9 97.0
Source: own elaborations on HCSO data
Apart from the change in support to agriculture, according to Csáki (2008) and Csáki et
al. (2004), the other reasons of the fall in production are the negative impact of
institutional disruption, the simultaneous reduction in agricultural production and food
consumption subsidies, price liberalization and the use of old machinery. Liefert et al.
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(2002) point out that, due to the low and not really reliable information available to
Western experts at the beginning of transition on the economic situation of the CEEc,
their studies underestimated the occurring fall in output. Moreover, Macours et al.
(2000) underline the importance that the huge reduction in terms of trade of agriculture
(between 40% and 80% in the transition period) played on the fall in output.
Although the crop sector gathered better results from the change in support, since the
EU  accession  the  production  of  the  three  main  cereals  –  maize  (the  most  important),
wheat and barley - decreased till 2007, and then increased again in 2008, and slowed
down in 2009 (Table 4.3.4). Both the production of sunflowers and rapeseed increased
between 2005 and 2009, respectively by 13.3 and 105% circa. By the way, Hungarian
crops play a main role in the EU-27: in 2009, Hungary contributed to the EU production
with 13% of maize, 3% of wheat and 19% of sunflowers (MoArd).
Table 4.3.4: Production of cereals and oilseeds in million tonnes, 2005-2009
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Variation (%)
Maize 9.1 8.3 4 8.9 7.5 -17.6
Barley 1.2 1.1 1 1.5 1.1 -8.3
Wheat 5.1 4.4 4 5.6 4.4 -13.7
Sunflower 1 108 1 181 1 060 1 468 1 256 13.4
Rapeseed 283 338 496 655 579 104.6
Source: own elaborations on HCSO data
Another indicator of the performance of the agricultural sector is productivity. As a
difference from some NMS (Poland, Romania), cereals yields increased in Hungary
after the EU membership (+20%) which performed the best after Slovenia, going close
to the EU-15 average value. In particular, the yield of maize increased from an average
2001-2004 value of 5.6 tonnes/ha to 6.8 (Figure 4.3.3), while the yield of wheat
increases less, from 3.9 to 4.2 tonnes/ha.













Source: own elaborations on FAO (2012)
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For animal and dairy production, the allocation of production quotas based on historical
data (2000-2002 average) negatively affected the sector, due to the low productivity
level of the numerous small farms which were created by the land reform (aimed at
contrasting the creation of large and more productive farms), and still under
restructuring at the time of the CAP introduction.
Animal production declined (Table 4.3.5), with important differences between the types
of products. The highest decline was recorded by beef (-5.7%) and pigs (-3.6%) which
lost respectively 5 thousands and 22 thousand tonnes. Instead, sheep and fish production
increases by 5%, while cow milk lost 9.4% between 2005 and 2009.
Table 4.3.5: Animal for slaughter and products in million tonnes, 2005-2009
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Variation (%)
Animals for slaughter,
000 tonnes
1 381 1 372 1 396 1 400 1 367 -1.0
of which beef 88 84 89 88 83 -5.7
Sheep 19 20 21 20 20 5.3
Pigs 608 613 643 620 586 -3.6
Poultry 640 632 616 646 649 1.4
Fish, 000 tonnes 19 21 21 20 20 5.3
Cow milk, million litres 1 878 1  796 1 794 1 792 1 702 -9.4
Source: own elaborations on HCSO data
Animals accounted for 36.8% of the gross output of agricultural production in 2009. In
that year, the sector was mainly represented by pigs, poultry breeders and milk
producers. The most profitable activity was the poultry sector, till the bird flue: poultry
and eggs account for 14.3 % of gross output, followed by pigs (11.3%) and cattle and
milk (8.4%). These numbers mask the decline in relative importance of the Hungarian
livestock sector, with negative trends of output and productivity that characterized the
transition process. Taking pigs as an explicative example, there were quite 10 millions
heads  20  years  ago  because  of  the  high  subsidies,  while  today  they  stop  at  4  millions
heads, while the number of cattle and sheep continues to decrease. After 2004, imports
of live pigs and pork increased significantly (the quantity imported in 2006 was three
times higher than that in 2003) mainly by Czech Republic and Poland, as a result of the
decrease in domestic stocks. The production fell down in 2007 and 2008 because
smaller farmers, responsible for the 2/3 of the production, ceased the activity which was
no remunerative anymore. The few producers remained are bigger (due to the process of
concentration followed to the fall in producers’ number) and they are profitable.
Farmers dealing with arable crops were the better off ones, especially after the EU
membership; the sector is characterized by large farms endowed with relatively good
equipment and able to exploit scale economies.
Farmers dealing with horticulture suffered from the shocking fall in production due loss
of subsidies, and chronicle disorganization. In fact, unlike other UE-15 Countries,
Hungarian horticultural producers don’t gather in producers’ organization, which would
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give them better bargaining power with the handlers and the representatives of big
retailers, resulting in higher incomes. The problems are mainly linked to the
remuneration of the products, not to fruit production, which showed a positive trend in
the pre-accession period and it expanded further after Hungary joined the EU in 2004.
In 2009, fruit, grapes and wine accounted for 6.3% of gross output. Fresh vegetables
accounted for 7.7%, and other vegetable products for 6.3% (HCSO, 2010).
The dual farm structure persisted in Hungary even after the EU membership (Table
4.3.6): large farms (> 100 ha) dominate land use, and their area increased from 59.7% in
2003 to 65.5% in 2007. Instead, small farms (< 10ha) decreased their share on total
UAA, from 14.9% in 2003 to 10.7% in 2007.
Table 4.3.6: UAA and share in land area by farm size group
2003 2005 2005
UAA % total UAA UAA % total UAA UAA % total UAA
< 10 ha 648 620 14.9 556 730 13.0 454 280 10.7
> 100 ha 2 597 810 59.7 2 640 570 61.9 2 768 900 65.5
Source: own elaborations on Eurostat
At the same time, the most of the Hungarian farms (80% of the total) owns less than 2
hectares, while farms over 100 ha represent only 1% (Table 4.3.7), and little change in
these proportions occurred after the EU membership.
Table 4.3.7: Number of holding by farm size group
2003 % on total 2005 % on total 2007 % on total
< 2 ha 566 660 79,6 531 430 80,2 452 340 79,9
> 100 ha 5 480 0,8 6 040 0,9 6 490 1,1
Source: own elaborations on Eurostat
The major impact of EU accession was on farm income in Hungary, which more than
doubled in nominal terms: gross farm income76 increased from 300 EUR/ha in 2003 to
more than EUR 700/ha in 2008, as a result of the CAP subsidies and the prices
adjustments to the EU level (Csáki et al., 2010). The index of agricultural income
(based on the real income of factors) calculated by Eurostat shows that before 2005,
Hungarian farmers’ incomes grew but remained lower than the EU-15 and EU-25 ones.
Instead, since 2005 Hungary performed better than the EU-25 and the EU-15; the index
reached 152.2 in 2008 and then declined in 2009, still above the 2005 value.
76 Gross farm income is calculated as: total output – total intermediate consumption + balance of current
subsidies and taxes (FADN data).
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CHAPTER 5
MAPPING AREAS FOR BETTER POLICY EVALUATION: AN ANALYSIS OF HUNGARIAN
RURAL AREAS
5.1 A background scenario for analyzing rural areas in the NMS
Over the last decade, policy monitoring and evaluation surged to the attention of the
European agenda, according to the internal and external challenges the EU had to face:
- the effects of the current international financial crisis, which deeply affected the
European economies;
- the possible enlargement to the economic and politically instable77 Western Balkans;
- the evaluation of the CAP and Cohesion policy after the enlargement to ten countries
from Central and Eastern Europe.
In particular, the “return to Europe” of the NMS was characterized by the troubled
heritage of 20 years of outstanding transition: lower p.c. GDP; higher share of the
agricultural sector on the economy in comparison with the EU average; increase in
regional inequality, mainly driven by the persisting backwardness of agricultural and
rural areas. The EU membership offered them opportunities as well as challenges, given
the typology and intensity of interventions required to catch up. At the same time, a
redistribution of EU budget from former beneficiaries to the NMS was introduced to
finance the Cohesion policy and the CAP: in fact, at the time of the EU membership, all
the regions of the NMS belonged to the Convergence area, being their p.c. GDP lower
than 75% of EU average. No surprise that the enlargement was accompanied by
discussions on the current programming period budget, and by claims for policy-
renationalization in sensitive sectors78.  Therefore,  in  order  to  gather  support  for
prosecution of the enlargement strategy, the European Commission awaited successful
results from the evaluation of the first five years of EU membership (EC, 2009).
However, these results did not happen, particularly in countries where the agricultural
sector still plays an important role and drives the process of internal divergence within
the EU (Monasterolo, 2008). In particular, the GDP growth which interested the NMS
rural areas showed that the lack of convergence was deeply influenced by spatial and
socio-economic structural features such as subsistence farming, social exclusion and
vulnerability, remoteness.
Considerable progresses were made in assessing the impact of policies on agricultural
and rural areas, and numerous indicators were introduced to evaluate the CAP and Rural
Development Policy, and their contribution to the convergence. The EU has introduced
the Common Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (CMEF), which provides a single
77 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro
and Serbia, as well as Kosovo under UNSC Resolution 1244/99. These Countries present a lower level of
development in comparison with EU average.
78 Still in 2003, severe op position to the enlargement (mainly because of the fear of losing a large amount
of EU funds) came from France and Spain.
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framework for monitoring and evaluation of all rural development interventions for the
programming period 2007-2013.
Despite this, the first analysis on the results of the measures financed by the CAP
evidenced deficiencies in institutional planning and implementing abilities, together
with an insufficient level of targeting policies and payments (Mantino, 2010). Amongst
other reasons, previous analysis (Monasterolo, 2010) on several case studies from the
CEEc  highlighted  a  limited  knowledge  of  the  local  reality  in  the  areas  for  which  the
intervention was prescribed. In the NMS, the characteristics of the most backward areas
were insufficiently analysed and addressed by the policies enacted (Csáki, 2009), and
limited data availability and accountability at a sub-regional level presented an obstacle.
At the same time, agricultural and rural areas in the NMS host the highest percentage of
poverty (Bertolini et al., 2008): here the policies introduced barely addressed the
specific problems of the composite European reality (Csáki et al., 2010). In fact, the
growth path which interested the NMS especially in the EU pre-accession period was
less evident in rural areas, which showed instead increasing divergence in the socio-
economic conditions with rural areas in the EU-15. Although a dynamic analysis of the
evolution of the living conditions in rural areas in the NMS and in the EU-15 would be
very important to understand the evolving socio-economic scenario and the policy
impact, it is still complicated by the lack of a common definition of rurality, whose
introduction is hampered by technical (availability of statistical information) and often
by political reasons (Hubbard, 2009). In fact, a sounder identification of rural areas
(which are now overestimated in some Countries and underestimated in others) would
lead to a redefinition of policy measures and, accordingly, to a redistribution of funds.
The results obtained by Anania et al. (1995) and Fanfani et al. (1999), which evidence
the importance of mapping the territory for a better identification of rural areas and their
evolving characteristics, provide a methodological contribution for the identification
and description of rural areas, in order to overcome the several limits imposed by the
currently used area classification methodologies. This approach allows us to introduce
new dynamic  modes  of  classification  of  rural  areas,  focused  on  the  regional  and  local
reality, which can contribute towards increasing the policy effectiveness, decreasing
resource dispersion (economic, physical, human), and reaching efficient results in the
medium to long term. The final outcome is the contribution to drafting better targeted
policies, able to address the needs of a specific territory.
The application of the revised typology of rural areas illustrated in the next pages is able
to catch the changes occurred on agricultural and rural areas before and after
enlargement, providing a better understanding of the effects the EU membership for
Hungary at the county level. I have chosen this country among the NMS because of the
importance (96% according to the OECD methodology) of the rural areas, and given the
historical socio-economic role played by agriculture.
Therefore, this chapter will:
- highlight the advances in the conceptualization of rurality and the multifunctional
nature of rural areas;
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- assess the statistical and methodological requirements, and provide an updated
overview of the methodologies used for the identification of rural areas;
- define the main challenges in monitoring and evaluating rural areas, compare the main
methodologies used in the EU and discuss the EC choice for the CMEF;
- introduce an improved typology of rural areas through the construction of a dataset of
relevant variables according to the current agricultural, rural development and
environmental sustainability issues, looking at the mixed case study approach (Terluin
et al., 2011) as an evaluation alternative;
- contribute to the analysis of the EU membership for Hungary, identifying the changes
occurred before (2003) and after (2007) the enlargement at the county level, using
multivariate statistics (principal components analysis, PCA; cluster analysis, CA). The
specific area’s structural, dynamic socio-economic and agricultural characteristics are
considered when selecting relevant variables;
- test the results of the CA with the Discriminant Analysis (DA), another classification
method which allows us to rank counties according to their level of rurality after having
identified the discriminant variables (backward regression was used to identify the
predictors).
- understand whether the implementation of these reforms reveals a persistent
discrepancy with the goal of eliminating regional inequality, which is a stated objective
of the European policy of cohesion, looking at the Hungarian case study. In fact, Article
158 of the Treaty establishing the European Community states that “in order to promote
its overall harmonious development, the Community shall develop and pursue its
actions leading to the strengthening of its economic and social cohesion. In particular,
the Community shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of
the various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions or islands,
including rural areas.”
5.1.1. In search for a shared definition of rurality
Several attempts were made by sociologists and economists to define rurality, focusing
on the determinants of localization of economic activities. Examples can be found in the
theory of growth poles (Perroux, 1955), the centre-periphery model (Friedman, 1972),
the cumulative causation (Kaldor, 1970) and, more recently, the new economic
geography (Krugman, 1991). All these approaches view rural areas as dependent, or
residual from urban ones (Bertolini et al., 2008). Every European country has its own
definition of rurality, influenced by the national perception of the elements that
characterize rural areas, and affected by the difficulties in providing reliable
disaggregated data.
The concept of rurality has been initially analyzed with a sectoral approach (and mainly
considered in its linkages with agriculture), and only lately a territorial approach has
been introduced, in order to take into account the multidimensional and complex reality
of rural areas. In developing countries, the sectoral (agricultural based) approach still
prevails: rural areas and rural households are still mostly exclusively identified with
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their main economic activities, i.e. agriculture, forestry and fishing. Instead, in the EU a
territorial approach developed, and rural areas started to be also spatially and
geographically analyzed, e.g. in their relation to the market and services (low access),
distance to main cities (long), and how these characteristics affect the socio-economic
and demographic conditions (i.e. low population density, unemployment, poverty,
migration and depopulation).
This change in perspective came parallel to the evolution of a specific policy for rural
development  within  the  CAP.  Rural  Development  (RD)  was  not  a  priority  in  EU
policies for a long time, and remained overshadowed by strong CAP price support.
From 1975, when the first structured interventions in the EU for mountainous and
disadvantages areas were enacted, rural areas were provided partial, insufficiently
funded and scarcely coordinated provisions. Only after Agenda 2000, RD was endowed
with its own Fund, and become the second CAP pillar, even if due to the imbalance of
funds allocation, it could be better addressed as a stool. The development of a
comprehensive  EU  Rural  Development  Policy  in  the  golden  years  of  globalization
introduced a new perspective for the analysis of rural areas, whose role, characteristics
and potentialities were not linked anymore to agriculture only (Table 5.1.1). In
particular, the conceptualization of rural areas provided by the endogenous and neo-
endogenous growth models opened the way to the development of the participative and
territorial based LEADER approach.
Table 5.1.1: Rural areas in the agricultural and Rural Development perspective
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their benefit
Source: own elaboration and adaptation from the results of the SCARLED project
Thus, RD policy monitoring and evaluation gained importance, but the improvement in
availability and comparability of relevant statistics proceeded at a much slower pace,
with several consequences on the choice for the most suitable methodologies to
indentify rural areas.
Internationally, the most used methodology was proposed by OECD (OECD, 1994;
2005), which classifies regions (NUTS3 level) in three groups – Predominantly Urban
(PU), Intermediate Rural (IR), and Predominantly Rural (PR) – according to three
criteria which mainly rely on population density. Appealing features of this
classification method are the simplicity in its application, in interpreting the results and
their comparability between States. Its application presents several limits: according to
the OECD classification (which is also adopted by the EU), PR represent 54% of the
territory (reaching 91% together with IR), and 19% of the population (EC, 2009). Then,
OECD classification doesn’t consider the historical and developmental characteristics of
different regions (i.e. productive structure, specialization, etc), nor the natural influence
of the presence of mountainous areas, deserts, and semi-Nordic areas on population
density. Finally, it doesn’t catch the heterogeneous development pattern: within the
same country it is possible to identify winning (rich) or losing (poorer), agricultural
based79 or services-oriented rural regions (Bertolini, 2009). In order to overcome these
limitations, with the growing availability of indicators at sub-regional level new
contributions were proposed. Based on the results of two Italian projects80,  a  new
geographical analysis of agricultural systems and rural areas was introduced by Anania
et al. in 1995, then applied to Emilia Romagna (Boccafogli et al., 1998), and used for
drafting the Italian Regional Plan for Rural Development 2000-2006. It consists of 49
indicators available at the municipality level, divided into 4 groups and analysed
through multivariate analysis:
- indicators of the structure of the economy;
- indicators of the structure of agriculture;
- indicators of the demographic structure;
- indicators of dynamic changes.
The  main  advantage  is  represented  by  the  possibility  to  identify  disparities  and
similarities between rural areas (which emerge as a part of the dynamic changes in the
79 Agriculture is still a distinctive feature of rural areas. EC, 2008.
80 The National Atlas of Rural Areas (by CAIRE and Ministry of Agriculture), and the territorial
agricultural systems (by National research project CNR-RAISA).
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economic system) within the same Province, Region or Nation, and to monitor their
evolution over the years.
Recently, an adjusted definition of rurality was provided by Bertolini et al. (2008): it
considers population density, but it also introduces the concept of adjusted density
(100ab/km²), calculated as total population – population belonging to the main inhabited
centre of the area (expressed in km²), and it adds the role of occupation in agriculture on
the national average at the NUTS3 level. In fact, choosing the EU average level would
lead to underestimate the rural regions in Countries where the share of people employed
in agriculture is low. This approach allows us to understand if the population of a region
is gathered in one town or is more equally distributed; the relevance of the primary
sector  on  the  regional  and  rural  economy;  to  correct  the  overestimation  of  rurality  in
countries presenting few large urban centres (i.e. Ireland, Slovenia) produced by the
OECD methodology81.
Also, the EU has developed a revised rural-urban typology (EUROSTAT, 2010) to
avoid the spatial problem represented by NUTS3 regions that are too small (<500 km²),
and the size-discrepancies between LAU2 and NUTS3. It follows OECD methodology
in that it is centred on population density (population grid) and it can easily be
reproduced in countries outside the EU for comparability. It is composed of a two-step
approach to identifying population in urban areas82:
1. population density threshold (300 ab./km²) for grid cells of 1 km²;
2. a minimum size threshold (5 000 ab.) applied to grouped grid cells above the density
threshold.
Results are, so far, not very satisfactory: this methodology classifies 68% of EU-27
population as living in urban areas and 32% in rural ones (5% higher than the original
OECD definition).
At the time of the EU accession, the lack of a shared definition of rurality which could
overcome the limits of the OECD one, which doesn’t catch the real distribution of rural
areas, and which doesn’t account for national peculiarities, had several consequences, as
evidenced by the results of the SCARLED 6th EU FP (Structural Change in Agriculture
and Rural Livelihoods) which provided some guidelines for the analysis of rural areas in
transition,  and  created  a  protocol  of  best  practices  from  the  successful  experiences  of
RDPs in selected EU-15 regions. Analyzing the restructuring process of the agricultural
sector and the rural socio-economic transformation in the NMS, the Project evidenced
the need to study rural transition within the national development context, because rural
development is the product of a country specific combination of internal and external,
endogenous and exogenous forces. In particular, the Project highlighted the importance,
in a scenario characterized by limited statistical information at a disaggregated level for
unclear identified rural areas, of providing a comparison of the national
multidimensional development contexts in the NMS: a particular attention is paid to the
81 By the way, similar final classification of rural areas in EU: 73%, but more differentiated urban ones.
82 Therefore, the population living in RA is the one living outside the urban areas identified in this way.
Grids are not applicable to overseas regions, which follow the OECD classification.
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changing socio-economic structural characteristics of agricultural and rural areas and
their role on the national economies, and to the contribution of non observed/off farm
economy, removing the veil on the contribution of subsistence production to rural
households’ income in the CEEc.
5.1.2. Rural development statistics and data sources
Agriculture and rural development is a key policy area because of its role in the
promotion of sustainable development and environmental protection, and for the
improvement of the quality of life and poverty reduction. Agricultural and rural areas
deserve particularly importance when considering the need to rethink the growth model,
characterized by the depletion of the limited natural resources (i.e. land, water, and
food) and their unequal distribution. Moreover, in the last years citizens’ interest
towards the use of public funds increased, as well as their commitment towards
sustainable living solutions, in order to preserve agricultural and rural areas as public
goods, i.e. areas which provide safe food and preserve the environment. Therefore,
policy makers are more and more interested in policy evaluation, at the national and
local level.
There is a need for increasing the availability of accountable, disaggregated, updated
and accessible statistical information, in order to monitor and evaluate the performance
of the policy introduced. Statistics are at this regard policy driven (within certain
limits): they have to offer the policy makers clear, fast and tailored information on the
situation, in order to monitor the effects of the policies, assessing their performance and
planning changes if necessary (UN, 2012). In fact, the provision of reliable and timely
released statistics helps analyzing the dimensions of the problems that the policy aims to
tackle, and how they change over time, setting the basis for policy monitoring and
evaluation. In fact, the provision of proper data can contribute defining targeted policies
and programs, also considering for the backlashes of the previous ones enacted,
increasing the policy effectiveness and efficiency.
The multidimensional reality of agricultural and rural areas in the age of globalization
requires the availability of a statistics from different fields (i.e. agriculture, labour
market, demography, geography), coming from different sources, and the application of
specific  methodologies  able  to  analyze  them  together  at  the  same  time,  often  in  a
comparative perspective, accounting for limits of using different data sources and
availability.  By  the  way,  the  production  and  collection  of  relevant  statistics  is  costly
(even today in the digital era) in terms of time and money, while policy makers mostly
need fast answers to the problems which come at their attention.
In  the  analysis  of  rural  areas,  different  data  sources  are  characterized  both  by
shortcomings and advantages. Case studies (Yin, 2009) can provide very detailed
information on a specific reality, but their methodological foundation, mainly based on
surveys or focus groups, cannot be generalized.
Instead, censuses are a precious source of data, because they represent a comprehensive
investigation on the whole population. In some cases, sector specific censuses such as
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the agricultural census (which is often scheduled in the intervals between two national
censuses) are also provided. The agricultural census is very important especially in
developing countries, where the rural population still mainly rely on agriculture for the
households’ income, because it offers important information on the development path
followed by rural areas, and the changes occurred.
The main disadvantage of censuses is that they take long time to collect the answers and
validate them and, most important, they don’t allow catching the changes occurred in
the short time, because long time passes between the individual censuses (usually ten
years). Moreover, they don’t report disaggregated information on consumption patterns
and income sources, which can instead be found in the household’s budget surveys. In
the last years, statistical yearbooks are redacted yearly in several industrialized and
developing  countries  by  the  national  statistical  offices,  often  according  to  an
internationally shared methodology (i.e. the case of the EU and OECD countries). They
have the advantage to collect socio-economic, demographic and agricultural data at a
very disaggregate level (e.g. municipalities) which are comparable through time, but
only for some main accounts.
Then, several international research groups and projects (e.g. the Global Footprint
Network  for  environmental  protection,  or  the  Millennium  Development  Goals)  and
international institutions and organizations (e.g. the EBRD for transition countries)
created own indicators and databases in order to share information and monitor the
evolution of specific issues, and new ones are coming.
For agricultural and rural areas, the challenge is the provision of territorially based
statistics and indicators, which are still weak and fragmented (Hill, 2003), to be
comparable between countries and regions. In fact, even countries belonging to the
same area (as in the EU case) tend to use different definition for key concepts such as
the household, and to differently aggregate their components (ISTAT, Blue-Ets Project,
2012). More statistics are required on the incomes of rural and agricultural households,
in order to allow indicators to accomplish the policy need to monitor the income
situation of agricultural households.
The  construction  of  indicators  for  the  analysis  of  rural  areas,  especially  in  the  case  of
synthetic indicators, have the advantage to offer a snapshot on the objective of interest,
but they often have to pay a price in precision in the aggregation of their statistical
sources, which can combine and cross data coming from different sources which often
differ  in  coverage,  precision  and  periodicity.  Moreover,  we  must  remember  that  the
final choice for the construction of indicators is always constrained by data availability.
In order to provide useful information for policy design, monitoring and evaluation,
indicators should fulfil the following criteria (UN, 2012):
- they should be relevant;
- they should be simple and easily understandable;
- they should be problem oriented;
- they should be clearly defined;
- they should be based on the same statistical unit;
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- they should result in conclusions easily communicated to policy makers;
- they should react rapidly to changed situations.
The WB and the OECD provided lists of guidelines for the construction of indicators to
analyze rural areas, and the former placed particular attention to developing countries.
The WB started to promote approaches principles in the area of rural development since
1998, focusing on the revitalization of rural development at the local community level,
the involvement of the stakeholders through all the stages of the projects, the delivery of
rural financial services to the poor, the promotion of sustainability in resource use
through community-based management.
Accordingly, the WB evidenced five themes (ISTAT, Blue-Ets Project):
- basic socio-economic data;
- enabling environment for rural development;
- broad based economic growth for rural poverty reduction;
- natural resource management and biodiversity;
- social well-being (education and health).
The OECD identifies both general and specific subjects for analyzing rural areas at
different degree of specificity.
Among the general subjects, the OECD lists (OECD, 1996):
- population and migration;
- economic structure and performance;
- social well-being and equity;
- environment and sustainability.
To each macro area, several indicators have been identified (Table 5.1.2), which cannot
be considered to be definitive and comprehensive, given the dynamic and
multidimensional nature of rural areas.
Table 5.1.2: OECD basic rural development indicators classified by themes
Population and migration Social well-being and equity
Population density p.c. GDP
Population change Housing conditions
Population structure (by sex and age) Education levels
Households (structure and social organization) Health conditions
Population living in local communities Crimes and justice
Economic structure and performance Environment and sustainability
Labour force Topography and climate
Employment growth Land use (change)
Unemployment rate Habitat and species
Sectoral share on employment and GDP Soils and waters
Public administration share on employment





Both the WB and OECD statistical information and indicators share a main limit, as
they are provided at an aggregate (national) level; thus, their relevance in different areas
of the same country can’t be assessed.
In the EU, Eurostat provides useful information for the analysis of agricultural and rural
areas, especially concerning the agricultural production, land quality and use, agri-
environmental dimensions of sustainability. Data come also at a disaggregated level, but
mostly they don’t go more in depth than the NUTS 2 (regional) level, which don’t allow
catching the relevance of specific features and realities at the local (sub-regional) level.
With regard to the living conditions in rural areas, basic data on economic structure and
performance (sectoral employment and investments), or social well-being (education,
communications) cover only the regional dimension.
5.1.3 Rural development policy evaluation in the EU
The identification of a proper methodology for the classification of rural areas and the
construction of accountable indicators are important not only for their informative
contribution  to  the  analysis  of  the  evolution  of  the  rural  landscape,  and  the  changing
urban-rural relations. They also provide the instruments for rural development policy
design and implementation, and for their monitoring and evaluation. With the reform of
the Structural Funds in 1988, a system of monitoring and evaluation of the regional
policies was introduced in the EU (OECD, 2009), followed by the Sound and Efficient
Management system to manage the EU spending, which opened the way to the Agenda
2000 reform. Rural Development was a main exponent of this trend: in fact, in the EU
the change in the philosophy behind RD went together with the acknowledgement of the
need for targeting policies and measures, avoiding the duplication of interventions and
the waste of public money. Formal evaluation, addressed by the EC as the “judgement
of interventions according to their results, impacts and needs they aim to satisfy” (CEC,
2000), was finally considered as an integral part of the policy process (Bradley et al.,
2010). Accordingly, an European evaluation framework was developed, in order to meet
the  EU  priorities  for  RD,  i.e.  the  promotion  of  knowledge  share  and  innovation  for  a
strong and dynamic agri-food sector; the preservation of biodiversity and natural
resources (land, water) against climate change; attention to the multifunctional role of
rural areas; the creation of off-farm employment opportunity through diversification; the
promotion of new, bottom-up governance approaches based on local participation.
Legislative regulations were introduced regarding the use of EU funds by the EU
Member States for the measures related to RD (for the current programming period
2007-2013, Regulation 1698/2005 is in force) establishing that the Member States are
compelled to have evaluations carried out by independent bodies, according to a
common EU timetable, following the principles of decentralization and accountability.
The EC set up a highly structured approach to the evaluation of each seven-year Rural
Development Policy programs (RDPs), the Common Monitoring and Evaluation
Framework, which applies to all the EU-27. It is composed by three main parts: ex-ante,
in itinere and ex-post evaluations, respectively occurring before, during and after the
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implementation of a programme, following the EC written guidance. The results of
these evaluations are gathered in reports accessible to all the stakeholders, in order to
increase accountability (policy and results for money), transparency and to provide
some lessons learnt.
The CMEF is a highly quantitative approach which includes 160 indicators gathered
into five groups, according to a hierarchy of objectives, a tool which presents the several
intervention logics which link individual actions and measures to the overall goal of
interventions (EC, 2006). In particular, it is composed of 140 common evaluation
questions pre-written by the EC, to be submitted to policy makers in the different
Member  States.  It  is  aimed at  assessing  the  policy  impact  at  the  national  and  regional
level, addressing neither the local reality nor specific sectors (i.e. farmers’ or
households’  income).  The  first  results,  analyzed  by  the  European  Project  RUDI
“Assessing the Impact of Rural Development Policies” (http\\www.rudi-europe.com)
shows that, even if the CMEF should facilitate the identification of the causal effects, in
the reality it presented several backlashes, both at the theoretical and operational level.
With its rigid structure and its main focus on the quantification of the policy effect, the
CMEF approach was difficult implement in the different member states, and the results
were often far from the awaited.
The designation of standardized evaluation questions and indicators made by the EC has
the advantage to put order in the common evaluation framework, enabling the synthesis
of evaluation results and checking for quality control. By the way, such a system often
fails to address the specific circumstances of different national or regional realities.
Member States are allowed to suggest changes in some questions, but in practice they
can’t do it because of the lack of money and administrative capacities, and time. Timing
is an open issue in the CMEF: the aim of learning from the evaluation is endangered by
the insufficient time left to Member States to consult their evaluators before submitting
the new programs. In fact, there is no break between two programming periods, and the
planning and agreement of a new programme has to take place before the results of the
ex-post evaluation. In this way, a time lag in programmes evaluation occurs, and the
new programming can’t benefit from the results of the evaluation of the former period,
thus hindering the sense and usefulness of the evaluation itself. Then, such a
quantitative evaluation system of performance measurement needs to rely on timely
updated and easily available data (with no further cost for MS), but this is often not the
case of RDPs. In fact, limitations persist at the national and sub-national level in data
availability, especially on the applications and claim forms from potential beneficiaries,
and for particular measures, which lead evaluators to answer the CMEF with proxy
measures (Bradley et al., 2010). Relying on data alone can be tempting (and easier)
can’t counterbalance a weak theoretical base for the diagnosis and effect in policy
performance (Midmore et al., 2009). In fact, this system can lead to forget “the mean of
it all”, the final objective of the evaluation, i.e. understanding how and why policies
operate  the  way they  do,  and  even  to  establish  a  proper  counterfactual  scenario  (what
would have happened in the absence of interventions). The importance of understanding
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the causal process behind rural development emerges in the case of dead-weight (i.e.
when there are recipients of policy funds who would have delivered the desired
outcomes even without compensation, Margarian, 2010) and the related selection-bias
problem; when the context plays a role in influencing the results (context-dependent
impact of measures); when measures are applied to regions, the outcomes can be
influenced by several and diverse factors; when the measure can’t be assessable with the
available data and measures. The complexity and inherent limits of this evaluation
framework  contribute  decreasing  the  efficiency  of  evaluation  results,  and  the  policy
makers and stakeholders’ commitment to policy evaluation (i.e. they only feel like
executants). By the way, as Blandford et al. (2010) highlight, the development of a
general theory able to reflect the behaviour of rural areas is extremely difficult due to
their heterogeneity. Better results could be obtained by promoting a dual approach: the
theoretical foundation of policy interventions should be strengthened according to the
results of policy monitoring; the CMEF could be improved introducing ad hoc targeted
and flexible indicators; increased data transparency would allow sparing time, which
can be used to provide policy advices before the starting of the next programming
period. The need for alternative, more “user friendly” and effective methodologies, led
to the introduction or application of different methods to rural development policy
evaluation. 22 evaluation methods alternative to the CMEF are analyzed in Terluin et al.
(2010), comparing the main strengths and weaknesses, especially in the implementation
and interpretation of the results (Table 5.1.3)
Table 5.1.3: Assessment of the main properties of evaluation methods
Source: Terluin et al., 2010
The analysis  of  the  CMEF highlights  several  limits  already  evidenced  above  (e.g.  the
description of how and why a result happened at the local level, the unintended effects).
Among the modelling approaches, the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) is able to
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address the policy effect at a very disaggregated level, but it needs very detailed data
which  can  be  often  collected  only  through  ad  hoc  surveys  (i.e.  in  the  case  of
households),  resulting  costly  and  time  constrained.  Moreover,  it  shows  the  policy
impact only for a certain year. General Equilibrium Models (GEM) can catch the impact
only  at  the  national  level,  and  they  require  complete  time  series,  while  the  more
complete Computable General Equilibrium Models (CGEM) are very costly (time, data
and methodological efforts required).
Instead, Terluin et al. developed and applied a mixed case study approach, which
combines different methods in different stages of the analysis, from which final results
are combined in order to provide support for the causal relationship (Terluin et al.,
2011). First, a desk research on secondary data is conducted on case study regions, in
order to provide a contextual framework, and then primary data are collected through
surveys to different stakeholders of representative groups.
This approach gives interesting results for explorative purposes, drafting a general
scenario of what has happened, where and why, and setting the basis for a more
complete methodological framework. By the way, its results are difficult to be
quantified, thus it lacks a synthetic measure of the results to be easily communicated to
policy makers. Moreover, the comparison of results isn't very immediate neither through
the years (if the questions need to be rearranged) nor between regions.
5.2 Methodology
The limits of the OECD classification of rural areas, used in the EU-27, for Hungary are
shown by Figure 5.2.1: just one county (Budapest) is classified as predominantly urban
(PU), while 47% of the territory emerges as predominantly rural (PR).
Figure 5.2.1: Hungarian counties according to the OECD perspective
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Different results are provided applying the Adjusted Rurality methodology (Figure
5.2.2): three counties are classified as PU, and only 28% of the territory as PR.
Figure 5.2.2: Hungarian counties according to the Adjusted Rurality
perspective
Legenda: PU: red; PR: green; IR: yellow
Source: own elaborations on HCSO maps
Therefore, a revised methodology is introduced, mainly influenced by the Adjusted
Rurality definition provided by Bertolini et al. (2008) and enriched by some meaningful
variables.
5.3 The sample and the data
The sample is composed by the 17 Hungarian rural counties identified with the
application of the enhanced adjusted rurality methodology, which excludes Budapest
Pest and Komárom-Esztergom (in red in Figure 5.2.2). A group of 44 socio-economic-
demographic and agricultural variables, which are available yearly at the county level
(NUTS3) for the years 2003 and 2007 is used (Table 5.3.1).
The relevance and representativieness of indicators have been inquired by the
literature83, and they appear to be fundamental also for shaping targeted local policies. In
this case, as for some NMS, the identification of relevant and statistically meaningful
variables is a demanding step, due to the persisting limitations of data availability, and
data reconciliation issues. For the purposes of the analysis of the changes occurred in
agricultural and rural counties in Hungary, a mixed database composed of indicators
coming from different sources but comparable, representative and available for the same
time period is used (data from Eurostat; the Household Budget Survey; the European
Union  Statistics  on  Income  and  Living  Conditions,  EU-SILC;  the  FADN/RICA;  the
Hungarian national statistical office HCSO).
83 OECD, 1994; Brasili et al. 2008,
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Table 5.3.1: List of variables and indicators
Source: Eurostat, HCSO, FADN/RICA
The level of disaggregation NUTS 3 was chosen due to the lack of data at the
municipality level. The variables were listed according to their relevance in shaping the
evolving trend of rural areas, coherently with the indications for RD policy evaluation
methodology provided by the EU CMEF. Indicators in line with the new CAP vision
towards agricultural diversification, multifunctionality and environment sustainability
are included, together with the six indicators emerged by the last findings on the
determinants of wealth gaps among EU regions84, in relation to agricultural productivity
and quality of life: topography; youth unemployment rate; long term unemployment
rate; number of patents; private and public funds invested in R&D; people in top
business positions. Finally, the guidelines provided by the SCARLED project for the
comparison of the socio-economic conditions, including some proxies of poverty
(mainly associated to remoteness) and vulnerability (most often linked to
unemployment, underemployment and subsistence agriculture) in rural areas, are taken
into account.
The variables were listed in four groups in order to ease the interpretation of results:
1. economic and productive structure: they offer an image of the economic and
productive system of the area, paying particular attention to the employment structure;
2. structural indicators for agriculture, considering the productive characteristics of the
sector;


























































































































3. socio-demographic structure, to monitor the evolution of the population, bearing in
mind its age structure and cultural characteristics;
4. economic dynamism: indicators reflecting the dynamism of the productive system. It
facilitates the analysis of the fluxes of the structural components in the agricultural
sector and in the employment structure, within the national macroeconomic framework.
Principal  components  analysis  (PCA)  was  applied  to  the  selected  variables.  PCA  is  a
methodology belonging to multivariate statistics which doesn’t require strong
assumptions on the model. Therefore, it is able to work in situations were available data
and  their  quality  are  far  from  optimal.  Moreover,  it  has  been  widely  used  for  similar
analyses (Cannata, 1998; Fanfani et al. 1999; Bogdanov, 2007; Monasterolo et al.,
2010). With PCA a group of p indicators, obtained on a group of n statistical units, is
transformed into a smaller group of variables, which are still able to explain a high
percentage of the original data variability, to avoid important loss of information
(Mazzocchi, 2008).. While at the beginning of the process the indicators are highly
correlated, the transformed variables we obtain (principal components, PCs), which are
a linear combination of the original indicators, are uncorrelated. The PCs are computed
on the correlation matrix, in order to avoid the distorting influence of different
measurement units (and hence different variance scales) across indicators85. The values
of the components are obtained from the component matrix86, and the scores of every
statistical unit (county) are computed for each component.
The k principal component scores of the selected components (k<p)  comes  from  the
following linear combinations, expressed as a matrix:
(1) Y= XA, where
Y is the nxk matrix, containing the scores of the n statistical units in the k components
A is the vector matrix pxk of the normalized coefficients
X is the nxp matrix of the standardized data.
The  scores  of  the  Y  matrix  are  then  used  in  the  cluster  analysis  (CA)87 to maximize
homogeneity within clusters and heterogeneity between clusters. This approach allows
us to identify and group areas with similar features, and describe them through the PCs
values.
85 The correlation matrix is used when the original variables have different measurement units. In this
case, standardization occurs.
86 Components are not rotated.
87 SPSS automatically provide standardized values, which are used in the cluster analysis. Then, all the
components are supposed to share the same variance equal to 1, and therefore the same weight in the
mapping, carrying possible distortive effects.
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5.4 Analysis and results
5.4.1 An application of Principal Components Analysis and Cluster Analysis to
the Hungarian rural counties in 2003
A principal component analysis (PCA) was conducted on the 44 variables. An initial
analysis was run to obtain eigenvalues for each component in the data. Five components
had eigenvalues over Kaiser’s criterion of 1, and the scree plot showed inflexions that
would justify retaining both components 3 and 5. Given the sample size, and the
convergence of the scree plot and Kaiser’s criterion on five components, this number of
components was retained in the final analysis. These components explain 75.2% of the
original variance, in line with the Guttman-Kaiser criterion, which suggests PCs
explaining 70-80% of cumulative variance.
There are different methods used to establish the number of principal components to
choose. In this analysis:
- the Guttman-Kaiser criterion is followed, which states to choose the principal
components able to explain the 70-80% of cumulative variance;
- the principal components with eigenvalue over 1 are retained;
- I looked at the elbow on the scree plot.
An initial analysis was run to obtain eigenvalues for each component in the data. Five
components  had  eigenvalues  above  1  (Kayser’s  selection  criterion),  and  the  scree  plot
showed inflexions that would justify retaining either 3 or 5 components. Given the
sample  size,  and  the  convergence  of  the  scree  plot  and  Kaiser’s  criterion  on  five
components, the latter number of components was retained in the final analysis. These
components explain 75.2% of the original variance, in line with the Guttman-Kaiser
criterion, which suggests PCs explaining 70-80% of cumulative variance.
PC1 - rurality (28%). This component gathers the main features of Hungarian rural
areas. Positive values are associated with the presence of recipients of social support,
dependency ratio, employment in public administration (PA) and in the primary sector;
presence of a young population and university students; all the unemployment indexes;
presence of small farms. Coherently, negative values are shown for p.c. GDP and net
earnings on the national average; employment rate; role of secondary sector on
employment and GDP; labour productivity in agriculture.
PC2 - agricultural development (16%). Positive values are associated overall with the
primary sector: its role on GDP and employment (full-time mainly); the presence of
larger farms and younger farmers; cereals, maize and pig breeding among the activities;
land price and R&D expenditures. Negative values are shown in labour productivity in
agriculture; population density and immigration rates; all unemployment indexes, in
particular long term unemployment.
PC3 - economic development (14%). This gathers the developmental features of rural
areas: positive values are recorded for population density and population change; p.c.
GDP and average earnings; employment in services, value of industrial production and
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university students. Instead, negative values are associated with long term
unemployment; aging index; older farmers; employment in public administration (PA).
PC4 - emerging rural diversification (10%). This identifies areas with natural and
agricultural assets (positive land price, cereals and maize, forests and livestock), and a
tendency toward economic diversification but persisting unemployment and low
salaries.
PC5 - touristic vocation (7%). Positive values underline the role of natural attraction
(forests, pastures, accommodation, and temporary immigration) and the primary sector
in the economy (agricultural and labour productivity in agriculture). Negative values are
recorded for long term unemployment, employment in the PA, presence of recipients of
social support, average farm size.
The next step was the application of cluster analysis to the 5 PCs. A two-step process was
adopted. First, a hierarchical method (Ward’s method) was applied and a dendogram
showing the nesting process was obtained. As hierarchical methods often present problems
with data containing a high level of error, the final clustering was obtained by applying non-
hierarchical method, the k-means algorithm, where k stand for the number of clusters
chosen to start the process. In fact, this method is faster and more reliable when working
with large databases. All the individual observations are assigned to the nearer cluster seed,
and  the  researcher  needs  to  set  the  initial  seeds  and  specify  the  number  of  clusters.
Furthermore, reallocation is allowed for in each iteration step.
5 clusters were identified:
1 - Deep rurality. This includes two counties (Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Szabolcs-Szatmár-
Bereg) located at the North-Eastern border of Hungary. In former Communist period they
were invested in heavy industrialization, but due to the unsolved structural problems during
transition they now show high unemployment rates (+30%, youth unemployment +50%88),
presence of recipients of social support and employment in PA (+60% and +20%), low P.c.
GDP (-30%). The secondary sector still plays a relevant role (thanks to the delocalization of
multinational companies i.e. GE and Borsch, mainly in the food industry, manufacturing,
chemical and metallurgy), while agriculture is lagging behind (farm size is the half of the
national average, as full-time work in agriculture).
2 - Potential rurality. This identifies the Southern Transdanubia Region (Baranya,
Somogy, Tolna), characterized by a positive PC2 due to the role of the primary sector (9%
of GDP, +20%), with maize as main cultivation (+40%); high natural endowments (Lake
Balaton, vineyards); good services, infrastructures, and investments, which contribute to
economic diversification and tourism (positive PC4 and 5, +30% accommodation).
3 - Manufacturing sector. This is composed of five counties belonging to Western and
Central Transdanubia, with good productive performance and living standards above the
national average (+25% GDP, -80% long term unemployment). It is specialized in
88 Percentages used for describing clusters values are intended in comparison with the national average.
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manufacturing activities (machine industry, textiles and foods, +30% value of industrial
production), also due to the several foreign companies, especially from Austria and
Germany, which invested in the area during transition (Audi, Renault, General Electrics).
Moreover, it is rich in historical and natural endowments, which helps diversification
(positive PC4 and 5).
4 - Agricultural activity: composed again of five counties, located in Northern and
Southern Great Plain, this is characterized by the role of the primary sector (+30% on GDP
and +22% of employment in agriculture) and the presence of natural attractions (i.e. Puszta,
flood plains, spa water). In this cluster, Debrecen, the second largest Hungarian city and an
important national research and university centre (+20% expenditures in R&D), is located.
These features were not able to contribute effectively to area development (-10% GDP and
net earnings, -20% labour productivity in agriculture).
 5 - Backwardness cluster includes Heves and Nógrád (Northern Hungary). It shows
negative values for all the PCs, highlighting problems in the economic (-20% GDP), social
(+20% recipients of social support, +40% long term unemployment) and agricultural
(prevalence  of  small  farms  and  old  farmers)  sectors,  which  were  unsolved  and  even
worsened during the transition period. These counties were characterized by the presence of
mining and chemistry industries, already declining before the system change: now the value
of industrial production is twice as low as the national average, and expenditures in R&D
and request for patents reach one third of the national average.
Figure 5.4.1: Hungarian rural counties, 2003
Legenda
Red: cluster 1
Light green: cluster 2
Light blue: cluster 3





5.4.2 Catching the enlargement effect: an application of Principal Components
Analysis and Cluster Analysis to Hungarian rural counties in 2007
In order to understand the changes that occurred in Hungary after the European membership,
I repeated the same process (PCA and CA) on 2007 data, using the same set of variables after
the end of the first programming period 2004-2006 for NMS.
5 PCs were identified, explaining 74% of the original variance:
PC1 - rurality (26%). This first component shares the same features of PC1 in 2003,
but it shows worse results. Positive values are associated with the presence of recipients
of social support; dependency ratio; all the unemployment indexes; employment in
agriculture and the role of PA. Coherently, negative values are associated to p.c. GDP,
net earnings and employment rate.
PC2 - age structure (15%). Positive values are associated with the presence of a young
population (youth index, university students, youth unemployment), population change
and with the value of industrial production, while negative values are associated with
the role of the primary sector on employment and GDP, presence of older farmers and
the ageing index.
PC3 - agricultural productivity (14%). This component gathers the performance
indexes for agriculture. Positive values are associated with occupation (mainly the
presence of younger farmers), agricultural productivity, cereals and maize production;
investments in R&D and patents, temporary immigration, which show the role of
external investments in agriculture in less favoured areas (negative land price).
PC4 - lagging agriculture (10%): positive  values  are  recorded  for  crops,  family
farming, land price, tourist accommodation and employment in PA. Instead, negative
values are associated with farm size, farmers’ age and full-time work in agriculture,
agricultural and labour productivity; relevance of the secondary sector and investments.
PC5 – rural diversification (9%): this component is characterized by naturalistic
attractions (forests, pastures) and tourism (accommodation, employment and role of the
tertiary sector on GDP), positive immigration indexes, with part-time and older farmers
prevailing in agriculture. Instead, negative values are associated with the secondary
sector and the value of industrial production.
After running the analysis with Ward’s method, the application of the k-means allows us
to identify again five clusters. They differ from the analysis provided for 2003 in
composition and values:
1 - Lagging rurality. It gathers three counties located in North-Eastern Hungary which
share the features of declining rurality: high rate of recipients of social support
(+50%89), high unemployment (+30%), p.c. GDP and net earnings lower than the
national average (-15%), positive demographic balance. Low productive agriculture is
mainly conduced at the family level (negative PC3 and positive PC4), with the
prevalence of industrial crops.
89 Percentages for describing clusters must be intended on the national average value.
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2 - Agricultural vocation. This is composed of four counties, mainly in Southern Great
Plain, showing agricultural vocation (+30% contribution of primary sector on GDP and
+23% employment, larger farm size, young farmers), high rate of expenditures in R&D
(+30%) and patents (+20%). The natural attractions could be better exploited for
diversification, creating tourist facilities.
3  - Industrial areas: Fejér and Győr-Moson-Sopron, in Central and North-Western
Hungary, are the most developed of the 17 counties examined. In fact, they have a high
GDP, net earnings and population density (respectively +30%, +10% and +20%), the
lowest unemployment rate (-50%) and employment in PA, a dynamic population. The
economy is driven by the secondary sector (highest value of industrial production),
while agriculture is conducted in a productive way (larger farms, high labour
productivity).
4 - The backward cluster is composed of just one county, Nógrád, located in Northern
Hungary, presenting characteristics of deep rurality and low development perspectives.
P.c. GDP is 60% lower than the national average, long term unemployment and relief
on social support are high (30%). Industrial production is still declining, and
investments are lagging, and no of diversification (e.g. tourism, services) are on offer.
5  - Diversification. This is the largest cluster, composed of seven counties on the
Southern and Western Hungarian borders. The rich natural, historical, wellness
(medicinal and thermal waters) sites and the eco-tourist infrastructures are an important
source of attractiveness of this flat and green area, where agriculture is dominantly
composed of crops and vineyards, and conducted in a quite productive way. In fact, p.c.
GDP and permanent immigration are above the national average, while unemployment
indexes are considerably low. Apart from in the tertiary sector, industry also has a good
role on the economy of the area, in the energy, telecommunications and food industry
sectors (PannonPower, SMT, Elcoteq, Sió).
Figure 5.4.2: Hungarian rural counties, 2007
Legenda:
Red: cluster 1
Dark green: cluster 2
Light blue: cluster 3
Yellow: cluster 4




5.4.3 Testing the classification results through Discriminant Analysis
A Discriminant Analysis (DA) was run for 2003 and 2007 in order get a confirmation of
the classification results obtained with the previous Cluster Analyses, ranking counties
according to the set of relevant variables (Klecka, 1980). The predictors (discriminant
variables) were defined through a backward regression run on the variables composing
the PC1 (from the previous Principal Component Analyses), which is the one explaining
the most of the variability of the original dataset. The backward method was preferred
to the forward one in order to avoid the possibility of incurring in suppressor effect.
For 2003, the backward regression evidenced five variables - number holdings <5 ha AA,
ageing index, dependency ratio, the share of secondary sector on GDP, population density
(p.c. GDP as dependent variable). According to the results of the diagnostics, two variables
were excluded due to possible multicollinearity problems - number holdings <5 ha AA and
the share of secondary sector on GDP which showed condition index over 30. Tolerance
index was over 0.260 for all predictors, VIF ranged between 1.6 and 3.8. The model had a
good explicative power: the Adjusted R Square was 0.967, and the value of the Durbin-
Watson test was around 2 (Table 5.4.1).
Table 5.4.1: Model summary 2003







7 .988g .976 .967 5.986481 2.162
Dependent variable: p.c. GDP
The discriminant analysis was run on four variables - dependency ratio, population
density, p.c. GDP, ageing index (this last one deleted from the groups due to not
significant value for the Wilk’s Lambda). The most influencing discriminant variable
was population density (Table 5.4.2). The number (and percentages) of correctly
classified cases are presented in Table 5.4.3. In total 90% of the cases were correctly
classified:  two  counties  previously  classified  as  urban  (Pest,  Komárom-Esztergom)
were reclassified as rural, while all the former rural counties maintained their
classification.  The  most  urban  county  was  Budapest,  and  the  most  rural  one  was
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén.




Density                .876
GDP Hung=100 -.103
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Table 5.4.3: Classification results
Predicted Group Membership
rurality Urban rural Total
urban 1 2 3County
rural 0 17 17
urban 33.3 66.7 100
Original
%
rural        .0 100 100
a. 90% of original grouped cases correctly classified.
The backward regression for 2007 identified the following variables: recipients of social
support, population density, agricultural value added, part time in agriculture and value of
industrial production (p.c. GDP as dependent variable). Agricultural value added showed
not significant t test for the regression coefficient and was excluded.
Table 5.4.4: Model summary 2007







11 .994k .987 .983 4.750485 1.694
Dependent variable: p.c. GDP
Thus, a DA was run on the remaining predictors. Looking at the values of the Fischer’s
discriminant coefficients in Table 5.4.5, the variable which most contribute to the
discrimination of Hungarian counties is p.c. GDP.
Table 5.4.5: Standardized canonical discriminant function coefficient
Function
1
Recipients of social support (%) 1.137
Density -1.249
GDP Hung=100 1.784
Work time <50% on total holders -1.281
Value of production, million HUF -.268
Significant Wilks’ Lambda for the discriminant function and Chi-square p-value allows
rejecting  the  hypothesis  of  equality  in  the  groups’  means.  From the  DA,  all  the  counties
emerged as rightly classified (Table 5.4.6), confirming the results of the previous Cluster
Analyses. Then, we can assume that the variables identified through the Principal
Components Analyses and the backward regressions are important for determining the
classification of Hungarian counties in urban or rural.
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Table 5.4.6: Classification of results
Predicted Group Membership
Rurality Urb Rur Total
Urb 3 0 3County
Rur 0 17 17
Urb 100       .0 100
Original
%
Rur .0 100 100
a. 100% of original grouped cases correctly classified.
5.5 Discussion of results
The analysis of the changes that occurred in the Hungarian rural counties between 2003 and
2007 presented here follows a previous one conducted on all twenty counties, including the
urban ones (Monasterolo et al., 2011). Analysis conducted on the whole Hungarian territory
evidenced the following changes between 2003 and 2007:
- a decrease in the importance of the components linked to: economic development (positive
values recorded for population density and p.c. GDP, net earnings, university education,
employment in services);
- an increased social and industrial decline (positive values for unemployment, recipients of
social support, and high employment rate in the public administration);
- increased role of agriculture (full-time employment in the primary sector, small farms).
At the same time, the Cluster Analyses showed:
- the move from the secondary sector to agriculture in some counties (Zala and Győr-Moson-
Sopron), without improvements in the economic performance and living conditions;
- diffusion of phenomenon of marginalization in the counties that are already lagging behind
(Nógrád, Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg).
Therefore, this analysis confirmed the presence of winning and losing regions from the
enlargement: the former group is represented by Budapest (able to attract initiatives in the
tertiary sector and finance) and the Western border (a specialized centre for industrial
production), while in the Eastern peripheries the socio-economic situation worsened, together
with agricultural productivity after the land reform.
The PCA and CA analysis made on Hungarian prevalently and intermediate rural counties,
shows, partially, similar results. In fact, between 2003 and 2007:
- greater importance is held in the component of rurality (recipients of social support,
dependency ratio, employment in PA and in the primary sector; unemployment; small
farms);
- the only component related to economic performance in 2003 (population density
and population change; p.c. GDP and net earnings; employment in services, value of
industrial production and university students) disappears in 2007;
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- a greater role is  played by agriculture, with both positive (agricultural productivity)
and negative (lagging agriculture) features;
- components of economic diversification have a residual importance.
Cluster Analysis for 2003 highlighted the role of rurality, both in its positive (C. 2 Potential
rurality) and negative features (C.1 Rurality, C.5 Backwardness). Moreover, a clear
distinction emerged between counties characterized by agricultural (C.4 Agricultural activity)
or manufacturing activities (C. 3 Manufacturing sector).
Instead, Cluster Analysis for 2007 evidenced the features of declining rurality (C. 1 Lagging
rurality, C. 4 Backward), and the decision to diversify activity (C.5 Diversification) in several
counties previously interested by manufacturing and agriculture (ex. C. 3 and C.4).
The counties of Vezprém (Central Transdanubia Region), Vas and Zala (Western
Transdanubia  Region)  for  example,  in  2003  belonged  to  cluster  3,  characterized  by
manufacturing activities and the secondary sector. Instead, in 2007 the role of the secondary
sector in GDP and employment decreased (-7% ,  -9%), as well  as p.c.  GDP (-10%), while
employment in the primary sector, its contribution to GDP and agricultural productivity
increased (+ 111%, +22%, +57%). The number of recipients of social support doubled and
the long-term unemployment rate increased by 42%.
The county of Heves, included in the cluster Backwardness with Nógrád in 2003, in 2007
joins the cluster Diversification: land price doubled, the amount of tourist  accommodations
increased (+6%, +5.7%), as well as temporary immigration (+28%) and employment in the
primary sector (+32%), but not its role on GDP (-34%). Investments in R&D grew by 55%
and the value of industrial production increased by 88%.
In the same period, the county of Hajdú Bihar moved from the Agricultural activity cluster to
the  Lagging  rurality  cluster.  The  number  of  recipients  of  social  support  and  long-term
unemployment increased (+40%, +112%) while p.c. GDP and employment rate decreased (-
7%, -3%). Employment in the primary sector and in PA increased (+32%, +3%), similarly to
the  part-time  agriculture  (+10%)  and  t  the  average  farm  size  (+22%).  Employment  in  the
secondary sector and its role on GDP dropped (-11%, -17%).
Finally, Nógrád confirmed in 2007 its position as county most lagging behind: p.c. GDP and
employment in the secondary sector decreased (-17%, -4.2%), while the number of recipients
of social support, the ageing index and long term unemployment increased (+43.4%, +12%
and +31%).
Some variables play a very important role in the characterization of clusters and their
description, both for the years 2003 and 2007, and they are mainly linked to employment,
living conditions, and to the primary sector (Table 5.5.1).
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Fejér 0.6 1.4 44.9 47.9 -3.4 109.2 1.5 -7.2 10.0 1.8




-6.1 1.8 68.2 40.5 2.2 17.5 -1.7 -17.7 10.1 16.3
Vas -11.8 2.2 83.5 40.5 -4.0 89.6 -7.7 66.3 -14.0 13.9
Zala -13.9 -0.2 115.5 40.5 5.3 122.0 -14.8 -6.2 -8.3 19.0




3.7 1.3 19.7 31.0 1.4 102.2 2.4 -22.2 15.4 3.7
Heves -2.3 2.1 42.1 31.0 -2.3 32.1 1.0 -34.4 11.6 4.6




-7.1 -0.5 38.8 111.9 -0.7 16.8 -4.7 -11.6 5.8 2.7
Somogy -12.1 1.2 75.2 23.4 -10.4 70.0 -5.3 0.2 -7.9 14.3
Tolna -2.7 1.4 62.0 23.4 -4.1 55.2 2.2 1.5 12.6 7.5
Hajdú-
Bihar




-2.1 0.0 65.8 111.9 0.2 113.1 -7.4 20.2 3.7 14.2
Bács-
Kiskun
-3.1 -0.5 73.3 35.6 -2.2 21.2 -9.7 -14.2 4.8 5.5
Békés -6.8 -0.7 59.2 35.6 5.5 30.6 -12.9 21.1 -3.1 13.8
Csongrád -4.9 0.9 77.0 35.6 7.9 17.5 -12.3 11.9 5.1 10.2
The extent of variation in the living conditions between the Hungarian rural counties,
for 2003 and 2007, is provided by the calculation of the coefficient of variation (COV)
in Table 5.5.2. The rationale is that the lower the COV, the smaller is the difference in
the values between counties, and therefore the more similar are the counties with respect
to that indicator. Some of the indicators are relative measures (e.g. participation rate,
unemployment rate); the most are absolute measures (e.g. number of pharmacies,
television contracts).
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Table 5.5.2: Coefficient of Variation for living conditions between the Hungarian
counties (NUTS 3)
2003 2007
Average monthly net earnings, HUF 10 9
Value investments, million HUF 171 191
Number of pharmacies 71 74
Number of retail shops 72 77
Number hospital beds 108 103
Monthly gas consumption per household member 17 17
Electricity consumption per household consumer 10 10
Cinema admissions (.000) 241 247
Number of television contracts 106 100
Dwellings stock 78 79
Tourist arrivals 200 181
Passenger cars 89 83
Number of shopping centres 234 180
Number of registered enterprises 116 114
Recipients of jobseekers allowance 36 45
Employment rate (%) 9 10
Inactive population (.000) 62 62
Participation rate (%) 8 7
Average recipients of social assistance 110 93
Number of pensioners 66 65
People with tertiary education 75 75
Unemployment rate 31 39
Source: own elaborations on HCSO data
In 2003, the highest differences between counties occurred in relation to cinema
admissions and the number of shopping centres, while the lowest was detained by the
participation rate and the employment rate. In 2007, the highest dispersion occurred
again for cinema admissions, followed this time by the value of investments and the
number of tourist arrivals, while the lower variation was recorded again for the
participation rate. Between 2003 and 2007, the COV decreases in relation to the number
of hospital beds, the number of tourist arrivals and shopping centre, but it increases for
the number of recipients of jobseekers allowance and for the unemployment rate.  It  is
interesting to note that, even if the analysis is conducted on all the Hungarian counties
including the capital town Budapest, where the average living conditions are better than
in the rest of the country, the value of dispersion in the average monthly salary and in
the electricity consumption is very low in the years considered.
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CONCLUSIONS
In seed time learn, in harvest teach, in winter enjoy.
W. Blake
The transition process first, and the EU Eastern enlargement later, were accompanied by
fears and great expectations: the former ones fully realized (inequality and poverty
spread, and the economy didn’t stabilize), while the latter ones were unattended. The
analysis of the transition process in the CEEc and in the FSU, and the preliminary
assessment of the EU enlargement for Hungary show that, in order to be effective in the
medium to long term, the reform policies need to be targeted to the local reality for
which they are prescribed. Moreover, they should follow a clear path in which the
consequentiality of interventions matters, and they require be monitoring and evaluating
through the years, according to a set of accountable and timely updated indicators. In
both processes, the “one fits all” solutions introduced through a top-down approach for
policy transfer via emulation, according to the prescriptions of the neoclassical models,
didn’t return the awaited results. Instead, they even threatened the future development
process.  In  fact,  at  the  time  of  the  EU  membership  in  2004,  after  fifteen  years  of
external support, in Hungary several problems remained unsolved, especially in the
agricultural and rural areas.
The analysis of the Hungarian case study provides preliminary interesting evidence on
the  effects  of  the  external  policy  advices  and  governmental  choices  on  the  promising
initial results of the first years of transition, addressing the characteristic of the growth
path followed by the Hungarian counties, and the CAP contribution to convergence.
The limitations of official statistics, especially at disaggregated level, influenced the
choice for methodologies (mainly multivariate statistics and non-parametric models)
and the time series used.
In Hungary, the policies introduced in the EU pre-accession period (1997-2003) and in
the first programming period (2004-2007) were not able to boost convergence within
the  country;  the  initial  p.c.  GDP  growth  slowed  down  after  the  EU  membership,  in  a
period characterized by expansive economy on the international markets. The non-
parametric convergence analysis performed on p.c. GDP PPS applying the Quah’s
stochastic kernel shows clear polarization: a small group of counties (NUTS 3) headed
by Budapest grows fast, while the other, largest group mainly composed by the rural
and less developed counties, tend to converge internally at lower income levels.
Moreover, the CAP introduction, which was accompanied by hearty discussions in the
EU about the budget redistribution to the NMS, played a limited role for the
development of the Hungarian agricultural and rural counties, because of the low
measures ability to target the peculiarities and needs of the most agricultural and rural
counties. In fact, the non-parametric convergence analysis conditioned to the SAPS
direct payments (the first data available on from the Hungarian national Payment
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Agency)  shows  that  the  marginal  distribution  of  p.c.  GDP  PPS  conditioned  to  direct
payments is very similar to the unconditioned ones for the same years (2004 and 2008).
The analysis of the Hungarian farmers’ applications for SAPS payments evidenced that
the CAP introduction was accompanied by inequality issues, low information provided
to farmers by the national agencies, and a lack of measures targeting, as the main
beneficiaries resulted the bigger farms located in economically active counties. Thus,
the CAP support was not able to set a strong foundation for the structural transformation
required in the agricultural and rural areas, decreasing the internal divergence and the
development gap. Moreover, even if the most of the CAP support was directed to pillar
I in order to promote modernization and competiveness of the agri-food sector, it had
only a limited impact on the promotion of agricultural productivity. Convergence in
agricultural labour productivity among the Hungarian counties between 2000 and 2007,
calculated with a parametric methodology (σ-convergence) due to the lack of time
series, didn’t occur: Budapest (an urban county) showed the best performance, while the
weakest growth in agricultural labour productivity was recorded by the most lagging
behind and rural counties (Nόgrád, Heves, Borsod).
Sometimes, the CAP introduction in the NMS stressed the problems emerged in
transition: this is the case of the Hungarian diary, animal production and horticultural
sectors,  which  were  not  able  to  successfully  restructure  and  organize  the  food  chain.
Even in the case of successful sectors, as crops production, two main features of the
Hungarian agriculture can be highlighted: the persistence of subsistence and semi-
subsistence agriculture, and the problems linked to small farmers’ poverty and social
exclusion in remote rural areas.
These results were deeply influenced by the limited knowledge of agricultural and rural
areas for which the intervention was prescribed, because of the limited data availability
and accountability at a sub-regional level, and the lack of a common definition of
rurality at the EU level. The currently most used area classification methodology,
provided by OECD and based on population density, widely misreports the presence of
rurality within the countries, thus preventing from the identification of their
development bottlenecks. The adoption of an alternative classification, which moves
from the adjusted rurality methodology and enriches it with meaningful socio-economic
demographic agricultural variables, available yearly at the NUTS 3 level, allows us to
catch the changing characteristics of agricultural and rural areas, creating a basis for the
introduction of more targeted policies. Its application to the Hungarian rural counties
before the EU membership (2003) and after the end of the first EU programming period
(2007), provides a better identification of the changes occurred at the local level. Ten
Hungarian counties up to twenty were classified as intermediate rural, and the
remaining seven as predominantly rural. The previous author’s study on all the Hungarian
counties for the same period 2003-2007 evidenced the decline of the industrial sector and an
increased role of agriculture. The analysis conducted on rural counties partially confirms it:
the declining role of industry is true also on the Western border (Vas, Zala, Veszprém)
previously characterized by growing secondary and tertiary sectors, and low productive
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agriculture is expanding, particularly in Eastern Hungary (i.e. Hajdú-Bihar). At the same time,
natural and cultural attractiveness of the Southern counties could be better valorised, thanks to
the presence of young and skilled people, and the increased role of the tertiary sector. Then,
marginalization increased in the already worse off counties located in the Northern Great
Plain and in Northern Hungary (Nógrád in particular).
A  serious  limit  for  the  application  of  policy  impact  analysis  is  represented  by  the  lack  of
accountable, disaggregated, and periodically updated data on farm performance, on the socio-
economic trends and the new CAP objectives. These data, together with an easier access to
the information collected by the national paying agencies, at the regional and sub-regional
level, would contribute to assess the EU role (if any). Given these statistical limitations, future
RD policy evaluations could return better results if conducted using a “mixed approach”
moving from the methodology proposed by Terluin et al. (2011), which integrate quantitative
analysis into the case-study approach. Analysis of data through multivariate methodologies
offers results that are easy to be read and to be interpreted by policy makers involved in policy
drafting and implementation, and by project managers.  In this way, it  would be possible to
overcome the complexity of interpretation of the rural development measures and indicators
proposed by the EU within the CMEF. This point fulfils the need, also recognized by the EC,
to better communicate and disseminate results from RD monitoring and evaluation, and for
the introduction of more targeted policies.
The CAP reforms implemented in the last decade were based on decoupling support from
production, they paid higher attention to the agri-environmental conditions, and they also
introduced an innovative approach in the RDP, especially in policy drafting and evaluation.
By the way, while the inequality in CAP payments in favour of pillar I and the limited
planning and managing abilities of the national institutions and authorities persisted, the living
conditions in rural areas didn’t improve considerably, as evidenced by the EC in 2010 (the
European Year for Combating Poverty and Social Exclusion).
At the same time, the new CAP regulation for 2014-2020 presented in October 2011
doesn’t contemplate main changes in the rationale for support, and in budget
distribution between the two pillars which remains mostly unchanged. The persisting
inequality in CAP payments between the two pillars and between the EU-27 (in favour
of the stronger ones) is linked to another historical CAP feature, the lack of
transparency. In fact, more transparency at all the policy making levels, from a wider
stakeholders’ participation to the agenda of policy reforms to higher data availability
and comparability, would pave the way for the introduction of an epochal CAP reform,
finally able to contribute effectively to a balanced and fruitful development path in the
enlarged  EU of  the  future.  In  fact,  agricultural  and  rural  areas  play  a  main  role  in  the
current international challenges with regard to climate change, food safety and food
security, resource constraints and poverty reduction.
In particular:
- the increasing urbanization trend (Antrop, 2004; FAO, 2010; Zasada, 2011)
redefines the urban, peri-urban and rural geography, affecting the agriculture,
socio-economic, environmental and landscape system of relationships. The
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expansion of urban areas in Europe, and the change of citizens’ consumption
preferences towards local and fresh food, induce changes in the food production
(an important share of agricultural activities now takes place in highly urbanized
settings), and promote the development of technological and organizational
innovation. In fact, more and more urban consumers and producers actively
involve through networking in new forms of sustainable food chains, i.e. the
short food supply chain (Chiffoleau, 2009; Dubuisson-Quellier et al., 2011),
setting up local consumptions groups, farmer markets and urban areas for
horticulture. The information is fast shared through social networks that connect
consumers and producers, and make consumers aware of the product origin,
traceability and the production process;
- growing attention is paid by citizens in the preservation of public goods and
quality of life, both in urban areas (i.e. greening the cities) and in peri-urban and
rural areas, which are not considered only as commuting areas, but also enjoyed
for their recreational (parks, nature) and eno-gastronic routes, agro-tourisms and
traditional attractiveness (organic farming, didactic farms);
- this new consumers-producers relationship develops in the awareness of the
current  constraints  to  the  use  of  natural  resources  (e.g.  land  and  water)  and  the
need to face the environmental challenge, supporting innovative sustainable
production and consumption solutions (less invasive fertilizers, containment of
GHG, waste reutilization and recycling). Urban and peri-urban agriculture,
through both technological and social innovation, can play an important role in
mitigating climate change (Nauta et al., 1999; Prins et al., 2005) through nutrient
recycling, waste reuse, sustainable income development opportunities, helping
the adaptation to climate change, and building more resilient urban areas.
Thus, a more comprehensive framework of targeted cohesion, structural, agricultural
and rural development policies, based on a deeper knowledge of the local reality waits
to be promoted and implemented, moving from the lessons learnt derived from sounder
policy evaluation. This new integrated approach would spur convergence of lagging
behind and declining rural and peri-urban areas, contributing to the promotion of better
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